Motivational and neuromodulatory influences on proactive and reactive cognitive control by Schevernels, Hanne
 
 
 
 
 
MOTIVATIONAL AND NEUROMODULATORY INFLUENCES  
ON PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE COGNITIVE CONTROL 
 
 
 
 
Hanne Schevernels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promotor: Prof. Dr. C. Nico Boehler 
Copromotor: Prof. Dr. Patrick Santens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift ingediend tot het behalen van de academische graad 
van Doctor in de Psychologie 
 
 
 
 
2015 



 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 13 
What is under control?  Refining the concept control 14 
Reactive and proactive control 14 
Structural and neuromodulatory systems involved in control 15 
An example: proactive and reactive inhibitory control 16 
Why is it under control?  The role of motivation 18 
Neural basis of reward processing 19 
Reward and effort 20 
Motivation triggers cognitive control 22 
When is it under control?  Using event-related potentials 25 
Outline of the present dissertation 27 
References 32 
CHAPTER 2 TASK PREPARATION PROCESSES RELATED TO REWARD 
PREDICTION PRECEDE THOSE RELATED TO TASK-DIFFICULTY 
EXPECTATION  45 
Introduction 46 
Materials and Methods 50 
Participants 50 
Stimuli and procedure 50 
EEG acquisition and preprocessing 53 
EEG analyses 54 
Results 56 
Behavioral results 56 
ERP results: cue-locked 58 
ERP results: target-locked and feedback-locked 62 
Discussion 64 
Conclusions 71 
Acknowledgements 72 
References 73 
6     CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 3 PREPARING FOR (VALENCED) ACTION – THE ROLE OF 
DIFFERENTIAL EFFORT IN THE ORTHOGONALIZED  
GO/NO-GO TASK 83 
Introduction 84 
Materials & methods 88 
Participants 88 
Paradigm 88 
EEG acquisition and preprocessing 92 
Data analysis 93 
Results 95 
Behavior 95 
ERPs 96 
Discussion 101 
Main effects of action and effort anticipation 101 
Effects of valence and interaction effects 106 
Conclusions 108 
References 109 
CHAPTER 4 ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE CONTROL IN A 
REWARDED STOP-SIGNAL TASK 121 
Introduction 122 
Materials & methods 127 
Participants 127 
Stimuli and procedure 127 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 130 
Analyses 134 
Results 137 
Behavior 137 
Event-related Potentials 138 
Discussion 143 
Reward effects on response inhibition 144 
The role of reward in visual processing of the stop stimulus 148 
Context effects 151 
Conclusion 152 
Acknowledgments 154 
References 155 
CONTENTS   7 
CHAPTER 5 THE EFFECT OF VAGUS NERVE STIMULATION ON 
RESPONSE INHIBITON 165 
Introduction 166 
Materials & methods 170 
Participants 170 
VNS apparatus 171 
Stimuli and procedure 171 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 173 
Statistical analyses 175 
Results 177 
Behavior 177 
Event-related Potentials 179 
Discussion 181 
Conclusion 186 
Acknowledgements 187 
References 188 
Appendix I 198 
CHAPTER 6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 199 
Results: an overview 199 
Mental preparation as an important proactive control function 199 
Neuromodulatory and reward influences in reactive control 202 
Theoretical implications and discussion 205 
The anticipation of cognitive and physical effort 205 
Reward and punishment as motivators 207 
The direction of the link between reward and effort 209 
Electrophysiology in the stop-signal task 212 
Clinical implications 214 
Future research 216 
Conclusion 217 
References 218 
CHAPTER 7 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 231 
Introductie 231 
Empirische studies 234 
Algemene discussie 239 
Conclusie 242 
Referenties 243 
8     CONTENTS 
APPENDIX DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 249 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Na bijna 4 jaar is het dan zover en heb ik een doctoraatsthesis 
geschreven. Het voelt nog steeds een beetje onwerkelijk, het is allemaal zo 
snel gegaan. Zoals gewoonlijk had ik nooit gedacht dat ik dit zou kunnen 
verwezenlijken en dat was ook niet het geval geweest zonder de steun van 
een groot aantal personen. Bij deze wil ik dus even de tijd nemen om deze 
mensen nadrukkelijk te bedanken.  
First and foremost, there is honestly no one I have to thank more than 
my supervisor, Nico Boehler. Since you were just appointed at the 
department as a professor when I graduated, I only met you when I applied 
for this PhD position. Hence, I did not know what to expect and apparently 
neither did you because I was your first PhD student. After almost 4 years I 
can say that I was really lucky to have you as my promotor. You were there 
to help me whenever I needed it and emails were replied to within 5 minutes 
– usually 5 seconds (still don’t know how you do that)! Talking to you 
would always inspire me to consider ideas and ways that I would have never 
thought of, I really learned so much from you in these 4 years. Moreover, 
interacting with you was never boring because you would always come up 
with some joke or story, even when discussing serious work (which 
sometimes would make me forget what we were talking about). You are 
really an excellent mentor and a great person, without you this dissertation 
wouldn’t have been possible! 
Verder wens ik ook mijn co-promotor Patrick Santens te vermelden. 
Ik herinner mij nog goed hoe ik enkele consultaties bij u heb kunnen 
meevolgen, wat voor mij zeker een verrijkende ervaring was. Bovendien 
hebt u altijd de tijd genomen om mij op de hoogte te brengen wanneer 
10     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
patiënten in aanmerking kwamen voor mijn studies (nadat u hen overtuigd 
had om deel te nemen). Hoewel het gelukkig niet al te vaak gebeurde, was u 
ook steeds bereid om mij te komen helpen indien zich problemen voordeden 
tijdens het testen. Ook de andere leden van mijn begeleidingscommissie, 
Wim Fias en Dirk Van Roost, wil ik graag  bedanken voor hun 
constructieve bijdrage tijdens onze jaarlijkse vergaderingen. Hoewel ik 
tijdens onze eerste vergadering nogal nerveus was, werd het al snel duidelijk 
dat jullie enkel feedback leverden in de meest positieve zin. 
 Er nog een aantal mensen waarmee ik graag heb samengewerkt en zo 
bijgedragen hebben aan dit proefschrift. Ruth, you helped me so much when 
I just started, especially with the set-up of my first experiment. You are such 
a nice person and I really think you’re a great scientist/professor! Klaas, ik 
ben heel blij dat ik de laatste twee jaar een bureau met jou heb mogen delen. 
Het was altijd fijn om samen EEG af te nemen (arme proefpersonen...) en 
tussen het werk door wat praatjes of mopjes te maken. Ik vind het 
opmerkelijk dat je altijd (echt altijd) bereid bent om anderen, inclusief 
mezelf, te helpen (zelfs met het nalezen van dit doctoraat). Liesbet, het was 
fijn om met jou te kunnen samenwerken en frustraties omtrent het 
analyzeren van EEG data te kunnen delen. Leen, bedankt voor alle hulp bij 
het verzamelen van de patiëntendata, zonder jou was dit nooit gelukt.  
Er zijn uiteraard ook heel wat mensen die me voornamelijk mentaal 
hebben gesteund gedurende deze vier jaar en hierdoor ook onrechtstreeks 
hebben bijgedragen aan deze thesis. De belangrijkste daarvan is uiteraard 
mijn steun en toeverlaat Hans-Lode. Op jou kan ik onvoorwaardelijk 
rekenen en je hebt me dan ook 100% gesteund bij het afwerken van dit 
doctoraat. Je had deze laatste weken niet enkel te maken met een gestresste 
vriendin, maar je moest ook nog eens het hele huishouden op je nemen (wat 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS     11 
je zelfs zonder -veel- klagen deed). Je bent er al zo lang voor mij, bedankt 
voor alles! Allerliefste mama en papa, jullie hebben me altijd 
onvoorwaardelijk gesteund in alles wat ik doe. Jullie zijn betrokken op alle 
aspecten van mijn leven en staan altijd voor me klaar. Ik vind het zo moeilijk 
om jullie snel te bedanken hier aangezien woorden (en zeker enkele zinnen) 
eigenlijk te kort schieten voor alles wat jullie al voor mij hebben gedaan, 
jullie zijn echt de allerbeste ouders die ik me maar had kunnen wensen! Ook 
mijn zus Anouk heeft me in deze 4 jaar altijd gesteund en gezorgd voor 
leuke afleidingen, waaronder het beste cadeau: suikertantekindje Cas! 
Natuurlijk kan jij hier niet ontbreken, Uschi. Straks zijn we al twee 
keer samen afgestudeerd, ik ben zo blij dat we ook dit weer samen hebben 
kunnen doen. Ik heb al het meeste plezier met jou beleefd, je kan me altijd 
weer laten lachen en je hebt zo’n belangrijke plaats in mijn leven en hart! 
Hanna, ook van jouw gezelschap heb ik ontzettend genoten niet alleen op 
maar ook naast het werk. De leuke etentjes bij jou (en Uschi) thuis kan ik 
niet meer op één hand tellen (en de keren dat je saus op mijn kleren of de 
grond gooide ook niet). Iemke, fijn dat je na mijn stage opnieuw mijn 
collega werd, en niet alleen dat, je bent ook zo een lieve vriendin geweest 
waarbij ik altijd terecht kon. Limburg represent!  Eowyn, ook al ben je iets 
later op de vakgroep toegekomen, ik had je onmiddellijk graag en ik heb al 
zoveel gelachen samen met jou! Bedankt voor de bemoedigende berichtjes 
tijdens het afwerken van mijn doctoraat en het feestvieren erna. Ook met jou 
erbij, Aster, was het altijd supergezellig! Eliana, although we worked on 
similar topics we usually had so much other stuff to talk about and I was just 
having such a great time with you that it just almost never came up (hot 
potato!). Kerensa, zo fijn dat ik in de laatste weken tijdens die late uren op 
het werk jou nog had! Also, I would like to thank my previous office 
12     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
buddies, Bart and Anand, although I had to witness long conversations 
about superheroes, I did enjoy your company a lot. Ook bedankt aan alle 
andere collega’s en vrienden (en Michael) die mij hebben gesteund tijdens 
het schrijven van dit doctoraat en er mee voor hebben gezorgd dat ik op het 
werk en daarbuiten een ontzettend leuke tijd heb beleefd.  
Tenslotte wens ik ook nog de Universiteit Gent en alle mensen te 
bedanken die aan mijn studies hebben deelgenomen, zonder hen zou dit 
onderzoek onmogelijk zijn geweest.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Goals transform a random walk into a chase.”  
Mihaly Csikzentmihalyi 
 
 
Imagine you are on your way to an important job interview (or a PhD 
defense) which you obviously don’t want to be late for. Of course it turns out 
that the road you wanted to take is blocked. Chances are that you will not 
wait until the situation is resolved and you decide to take a different route. 
This is an example of how in daily life we need to be able to flexibly adapt 
our behavior to environmental changes while keeping our internal goals in 
mind. In psychology this capability has been referred to as cognitive control. 
Hence, cognitive control is a very broad concept that involves a large scope 
of executive processes like updating and maintaining task goals, attention, 
working memory, response inhibition and performance monitoring. These 
control-related functions are thought to mainly rely on processes in 
prefrontal brain areas (Miller, 2000) and cognitive control has usually been 
seen as a higher-order voluntary process (Miller & Wallis, 2009). Although 
they have been largely studied separately for a long time, today the 
importance of motivation in cognitive control has generally been recognized 
(Botvinick & Braver, 2014). Motivation can trigger control in the sense that 
goals are prioritized in function of the value of their outcome. For example, 
you might be particularly eager to get to that job interview (in time) because 
this new job would considerably increase your salary. In the current 
dissertation we aim at investigating the underlying processes of different 
forms of control and their potential interaction with motivation. 
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WHAT IS UNDER CONTROL?  
REFINING THE CONCEPT CONTROL  
Reactive and proactive control 
In some situations cues can warn us about an upcoming event so that 
we can already optimize cognitive and motor systems to deal with it in a way 
that is consistent with our goals. For example, when riding a two-way bike 
lane and seeing another biker coming from the opposite direction, we can 
prepare to safely pass each other by keeping right and slowing down in order 
to continue our way. On the other hand, sometimes situations do not allow us 
to anticipate and thus we need to be able to immediately deal with the 
situation when it occurs. Coming back to our biking example, if we reach an 
intersection where the view is blocked and suddenly another biker is coming 
from that direction we have to hit the brakes instantly to avoid a crash. In the 
present work we distinguish these two forms of cognitive control, referring 
to the first as proactive control and the latter as reactive control (along the 
lines of the dual mechanism of control theory by Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 
2007). 
Proactive control supports the processing of and dealing with an 
upcoming event by active preparation. This could involve active rehearsing 
and maintaining task goals, changes in resource allocation and the 
implementation of general task strategies. Reactive control triggers task-
specific cognitive processes only when they are really needed and thus 
functions more as a late correction mechanism. Hence, one major difference 
between proactive and reactive control relates to the time of their 
involvement, i.e. when control processes are implemented. This temporal 
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separation also means that proactive and reactive control can interact to 
optimize behavioral performance and outcomes. 
Structural and neuromodulatory systems involved in control 
As previously stated, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is supposed to be 
critically involved in cognitive control (Miller, 2000). Yet, also other regions 
seem to be included, forming a network of cortical (e.g. PFC, anterior 
cingulate cortex, pre-supplementary and premotor cortex), and subcortical 
regions (like the insula, thalamus, caudate and putamen) that interact to 
implement control (e.g. Cole & Schneider, 2007; Niendam et al., 2012). 
More specifically, proactive cognitive control is thought to be mostly 
characterized by sustained brain activation in PFC, possibly driven and 
maintained by activity in the dopaminergic system (Boehler et al., 2011; 
Braver, 2012). In contrast, reactive control is believed to typically implicate 
late enhanced brain activation patterns that are specifically related to the 
actual performance of the task. Importantly, the dopaminergic system seems 
to be less involved in reactive control (at least concerning reactive control in 
a given situation rather than learning from it, which could also be considered 
a reactive form of control and features significant dopaminergic 
involvement, see e.g. Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). For instance, concerning 
neuromodulatory influences, response inhibition, which has been typically 
considered a reactive control function (see below), has been found to be 
mainly affected by the noradrenergic modulatory system and not the 
dopaminergic system (Bari et al., 2009; for an overview see Eagle et al., 
2008; but see Robertson et al., 2015). 
Although the points above suggest not only neurochemical but also 
structural difference between reactive and proactive control, we note that 
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during preparation also task-related brain regions have been found to be 
activated (e.g. Duque et al., 2012; Vink et al., 2015) as a function of 
proactive control. Moreover, dopaminergic regions have also been shown to 
be involve in reactive functions like performance monitoring, as evident 
from attenuated error negativities that reflect error processing (Falkenstein et 
al., 1991, 2000; Gehring et al., 1993) through a drug-induced increase in 
dopamine levels (for an overview see Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). Thus, 
although there could be some differences in the systems involved, the 
distinction between proactive and reaction control made here is mostly 
conceptual and to a lesser extent systematical. 
An example: proactive and reactive inhibitory control 
A central cognitive control function is response inhibition (Aron, 
2007; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), which is the ability to withhold a 
predominant or already-initiated motor action when it is not or no longer 
appropriate. One of the main paradigms that have been used to investigate 
this function (also in the current dissertation) is the stop-signal task. In this 
task subjects need to rapidly cancel a response when an infrequent stop 
signal occurs shortly after the presentation of a go stimulus (see figure 1). 
Whether inhibition is successful or not is thought to be defined by a race 
between a go process and a stop process that are triggered by the respective 
stimuli and for the most part proceed independently from each other (Logan 
& Cowan, 1984; Logan et al., 1984). Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) studies in humans using the stop-signal task have shown 
that response inhibition primarily involves activity in (pre)frontal regions 
(like the right inferior frontal gyrus and/or the pre-supplementary motor 
area) and in basal ganglia circuits (e.g. Aron et al., 2014; Aron & Poldrack, 
2006). 
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Typically, in the stop-signal task reactive inhibitory control is studied, 
implicating immediate stopping when the stop signal is observed, the 
occurrence of which cannot be predicted. The speed of this process is 
reflected by the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) which is a measure for 
how long it takes to inhibit a response from the moment the stop signal is 
presented (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Given that performance in the stop-
signal task depends on a race between going and stopping, successful 
inhibition can likely also be promoted by inserting control processes or 
strategies before the onset of the trial or stop signal that bias this race. This 
has been labeled as proactive inhibition (e.g. Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009) and one of its prime illustrations is proactive slowing in which 
responses are given more slowly in task contexts with a high probability of 
full response inhibition being necessary, likely relating to response 
thresholds being increased in order to improve successful stopping 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). Proactive response inhibition might be 
engaged via the use of knowledge about the upcoming event as indicated by 
cues or contextual information (Swann et al., 2013; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009). This means that proactive adjustments can be made flexibly between 
trials. This was shown in a previous study of Chikazoe et al. (2009) who 
found response slowing in go trials in which the color of the go stimuli 
indicated that stopping might be required compared to certain going. 
Moreover, imaging results implied that when a cue signals the need for 
inhibition, a typical stopping-related brain network is already activated 
thereby suggesting that stopping is being prepared (see also e.g. Vink et al., 
2014, 2015; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010; Zandbelt et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
inhibitory cognitive control can also be implemented in the span of several 
trials, which was demonstrated by the finding that the response threshold 
was increased in blocks with relevant stop-signals compared to blocks in 
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which stop signals can be ignored (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). Proactive 
and reactive inhibitory control do not need to be mutually exclusive and can 
even work together to reach optimal stopping performance. For example, 
Chikazoe et al. (2009) found that increased slowing (i.e. preparation cost) in 
go trials was correlated with decreased SSRTs and reduced reactive 
inhibitory control activity. 
 
Figure 1. Example of the stop-signal task. In the stop-signal task most trials are go 
trials in which subjects have to press a button (left or right) as fast as possible 
according to the direction of the go stimulus (‘>’). However, occasionally they have 
to suppress this response when the stop signal rapidly follows the presentation of the 
go stimulus. The stop signal is visual (‘V’) in the visual stop-signal task and 
auditory (a tone) in the auditory stop-signal task. 
WHY IS IT UNDER CONTROL?  
THE ROLE OF MOTIVATION  
‘What guides behavior?’ This is a question that has attracted a lot of 
attention over many years in different fields. Our everyday behavior can be 
driven by both intrinsic, e.g. internal goals, and extrinsic factors, e.g. reward 
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and punishment (see also the self-determination theory, Deci & Ryan, 1985). 
In the current work we focused on extrinsic motivators (mostly reward). 
People and other animals strive to increase positive outcomes like reward 
and decrease negative outcomes like punishment. Although we focus on 
monetary reward (and punishment) as motivators, we do not presume that 
results are restricted to reward and thus similar findings could be obtained by 
manipulating other types of motivators.  
Neural basis of reward processing 
Many years of research in humans and animals have successfully 
shown the significance of the dopaminergic neuromodulatory system in 
reward-related processes. Importantly, it was found that in monkeys 
dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) do not only fire 
when receiving a reward but also during reward prediction when a stimulus 
consistently precedes the reward (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994; Schultz, 
1998; Schultz et al., 1997, 1998). A similar involvement of the dopaminergic 
system in reward anticipation has been shown in humans, usually by fMRI 
studies that implemented a monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson et 
al., 2000). In this task a cue informs subjects whether correct performance in 
the upcoming trial will be rewarded/punished or not (see figure 2). 
Accordingly, when comparing neural activity during preparation when cues 
signal reward (or punishment) versus no-reward, mainly increased 
hemodynamic activation is observed in the ventral striatum and the 
dopaminergic midbrain (e.g. Knutson et al., 2000, 2005b; Knutson & 
Cooper, 2005a; Schott et al., 2008; Wittmann et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2. Example of the monetary incentive delay (MID) task. In the reward block 
of an MID task a cue indicates whether reward can be gained (here: blue circle = 
reward and green circle = no reward) in case a correct button is pressed within a 
certain time limit after the presentation of the target (black square). Accordingly, 
feedback informs subjects about the amount of money they won. 
Reward and effort 
In real life, reward is usually not the sole factor that is guiding 
behavior. Since reward is often not readily available, one also needs to take 
into account the amount of effort needed to obtain the valuable outcome or 
in general to achieve the goal. Effort can be related to either physical or 
mental effort and reflects the degree of engagement in a physically or 
mentally demanding task (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Given that cognitive 
control is a complex function, cognitive effort is bound to be involved in 
control processes when trying to reach a goal (e.g. Shenhav et al., 2013). 
In general, it is assumed that animals and humans tend to avoid 
effortful actions (Kool et al., 2010) and according to the effort-discounting 
principle the net value attached to a reward depends on the amount of effort 
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required, defining effort in terms of a cost. Specifically, if a reward can be 
obtained easily it is valued more than when it is only achieved through a lot 
of effort (see e.g. Botvinick et al., 2009; Westbrook et al., 2013). However, 
humans also have a tendency to engage in challenging tasks, for example to 
achieve long-term goals (Duckworth et al., 2007), and some people are 
inclined to do this more than others (need for cognition, see Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984, 1996). 
The dopaminergic system originating in the midbrain (from the 
substantia nigra pars compacta and the ventral tegmental area) and its main 
subcortical and cortical target areas like the striatum and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) have been supposed to play a key role in this link 
between reward and effort. As such, some studies have proposed that these 
regions encode the net value, i.e. the subjective value of reward in which 
effort is discounted from the reward, suggested by increased activation in 
these regions when anticipating/choosing less effortful performance in 
rewarded conditions (Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 2009). Yet, it has 
also been suggested that the dopaminergic system and the ACC are 
particularly implicated in overcoming effort costs to acquire a desired goal 
(Kurniawan et al., 2011). Moreover, in contrast to the discounting principle, 
studies have shown that similar regions (including the dopaminergic 
midbrain and ACC) are related to effortful motivated cognitive preparation 
with increased activity when preparing for a highly demanding task (e.g. 
Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Vassena et 
al., 2014).  
We note that usually in these previous studies effort is related to 
action execution and a Pavlovian link has been assumed between action and 
reward since humans and animals are more likely to engage in approach 
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behavior when being rewarded (or preparing for reward), in contrast to 
avoidance behavior when being punished (for evidence see Guitart-Masip et 
al., 2011, 2012b, 2014). Together these results imply a tight coupling 
between reward and effort when an action is (to be) performed. 
Motivation triggers cognitive control 
Typically reward has beneficial effects on a wide variety of cognitive 
functions. For example, reward seems to positively influence cognitive 
control indicated by improved task-switching (e.g. Umemoto & Holroyd, 
2014), working memory performance (e.g. Jimura et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 
2004), response inhibition (e.g. Boehler et al., 2012; Rosell-Negre et al., 
2014), goal-driven attentional control (e.g. Kiss et al., 2009; Padmala & 
Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010), and even memory formation 
(Wittmann et al., 2005, 2008). Moreover, these studies typically show that 
enhanced motivation is associated with increased activation in networks that 
underlie (task-specific) cognitive control functions (Boehler et al., 2014; 
Jimura et al., 2010; Pochon et al., 2002; Taylor et al., 2004) and thus it is 
likely that reward can trigger or energize boosted control in order to 
optimize performance and obtain goals (Kouneiher et al., 2009). 
Motivation and proactive control 
Reward is especially believed to promote a sustained proactive mode 
of cognitive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2007), in line with the 
observation that both motivation and proactive control implicate the 
dopaminergic system and dopamine release in the prefrontal cortex (see also 
Chiew & Braver, 2014). This hypothesis was supported by studies using the 
AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT) task in which subjects are 
instructed to press one button every time a probe (‘X’) is preceded by a 
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specific cue (‘A’) and another button for all other stimuli. This task involves 
several cognitive functions like goal representation, goal maintenance and 
sustained attention. In a proactive control state one would be primarily 
focused on the cue (‘A’), while in a reactive control state one would be 
rather attending the probe (‘X’) (Braver et al., 2009). In line with a proactive 
cognitive control mode, it was found that reward enhanced performance in 
‘AX’ trials while it had detrimental effects in ‘AY’ trials, in which the cue 
falsely led subjects to expect a probe (Locke & Braver, 2008; see also Strang 
& Pollak, 2014). Moreover, fMRI results displayed more sustained 
activation triggered by the cue in regions related to cognitive control in the 
reward context (Locke & Braver, 2008; Strang & Pollak, 2014).  
Given this link between proactive control and reward, motivational 
effects have mainly been shown in tasks using reward context (blocks) and 
cueing paradigms (e.g. Padmala et al., 2011; Pochon et al., 2002; Rosell-
Negre et al., 2014). As such, Jimura et al. (2010) observed that in a reward 
block, consisting of reward trials and no-reward trials, working memory 
performance was enhanced even (and particularly) for no-reward trials, 
which seemed to profit from the reward context. Sustained activation in the 
right lateral PFC confirmed that the reward context created a shift to a 
proactive control mode that influenced all trials (including no-reward trials). 
Along similar lines, Soutschek et al. (2014) showed that manipulating 
congruency expectancy in a Stroop task, which modulates proactive control, 
decreased the Stroop effect under low motivation but not in highly 
motivating conditions. This suggests that both factors influence the same 
proactive control processes and thus no additional advantage of congruency 
expectancy could be detected when subjects were highly motivated. Yet, 
motivation did not affect the level of conflict adaptation (i.e. reduced conflict 
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after incongruent trials), a form of reactive control adjustments. Hence, all 
these aforementioned results point in the direction of a large influence of 
motivation in (preparatory) proactive control processes.  
Motivation and reactive control 
In contrast to Soutschek et al. (2014), other researchers did detect 
motivational effects on reactive conflict adjustments. More specifically, it 
was usually observed in this line of research that conflict adaptation 
increased after reward feedback when contingent upon task performance 
(Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer et al., 2011; see also Braem et al., 2014). This 
might indicate increased attention to task-relevant information after conflict 
detection, possibly via the strengthening of associations (Braem et al., 2012). 
Moreover, in a number of studies by Krebs et al. (2010, 2011, 2013) it was 
shown that reward can also have an impact on control processes when the 
reward information is linked to a target feature instead of being cued, thus 
limiting the role of preparatory control. Here, interference was reduced when 
reward was associated to the task-relevant dimension (i.e. color of the word) 
of a target in a Stroop task, implicating enhanced reactive control processes 
as demonstrated by boosted activation in lateral prefrontal areas (Krebs et 
al., 2011). However, in case reward information was implicitly linked to the 
task-irrelevant dimension (i.e. word meaning, which itself was both task- and 
reward-irrelevant) interference was enhanced. These results suggest that 
reward information can influence attention thereby being able to both 
promote and hinder behavioral performance (Krebs et al., 2011, 2013; see 
also Anderson, 2013). Furthermore, Boehler et al. (2012, 2014) found that 
reward can improve response inhibition in a similar set-up, presumably via 
enhanced reactive control. To summarize, even though findings are less clear 
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and less numerous it seems that motivation can also influence reactive 
cognitive control in some situations. 
WHEN IS IT UNDER CONTROL?  
USING EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS 
In all of our studies we measured electrical brain activity from the 
surface of the scalp, i.e. an electroencephalography (EEG), while subjects 
performed a cognitive task. The EEG is mostly generated by the summation 
of synchronized post-synaptic activity in a large number of neurons in the 
brain (mainly the cortex). Importantly, electrical activity is measured with 
only a slight delay which is considered the main advantage of EEG. In case 
EEG signals are recorded while subjects perform a task, event-related 
potentials (ERPs) can be derived which represent neural activity time-locked 
to a certain event (e.g. a stimulus or response). Thus, related to this event 
several ERP components can be observed that reflect certain neurocognitive 
processes elicited by an event. The high temporal resolution of this 
technique allows us to identify exactly when activity occurs. This temporal 
precision was one of the key reasons to use EEG in our studies given that we 
generally discriminate proactive and reactive processes as a function of time. 
Hence, we can investigate proactive and reactive functions in the same task 
and establish possible interactions. For instance, we can examine both 
preparatory functions during cue-target intervals and task-related reactive 
processes evoked by the target.  
A component that has been used to investigate proactive control is the 
contingent negative variation (CNV) (e.g. Killikelly & Szűcs, 2013; van 
Wouwe et al., 2011; Vanderhasselt et al., 2014). This is a slow negative-
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going wave that is typically observed during cue-target intervals at 
frontocentral electrodes. The CNV starts to appear around 1 second before 
the (cued) presentation of a target stimulus and is supposed to reflect 
orienting towards and preparation for the upcoming target, including 
attentional and response preparation/readiness (Connor & Lang, 1969; 
Tecce, 1972; van Boxtel & Brunia, 1994). Many studies have established the 
role of the CNV in effortful cognitive preparation and top-down attentional 
orienting (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Falkenstein et al., 2003; Gómez et al., 
2007; Grent-’t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007; Rösler et al., 1997; Wild-Wall et al., 
2007).  
Proactive control might not only be reflected in cue-evoked 
preparatory potentials like the CNV, but also in target-evoked components 
like the sensory N1 that reflects (top-down guided) attentional processing of 
the related stimulus (Hopf et al., 2002; Luck et al., 1990; Vogel & Luck, 
2000). Before the start of each trial or block strategic adjustments can be 
made in line with a flexible control system. These proactive changes likely 
involve shifts in selective attention to stimuli that would result in 
fluctuations of the target-locked N1 amplitude. For example, in a magnetic 
electroencephalography (MEG) study of Boehler et al. (2009) using the stop-
signal task this idea was supported since they found that enhanced magnetic 
N1 amplitudes for go stimuli predicted facilitated action execution and 
increased stop-locked N1 amplitudes were associated with successful 
inhibition. Hence, it was suggested that the N1 component indexed dynamic 
adjustments in the strategic allocation of attentional resources. 
On the other hand, the N2 and/or P3 components (also label the N2/P3 
complex) in the go/no-go and stop-signal task have been typically thought to 
reflect reactive response inhibition (e.g., Bekker et al., 2005; Bokura et al., 
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2001; Eimer, 1993; Huster et al., 2011; Kok et al., 2004; Schmajuk et al., 
2006; van Gaal et al., 2011). Hence, reactive processes might be revealed by 
target-evoked ERP components that are typically related to the performance 
of the task. To conclude, EEG can be a powerful tool in distinguishing 
reactive and proactive processes and establishing a potential interaction. 
OUTLINE OF THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
In the current dissertation we aimed at defining processes underlying 
proactive and reactive control and the influence of motivation therein. Given 
the assumed fast temporal succession of different operations, we were 
particularly interested in the temporal dynamics of these processes, which is 
why all empirical chapters report studies using EEG.  
In the first two empirical chapters (CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3) we 
investigated an important function of proactive control: effortful cognitive 
preparation for the upcoming target. Given the strong link between proactive 
control and motivation, in CHAPTER 2 we examined whether reward 
influences preparation via top-down attention or whether the related 
processes can be temporally distinguishable. This work was based on a 
previous fMRI study of Krebs et al. (2012) in which the authors sought to 
determine distinct and shared brain regions in the anticipation of reward and 
task difficulty in a cued-attention paradigm. Importantly, besides some 
specific brain activation, expected value and task-difficulty evoked highly 
overlapping brain activity and an interaction was observed in dopaminergic 
regions with maximal activation for cues predicting difficult yet rewarding 
trials. Hence, a cortico-subcortical circuit and the dopaminergic system are 
supposed to interact to allocate additional resources in highly demanding 
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tasks when it is particularly worth the effort. Since the expectation of reward 
and task demands evoke similar brain activity, reward seems to act via 
strategic attention (for a discussion see also Maunsell, 2004). Yet, because of 
the low-temporal resolution of fMRI it is not known whether effects of 
attention and task-difficulty are triggered at the same point in time. Thus, we 
implemented the paradigm in an EEG setting and explored ERP components 
evoked by the cue (reflecting both early cue evaluation and later preparatory 
phases), target and feedback. We were mainly interested in the cue-evoked 
CNV since this component is supposed to reflect effortful cognitive 
preparation. This chapter indicated selective influences of reward in cue-
evaluation and preparatory processes that are temporally distinguishable 
from top-down attentional effects. Yet, they also seem to interact in a later 
preparation phase indicative of the integration of both factors. 
Given this significant role of reward (and the dopaminergic system) in 
effortful preparation, in CHAPTER 3 we tried to refine the interpretation of a 
series of recently-published studies employing an anticipated motivated 
orthogonalized go/no-go task (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012a, 2014). The 
goal of Guitart-Masip and colleagues was to test the Pavlovian hypothesis 
that reward is closely coupled to action execution while punishment engages 
avoidance or action inhibition. Hence, these authors designed a paradigm in 
which both action and valence were crossed during anticipation, resulting in 
four types of cues: go to win, go to avoid losing, no-go to win and no-go to 
avoid losing. In go trials subjects had to press a left or right button according 
to the location of a target circle on the screen, while subjects had to withhold 
a response in no-go trials. Behaviorally, results showed that performance in 
go trials was improved in reward compared to punishment conditions 
suggesting a link between action execution and reward. Surprisingly, using 
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fMRI they found increased activation in the typical ‘reward network’, like 
the striatum and dopaminergic SN/VTA regions, when preparing for action 
over inhibition, which was furthermore mostly independent from anticipated 
valence (reward or punishment). They concluded that these regions 
predominantly encode the anticipation of action execution rather than 
reward. However, as already noted, previous work of our group has shown 
that these dopaminergic regions are also implicated in the effortful control of 
resources during preparation (Krebs et al., 2012), even in the absence of 
reward or punishment (Boehler et al., 2011). Therefore, the difference in 
action-related activation during preparation in the dopaminergic midbrain 
that was indicated by Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a) might be explained 
by variations in cognitive preparatory effort. The study presented in 
CHAPTER 3 explores this hypothesis, again mainly via investigating 
modulations in CNV amplitude.  
These previous studies of Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a, 2014) 
also suggested a behavioral link between reward/dopamine and action 
execution and as described in the introduction (and established by the results 
of CHAPTER 2) motivation seems to enhance task performance mostly via 
proactive preparatory processes. However, it has been shown that action 
inhibition can also profit from reward, not only when reward information is 
cued (Rosell-Negre et al., 2014) but also in a non-cueing design without the 
engagement of global preparatory processes (Boehler et al., 2012). Boehler 
et al. (2012) found that when the color of a visual stop signal in the stop-
signal task signaled that correct stopping would be rewarded in the current 
trial, inhibition was improved (shorter SSRTs). In a follow-up fMRI study 
this positive reward effect was explained in terms of enhanced reactive 
control since increased activation in regions typically related to reactive 
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inhibition was observed in reward-related trials (Boehler et al., 2014). 
Although these results implied boosted reactive control, in CHAPTER 4 we 
investigated the possibility that latent proactive control processes might still 
contribute to the favorable impact of reward. Specifically, proactive control 
could be employed in the form of a sustained attentional proactive control 
mode induced by a reward context (Jimura et al., 2010; Locke & Braver, 
2008) and/or via a more selective proactive control process in which subjects 
strategically screened for the reward-related color. Accordingly, in 
CHAPTER 4 we conducted an ERP study in which subjects performed the 
rewarded stop-signal task (reward block) of Boehler et al. (2012, 2014), 
intermixing reward and no-reward trials, and an identical stop-signal task in 
which none of the trials were rewarded (no-reward block). This allowed us 
to establish the impact of reward on both proactive and reactive control 
functions in the stop-signal task.  
Although beneficial effects of reward on response inhibition could be 
related to changes in the dopaminergic neuromodulatory system, at least in 
task contexts that allow for enhanced proactive control, earlier research 
suggested that response inhibition itself is mainly modulated by the 
noradrenergic system. As such, people with attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) who are impaired in stopping performance (Lijffijt et al., 
2005; Murphy, 2002; Senderecka et al., 2012) generally show improved 
inhibition after administering medication that increases noradrenaline 
concentrations (Aron et al., 2003; Chamberlain et al., 2007; Overtoom et al., 
2003). Moreover, in healthy animals and humans particularly drugs that 
affect noradrenaline levels (like selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors) 
seemed to enhance action-cancellation abilities in the stop-signal task (Bari 
et al., 2009; Humby et al., 2013; Linssen et al., 2012; see also Eagle et al., 
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2008). Therefore, in CHAPTER 5 we tested whether vagus nerve stimulation 
(VNS) in epileptic patients would affect response inhibition, since VNS is 
thought to excite noradrenergic neurons in the locus coeruleus (Fornai et al., 
2011). Again surface ERPs were recorded in order to examine underlying 
brain processes. As indicated in the previous chapter and earlier studies 
(Bekker et al., 2005a, 2005b; Boehler et al., 2009), it seems that stopping 
performance might also depend on perceptual processes, like detecting the 
stop signal, which has been referred to as a proactive control function 
(Verbruggen et al., 2014). Hence, additional to stopping performance, the 
influence of VNS on these proactive sensory (N1) and reactive inhibitory 
(P3) processes was assessed in this chapter.  
In the last section of this dissertation, the GENERAL DISCUSSION, we 
provide an overview of the results and relate our findings to the existing 
literature. Subsequently, we discuss the generalizability and overall 
implications of these results. General strengths and weakness of our studies 
are mentioned and we suggest some future research ideas. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
TASK PREPARATION PROCESSES RELATED TO REWARD 
PREDICTION PRECEDE THOSE RELATED TO TASK-
DIFFICULTY EXPECTATION 1 
Recently, attempts have been made to disentangle the neural 
underpinnings of preparatory processes related to reward and attention. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research showed that neural 
activity related to the anticipation of reward and to attentional demands 
invokes neural activity patterns featuring large-scale overlap, along with 
some differences and interactions. Due to the limited temporal resolution of 
fMRI, however, the temporal dynamics of these processes remain unclear. 
Here, we report an event-related potentials (ERP) study in which cued 
attentional demands and reward prospect were combined in a factorial 
design. Results showed that reward prediction dominated early cue 
processing, as well as the early and later parts of the contingent negative 
variation (CNV) slow-wave ERP component that has been associated with 
task-preparation processes. Moreover these reward-related 
electrophysiological effects correlated across participants with response 
time speeding on reward-prospect trials. In contrast, cued attentional 
demands affected only the later part of the CNV, with the highest amplitudes 
following cues predicting high-difficulty potential-reward targets, thus 
suggesting maximal task preparation when the task requires it and entails 
reward prospect. Consequently, we suggest that task-preparation processes 
triggered by reward can arise earlier, and potentially more directly, than 
strategic top-down aspects of preparation based on attentional demands. 
  
                                                     
1 Schevernels, H., Krebs, R.  M., Santens, P., Woldorff, M. G., & Boehler, C. N. 
(2014). Task preparation processes related to reward prediction precede those related 
to task-difficulty expectation. NeuroImage, 84, 639–647. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyday human behavior is guided by internal states and objectives 
that interact with external factors. Central among these external influences 
are reward and reward prediction. The dopaminergic midbrain is known to 
play a critical role in these reward-related processes and to be central to 
reinforcement learning (e.g., Glimcher, 2011; Wise & Rompre, 1989). It has 
been shown that stimuli predicting the possibility to obtain a reward invoke 
neuronal activity that is similar to that triggered by the reward itself in both 
animal (e.g., Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994; Schultz et al., 1997) and human 
research (e.g., D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Knutson et 
al., 2005; Schott et al., 2008; Zaghloul et al., 2009). This process is believed 
to simultaneously energize cognitive and motor processes that may help to 
successfully obtain the reward (Salamone & Correa, 2012). Along such 
lines, the anticipation of reward has been shown to enhance a wide range of 
cognitive operations, including memory and novelty processing (e.g., 
Adcock et al., 2006; Krebs et al., 2009; Wittmann et al., 2005, 2008), 
perceptual discrimination (e.g., Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et 
al., 2009), cognitive flexibility (e.g., Aarts et al., 2010) and conflict 
resolution (e.g., Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Stürmer et al., 2011). 
Effects of reward and attention have largely been considered as 
distinct phenomena, and they therefore have been investigated mainly in 
separate fields. However, it has been pointed out that most studies are not 
able to distinguish direct reward effects from effects of voluntary attentional 
enhancement (Maunsell, 2004). Previous studies have shown that attention 
and reward clearly interact: visual attention is more efficient when 
conditions or stimuli are motivationally significant (Engelmann & Pessoa, 
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2007) and rewarded stimulus aspects draw more attention (Krebs et al., 
2010, 2013). These studies, however, have generally not been able to 
differentiate between more direct low-level influences of reward versus 
indirect strategic attentional effects, although some recent studies have 
shown that reward associations can have a direct impact on early stages of 
visual, cognitive, and oculomotor processes, without the mediation of 
strategic attention (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Hickey and van Zoest, 
2012; Hickey et al., 2010). These early-stage effects are thought to rely on 
the direct association between task-relevant stimulus features and reward, 
and hence do not reflect preparatory or strategic effects that require a cue-
target sequence. Baines et al. (2011), in turn, investigated the dynamics of 
spatial attention and motivation in an event-related-potentials (ERP) study, 
but also focused on effects of target processing. They showed that 
motivation and attention had early independent effects when visually 
processing the target stimulus, with interactions only arising later. 
Whereas the above studies thus tried to dissociate influences of reward 
and attention largely during target discrimination processes, the possible 
dissociations of attention and reward prospect during task preparation have 
received little attention so far. Yet, effective preparatory brain mechanisms 
can be crucial for successful task performance. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the dopaminergic system plays an important role in improving 
task performance mostly in proactive/preparatory contexts (Braver et al., 
2007). Importantly, the dopaminergic response that is typically related to 
reward anticipation is usually assumed to be only elicited by extrinsic factors 
(but see Salamone & Correa, 2012). However, in a recent paper by our group 
(Boehler et al., 2011) this idea was challenged. In this fMRI study, a visual 
discrimination task was performed in which a cue informed participants of 
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the task demands (high or low) for the upcoming trial. Despite the absence 
of reward or any other immediate extrinsic motivator, the dopaminergic 
midbrain showed enhanced activity for high compared to low task demands. 
Thus, anticipation of attentionally demanding tasks, independent of any 
extrinsic factor, can invoke neural processes that resemble the anticipation of 
reward, suggesting that the dopaminergic midbrain is more generally 
engaged in flexible resource allocation processes to meet situational 
requirements for which it can be recruited in different ways (see also 
Nieoullon, 2002; Salamone et al., 2005). 
To further investigate the overlap and distinctiveness of the neural 
networks related to reward-dependent and reward-independent recruitment 
of neural processing resources Krebs et al. (2012) systematically crossed 
reward and attentional demand prediction in a subsequent fMRI study. Both 
factors activated selective but also similar neural networks with mostly 
additive effects, but also interactions for some areas, including the 
dopaminergic midbrain, with maximal activity in response to cues that 
predicted difficult potential-reward trials. These findings were taken to 
support the view that the dopaminergic midbrain plays a role in a broader 
network that is involved in the control of neuro-cognitive processing 
resources to optimize behavior when it is particularly worthwhile. 
Importantly, the above task required attentional orienting and task 
preparation immediately in response to the cue, which sets it apart from 
typical neuroeconomic experiments that emphasize evaluative processes and 
have conceptualized task demands as costs that get discounted from the 
possible reward (Croxson et al., 2009; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). There 
are however important questions that cannot be addressed with fMRI 
because of the slow characteristics of the hemodynamic response. Most 
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importantly, studies using fMRI are not able to distinguish processing stages 
related to cue evaluation and task-preparation processes in general, as well 
as potential differences in the temporal dynamics of such processes related to 
the processing and anticipation of reward and task demands. The present 
study was performed to tackle these questions of timing by using ERPs in an 
adapted version of the study by Krebs et al. (2012). 
Our central aim was to systematically investigate how the prediction 
of attentional demands and reward availability is registered over time, and 
leads to adjustments in preparatory activity preceding the target stimulus 
onset. After the initial registration of the relevant features, we expected 
differential effects on neural markers of task preparation and attentional 
orienting. An ERP component that is particularly interesting in this regard is 
the contingent negative variation (CNV), which is a central slow negative 
brain wave that has been typically observed between a warning (cue) and 
imperative stimulus (target). This ERP wave has been shown to reflect the 
anticipation of or orienting to the upcoming stimulus and response 
preparation, and has been related to preparatory attention, motivation and 
response readiness (Grent-’t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007; Tecce, 1972; van 
Boxtel & Brunia, 1994; Walter et al., 1964). We expected that cue 
information about reward availability and task demands could lead to 
dissociations of processes related to the interpretation of the cue information 
and subsequent task preparation not only in amplitude but also in time. 
These two manipulations could start to influence brain processes at a 
different point in time, with reward effects potentially arising earlier since 
reward is known to be a salient stimulus feature that can even modify early 
visual processes directly (e.g., Hickey et al., 2010) and because a reward-
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predicting cue can become an inherently motivating stimulus (Bromberg-
Martin & Hikosaka, 2009; Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994).  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-two healthy right-handed participants with normal color 
vision participated in the present study (three male; mean age 20, range 18-
23). The study was approved by the local ethics board and written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki prior to participation. Participants were compensated at 15€ per 
hour plus an additional performance-based bonus between 4 and 8€. 
Stimuli and procedure 
The present experiment was based on an earlier fMRI study (Krebs et 
al., 2012), by using a very similar version of the paradigm with some 
adjustments related to electroencephalography (EEG) methodology (Fig. 1). 
A central gray fixation square (0.5°) and two placeholder frames, one in the 
left and right visual field (6° lateral from fixation and 6° below fixation), 
were continuously present on a black background throughout the 
experiment. Each trial started with a centrally presented arrow cue (400 ms 
duration) predicting the target location (left or right), as well as reward 
availability and task difficulty. With respect to reward likelihood, cue color 
was either green or blue, indicating whether a fast correct answer was going 
to be rewarded or not. In addition, white or black squares in the center of 
these arrows specified the difficulty (high or low) of the upcoming task trial. 
Colors predicting reward (green and blue) and task difficulty (white and 
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black) were counterbalanced across participants. To enable links to some 
earlier studies in this attentional-cueing field (e.g., Grent-’t-Jong & 
Woldorff, 2007), catch cues trials were also included (where the cue was 
gray upward-oriented arrows, enclosing a little dark gray square, indicating 
no target would follow); these trials were, however, ultimately not used for 
the present analysis. 
After a variable inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1100 ms to 1600 ms 
the target stimuli were presented in the placeholder frames for 100 ms, 
whereas catch cues were followed at that time point by another cue that 
started a new trial. Targets were gray circles (radius 1°), interrupted by two 
opposing gaps.The participants were asked to respond only to the covertly 
attended stimulus at the cued location, while ignoring the stimulus in the 
opposite hemifield, by indicating which gap was larger (index versus middle 
finger of the right hand for larger gap at the bottom versus the top, 
respectively). On low-difficulty trials, one of the gaps was clearly larger than 
the other, with gap angles of 90° versus 20°. On high-difficulty trials, the 
two gaps were more similar, with gap angles of 40° versus 20°, and were 
thus harder to discriminate. A response time-out was adjusted after every 
high-difficulty trial to obtain a constant ratio of 75% correct versus 25% 
error or missed trials thereby ensuring that the task was similarly difficult for 
all participants. This variable response time-out was used during task 
performance to adjust visual feedback. Yet, it was not applied when 
analyzing behavioral data and cue- and target-related ERPs.  
A feedback display was presented after a varying ISI of 900 to 1300 
ms. In potential-reward trials, four cents could be won or lost, indicated by a 
display above the standard fixation square of ‘+4’ after correct and fast 
responses and ‘-4’ after incorrect or too-slow responses. To preserve trial 
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structure similarity, in no-reward trials feedback comprised of a ‘+0’ or ‘-0’ 
for correct and incorrect/missed trials, respectively. The feedback stimulus 
was displayed for 400 ms, followed by an inter-trial interval of 600-1000 ms. 
Additionally, after each experimental run the total gained amount was 
presented. 
The participants started with a short practice run to get acquainted 
with the task. After practice, three runs of 200 trials each were performed. In 
every run, the factors of reward and task difficulty were crossed and shown 
in randomized order, resulting in 20 trials per condition (high-difficulty 
reward, low-difficulty reward, high-difficulty no-reward, low-difficulty no-
reward) per target side (left vs. right) plus 40 catch trials. This resulted in a 
total of 60 trials per active-attention condition (120 when combining data for 
left- and rightward cues), and 120 catch trials. The participants sat in a 
shielded room and were monitored with a camera. They were asked to sit in 
a relaxed position, limit blinking, and fixate on the fixation square 
throughout the task. In each run five 20-second breaks were inserted in 
which the participants could move and relax their eyes. 
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Figure 1. Paradigm. In active-attention trials cues indicated the target location 
(direction of arrow), availability of reward (color of arrow) and task difficulty (color 
of fixation square). After a variable ISI a target was presented and participants had 
to indicate whether the top or bottom gap was larger. Subsequent feedback indicated 
the amount of money won or lost (4 eurocents for reward trials or 0 eurocents for 
no-reward trials). 
 
EEG acquisition and preprocessing 
EEG activity was recorded with a Biosemi ActiveTwo measurement 
system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) using 64 Ag-AgCl scalp 
electrodes attached in an elastic cap, arranged according to the standard 
international 10-20 system. Four external electrodes were additionally 
attached to the head: left and right mastoids, which were used for later 
offline re-referencing to the average of these two channels, and a bilateral 
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electro-oculogram (EOG) electrode pair next to the outer canthi of the eyes 
referenced to each other to measure horizontal eye movements. Signals were 
amplified and digitized with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz.  
EEG data was processed using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
and the ERPLAB plugin (http://erpinfo.org/erplab), running on MATLAB. 
Trials with blink artifacts were corrected by independent component analysis 
(ICA). Epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the relevant stimulus 
(cue, target or feedback), including a 200 ms pre-stimulus period, that was 
used for baseline correction. The total time window of the epoched ERPs 
varied according to the kind of stimulus, with the post-stimulus length equal 
to the duration of the stimulus presentation plus the time window of the 
shortest ISI. Epochs with horizontal eye movements detected by a step 
function (with threshold 60μV and moving window of 400 ms in the bipolar 
EOG channel) were rejected. We also rejected trials with drifts larger than -
/+ 200 μV in any scalp electrodes. For cue-related data, this led to the 
rejection of 6% of epochs on average for the different cueing conditions, for 
which rejection rates were very similar (ranging from 5.6% to 7.2%). For the 
targets, on average 4.5% of the epochs were excluded, with minimal 
differences between conditions (range 4.2% to 4.8%). On average 5.6% of 
the correct feedback epochs were rejected, again with similar percentages for 
all conditions (ranging from 5.1% to 6.2%). Next, EEG epochs were 
averaged across participants according to the different conditions. 
EEG analyses  
Although we were mostly interested in the cue phase activity, ERP 
responses to the target and feedback stimuli were also analyzed to 
investigate the possible effects of preparation on target and feedback 
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processing. Analyses of the cue data included all trials, while analyses of the 
target and feedback stimuli were limited to trials with correct responses. 
Although it would also be interesting to look at error responses and negative 
feedback, we did not analyze this data. The main reason is that there are not 
enough error trials for a reliable ERP analysis, in particular when 
dissociating trials with incorrect responses from trials with correct responses 
that were given too late.  
Mean amplitudes were derived for time-windows averaged across 
electrodes within a region of interest (ROI). Time windows and ROIs of 
components were defined by ERP waveforms and topographic maps 
collapsed across conditions. Thus, the channel and time-window selection 
was orthogonal to the conditions of interest. Based on this approach, the cue-
related P1 was quantified at posterior electrodes PO7, PO8, PO3, PO4, O1 
and O2 between 70 and 130 ms. This component was followed by a negative 
wave (N1) over the same posterior brain area from 130 to 180 ms. A P2 with 
a central positive deflection at electrode sites C1, C2, Cz and CPz from 200 
to 250 ms was detected, followed from 250 to 300 ms by a negative anterior 
(electrodes FC1, FC2, F1, F2, FCz and Fz) deflection in the N2 range. A 
clear P3 component was observed at occipito-parietal electrode sites (P1, P2, 
PO3, PO4, Pz and POz) and quantified between 300 and 500 ms. The CNV, 
a late negative-going wave for active-attention cues, was detected within a 
central ROI (C1, C2 and Cz) between 700 and 1500 ms (earliest onset of the 
target). Consistent with earlier studies (Broyd et al., 2012; Connor & Lang, 
1969; Goldstein et al., 2006; Jonkman et al., 2003) this large time window 
was divided in two parts: 700-1100 ms and 1100-1500 ms, resulting in an 
early and late CNV component. 
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For targets, the P1 was quantified over lateral posterior sites (PO7, 
PO8, PO3, PO4, O1 and O2) between 70 and 130 ms, followed by a negative 
N1 in a time window of 150-200 ms over those same sites. From 180 to 230 
ms post-target onset a P2 component was present and maximal at central 
electrode sites C1, C2, Cz and CPz. The N2 amplitude was analyzed on 
frontal electrode sites (F1, F2, FC1, FC2, FCz and Fz) between 250 and 300 
ms. A late target P3 was visible from 300 ms to 600 ms in parietal regions 
(P1, P2, Pz and POz). A feedback-related component was observed over 
central parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2 and CPz) starting around 200 ms after 
feedback presentation, which was quantified between 200 and 400 ms. 
Amplitudes were examined using a repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (rANOVA) with factors reward (reward, no-reward) and task 
difficulty (high, low). Results are generally reported without strict 
Bonferroni correction for multiple testing when multiple ERP components 
were considered to avoid over-correction, thereby potentially manufacturing 
false negatives. However, we are also referring to the corrected p-values 
when interpreting the results of the rather exploratory early and mid-range 
potentials (P1, N1, P2, N2 and P3) in the cue and target phase (yielding a 
corrected value of p<0.01). 
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
Response times (RTs) were shorter in trials with potential reward (M 
= 514.96 ms, SD = 50.69 ms) versus those without (M = 526.28 ms, SD = 
54.43 ms), as indicated by a main effect of reward (F(1,21)=22.81, p<0.001, 
see table 1). There was also a significant main effect of task difficulty 
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(F(1,21)=109.36, p<0.001) with faster responses for low-difficulty trials (M 
= 491.29 ms, SD = 50.13 ms) than for high-difficulty trials (M = 549.95 ms, 
SD = 57.47 ms). The interaction of reward and task difficulty approached 
significance (F(1,21)=4.02, p=0.058) explained by a larger RT difference 
between high-difficulty and low-difficulty trials for reward trials compared 
to no-reward trials. 
Analyses of the accuracy data yielded a main effect of reward 
(F(1,21)=14.03, p=0.001) with more correct responses for reward trials (M = 
90 %, SD = 4 %) as compared with no-reward trials (M = 87 %, SD = 4 %). 
Unsurprisingly, accuracy was higher when the discrimination task was easy 
(M = 95 %, SD = 5 %) than when it was difficult (M = 81%, SD = 3 %; 
F(1,21)=234.38, p<0.001). No significant interaction of reward and task 
difficulty was found for task accuracy (F(1,21)=1.689, p=0.27). All these 
results are in line with the behavioral effects of the previous fMRI version of 
this task (Krebs et al., 2012). 
 
Table 1. Behavioral results. Response times in milliseconds (ms) and percentage 
correct responses in all four main conditions with corresponding standard deviations 
in brackets. 
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ERP results: cue-locked 
Early and mid-range potentials 
None of the early sensory components elicited by the cues (P1 and 
N1) were modulated by our task manipulation (all p>0.1). The cue-related 
P2 component had a larger amplitude for reward cues than for no-reward 
cues, as indicated by a main effect of reward (F(1,21)=13.09, p=0.002; see 
figure 2A). Task difficulty did not influence the amplitude of this component 
(F(1,21)=1.65, p=0.21), and there was no significant interaction between the 
two factors (F(1,21)=0.14, p=0.71). The mean amplitude of the N2 
component showed a trend-level main effect of reward (F(1,21)=3.63, 
p=0.07), with a larger amplitude for no-reward cues. No main effect of 
reward nor an interaction between reward and task difficulty was observed 
on this component (F(1,21)<1). Since the N2 follows the P2 very quickly, 
modulations of those components are not easily distinguishable. However, 
the most important finding here is that the reward availability is detected as 
early as 200 ms post-cue (P2 effect). The subsequent P3 amplitude was 
larger for reward cues compared to no-reward cues (F(1,21)=22.07, p<0.001; 
see figure 2B). No significant main effect of task difficulty (F(1,21)=2.86, 
p=0.11) or interaction (F(1,21)<1) was found for the P3 response. 
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Figure 2. Mid-range cue-related potentials. (A) Grand average ERPs elicited by cues 
in all four conditions at electrode sites C1, C2, Cz and CPz between 200 and 250 
ms, and a topographic map reflecting the difference in P2 amplitude between 
reward-predicting cues and trials without reward prediction (electrodes of interest 
are indicated by white markers). (B) Grand average ERPs locked to the onset of the 
cue at electrode sites P1, P2, PO3, PO4, Pz and POz between 300 and 500 ms, 
reflecting P3 amplitudes in all conditions, and a topographic plot for reward 
condition versus no-reward condition. 
 
Contingent Negative Variation (CNV) 
 For the early part of the CNV an enhanced amplitude was found for 
reward-predicting cues (F(1,21)=19.41, p<0.001), while no main effect of 
task difficulty nor interaction between reward and task difficulty was 
observed (both F(1,21)<1; see figure 3B). Reward also modulated the late 
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part of the CNV (F(1,21)=22.88, p<0.001), again with larger amplitudes for 
reward trials. Yet, this later main effect was modulated by an interaction 
between reward and task difficulty (F(1,21)=4.32, p=0.05; see figure 3C). 
This interaction resulted from the difference between high-difficulty and 
low-difficulty cues being larger for reward trials than for no-reward trials, 
with the largest late CNV deflection for high-difficulty reward trials. 
To fully capture this result pattern (see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011), a 3-
way rANOVA with the additional factor time (early vs. late CNV) was 
implemented. A main effect of time was present (F(1,21)=75.44, p<0.001), 
with a higher level of negative-polarity activity in the later window. Again, 
larger CNV amplitudes were observed for reward cues compared to no-
reward cues, resulting in a main effect of reward across both time periods 
(F(1,21)=22.95, p<0.001). There was also a significant interaction between 
time and task difficulty (F(1,21)=10.85, p=0.003), due to a larger difference 
between high-difficulty and low-difficulty trials in the late phase, with high-
difficulty trials being more negative. Moreover, a marginally significant 
three-way interaction between time, task difficulty and reward was observed 
(F(1,21)=3.52, p=0.075). This 3-way interaction pattern was due to the 
interaction between task difficulty and reward only arising at a later stage of 
the preparation process. 
Finally, this difference in CNV amplitude in the late time interval 
between high-difficulty and low-difficulty cues in reward trials was related 
to performance during target processing in that it correlated with the high-
versus-low difficulty difference in the RTs to the following potentially 
rewarding target (r=-0.5, p=0.017; see figure 3C). In contrast, the difference 
in late CNV amplitude between high-difficulty and low-difficulty cues 
without a potential reward and the corresponding difficulty effect in RTs to 
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the target was not significant (p=0.7). Moreover, no significant correlation 
was found between reward and no-reward differences for RTs and early and 
late CNV amplitude (respectively p=0.76 and p=0.38). 
 
Figure 3. Contingent Negative Variation. (A) Electrophysiological waveform 
indicating the CNV, with an early (700-1100 ms) and late (1100-1500 ms) phase at 
electrode sites C1, C2 and Cz. (B) Topographic maps resulting from condition-wise 
contrasts in the early and late time window of the CNV (ME = main effect). (C) 
Correlation between difficulty effect in the reward condition on the late CNV 
amplitude and target RTs (high minus low task difficulty, respectively). 
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ERP results: target-locked and feedback-locked 
Albeit of subordinate priority, we also analyzed the ERPs elicited by 
the target stimuli. No significant differences between conditions were 
detected in the mean amplitudes of the early P1 and N1 components (all p-
values>0.1). A significant interaction (F(1,21)=4.88, p=0.04) was obtained 
for the P2 component. This interaction is explained by a larger difference 
between high-difficulty and low-difficulty targets in reward trials (with a 
more positive wave for low-difficulty reward trials) compared to the same 
contrast for no-reward trials. However, this interaction effect related to P2 
amplitude should be viewed as more exploratory considering that it would 
not survive a Bonferroni correction that takes all five ERP components into 
account that were analyzed here (resulting in a threshold of p<0.01). 
Subsequently, a more negative N2 deflection was observed for targets in no-
reward trials, revealed by a main effect of reward (F(1,21)=11.31, p=0.003). 
The main effect of task difficulty (F(1,21)=1.61, p=0.22) and the interaction 
(F(1,21)<1) did not reach significance for these components. For the P3 
component, a main effect of reward was observed (F(1,21)=23.65, p<0.001, 
see figure 4A), with a larger amplitude for targets in reward trials compared 
to no-reward trials. Additionally, the P3 amplitude was larger for low-
difficulty targets than for high-difficulty targets, reflected statistically by a 
main effect of task difficulty (F(1,21)=32.86, p<0.001). No significant 
interaction of reward and task difficulty was observed for the P3 
(F(1,21)=2.36, p=0.14). 
A prominent feedback-related component that was visible over 
posterior central electrode sites showed a significant main effect of reward 
(F(1,21)=105.33, p<0.001), with larger positive amplitudes for the reward 
condition compared to the no-reward condition. The main effect of task 
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difficulty was also highly significant (F(1,21)=127.99, p<0.001) due to more 
positive amplitudes for high-difficulty than low-difficulty trials. Moreover, a 
highly significant interaction was observed (F(1,21)=29.82, p<0.001), 
explained by a larger amplitude difference in high-difficulty versus low-
difficulty trials in the reward condition compared to the no-reward condition 
(see figure 4B). 
 
Figure 4. Target- and feedback-related potentials. (A) Grand average ERPs 
indicating target P3 amplitudes at parietal electrode sites P1, P2, Pz and POz 
between 300 and 600 ms and a topographic map reflecting the average of all four 
main conditions, with the ROI being indicated by white electrode markers. (B) 
Electrophysiological waveforms time-locked to the onset of the feedback electrodes 
CP1, CP2 and CPz (from 200 to 400 ms) and a topographic map averaging the four 
main conditions. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the present study the participants performed a cued visual 
discrimination task in which the targets were preceded by cues that indicated 
not only the target location but simultaneously the level of task difficulty and 
the possibility to receive a monetary reward in case of a correct and fast 
response. Krebs et al. (2012) already demonstrated the utility of this task to 
assess cognitive processes related to the prospect of reward and task 
demands. Again, in the current study the experimental manipulations were 
proven successful in that reward improved discrimination performance 
(more accurate and faster responses), which furthermore interacted with the 
manipulation of task difficulty. 
The central aim of the present study was to explore neural activity 
related to the anticipation of both reward and attentional demands (i.e., 
discrimination difficulty), and more specifically, the respective time course 
of such activity. The present results support the idea that these processes can 
be dissociated temporally during task preparation. In this preparation phase 
reward availability modulated the processing of the cue starting from 200 ms 
post cue onset, with larger P2 amplitudes for potential-reward trials 
compared to no-reward trials. In addition, the main effect of reward was 
prevalent in all later ERP components of the cueing phase. The impact of 
reward on the amplitude of later components of warning stimuli, particularly 
on the P3, has been shown in previous studies (Goldstein et al., 2006; 
Hughes, et al., 2012). In contrast, reports on how reward availability impacts 
the anticipatory CNV component are rather inconsistent. Some researchers 
have reported variable CNV amplitudes depending on the rewarding 
characteristics of the warning stimulus (Hughes et al., 2012; Pierson et al., 
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1987), which however others have failed to find (Goldstein et al., 2006; 
Sobotka et al., 1992). Another anticipatory slow-wave component that is 
similar to the CNV is the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) which reflects 
anticipatory attention (disentangled from motor preparation; van Boxtel and 
Böcker, 2004; Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001; Brunia et al., 2011). The SPN has 
also been shown to be affected by the motivational relevance of a stimulus, 
more precisely, and in line with the current results, a more negative SPN 
amplitude is observed when a rewarding event is expected (Brunia et al., 
2011; Fuentemilla et al., 2013). Hence, in agreement with previous reports, 
the present study clearly supports the notion that reward can influence the 
attentional anticipation of, and the preparation for, an upcoming target.  
On the other hand, and more importantly, task-difficulty effects arose 
only later in the preparation phase, as reflected by an interaction effect in the 
late CNV component. Specifically, CNV differences following cues 
predicting high-difficulty versus low-difficulty targets were more apparent in 
reward trials compared to no-reward trials, but only in the late part of the 
CNV. As a consequence, the most negative going wave was observed for 
high-difficulty reward trials. Importantly, this difference in task preparation 
indeed affected subsequent target-discrimination performance, indicated by 
the fact that participants with a larger difference in late CNV amplitude 
between high-difficulty and low-difficulty cues in the reward condition also 
showed faster responses for high-difficulty reward targets compared to low-
difficulty reward ones. Such correlations between CNV amplitude and 
behavioral performance have been shown before (Birbaumer et al., 1990; 
Fan et al., 2007; Haagh & Brunia, 1985; Wascher et al., 1996) and 
correspond to the notion that the CNV reflects both motor preparation and 
attention or stimulus anticipation (Connor & Lang, 1969; Rohrbaugh et al., 
66    CHAPTER 2 
1976; Tecce, 1972; van Boxtel & Brunia, 1994). It has to be noted that 
reward and task-difficulty might influence both kinds of processes in a 
different way, but it is not possible to distinguish attentional orienting from 
motor preparation in the current experiment.  
Although a main effect of task-difficulty was found for RTs, there was 
no clear difference between CNV amplitudes in high-difficulty no-reward 
trails and low-difficulty no-reward trials. This might be explained by a 
motivational account, in which additional strategic attention is employed 
only when it is worth the effort. Therefore, no extra preparation processes 
will be triggered by high-difficulty cues in situations without the potential of 
being rewarded. The current finding is probably context-dependent, since 
participants usually also engage attentional resources in difficult tasks that 
lack (the prospect of) reward. In the current experiment, however, no-reward 
trials could be seen as disappointing leading to a lack of motivation to spend 
processing resources on these trials. Alternatively, control processes elicited 
by task difficulty might be qualitatively different in the reward condition and 
the no-reward condition along the lines of a proactive vs. reactive distinction 
(e.g., Braver, 2012). Specifically, high task-difficulty in a reward context 
clearly engage proactive control mechanisms, as indexed here be the CNV. 
In contrast, different levels of task difficulty in the no-reward condition of 
the current experiments might have invoked different levels of reactive 
control (i.e., during target processing), which could be difficult to detect in 
the target-related ERPs. A final option would be that the participants did not 
invoke any additional control processes, neither pro- nor reactively, for high-
difficulty trials as compared to low-difficulty trials in the no-reward 
condition. The current ERP data cannot adjudicate between these 
alternatives.  
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Patient research and studies with healthy individuals have indicated 
that the CNV might be related to the dopaminergic system (e.g., Amabile et 
al., 1986; Gerschlager et al., 1999; Linssen et al., 2011). Consequently, the 
observed interaction between task difficulty and reward in this component 
appears to be consistent with the results of the previous fMRI study of Krebs 
et al. (2012) showing  a very similar interaction pattern in the dopaminergic 
midbrain with highest activation levels in respond to cues that predicted both 
reward and high difficulty. Of course, it should be noted that ERP 
measurements will not directly reflect activity in deep brain structures such 
as the dopaminergic midbrain (Cohen et al., 2011), but only through cortical 
consequences of its involvement. This possible link to the dopaminergic 
system raises another alternative, or possibly supplementary, interpretation 
for the current results. With higher levels of (reward) uncertainty, slower 
sustained activations of the dopaminergic system have been shown to 
increase (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006). The current results 
related to late CNV amplitude are in line with this finding. The amplitude is 
lowest for cues that do not predict reward. Not only do these trials not 
feature reward, but reward uncertainty is also lowest here (for both high-
difficult and low-difficult trials). In reward trials, reward uncertainty is 
present in both conditions, but most pronounced when cues predict a high-
difficulty trial; correspondingly the largest CNV amplitude has been detected 
in this condition. However, considering the established characteristics of the 
CNV as a typical preparatory component reflecting anticipatory attention 
and motor preparation, this uncertainty-based interpretation appears less 
likely as the full explanation of the data pattern than the task-preparation-
related account. 
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The central finding of the current study is the temporal dissociation 
between processes related to the anticipation of potential reward and 
attentional demands. The earlier and more pronounced effect of reward 
compared to task difficulty appears to suggest that reward might influence 
visual processing of the cue stimuli in a more bottom-up way, while 
anticipated attentional demands seem to trigger a more voluntary (top-down) 
influence that arises later. This might relate to the idea that there could be 
different routes by which the dopaminergic system is recruited that has been 
previously suggested by other researchers (e.g., Salamone et al., 2005). Also, 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease, which is characterized by major 
disturbances of the dopaminergic system, voluntary attention mechanisms 
are affected while performances and processes in automatic attention tasks 
can remain intact (Brown and Marsden, 1988; Brown and Marsden, 1990; 
Yamaguchi and Kobayashi, 1998). Other studies have shown that reward 
associations, especially for task-irrelevant stimulus aspects, can distract 
participants from the task-relevant aspects and have a detrimental effect on 
performance (e.g., Hickey et al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), 
which also adds evidence in favor of potential automatic influences of 
reward on task processes. We suggest that reward influences cue-related 
processes relatively directly, while strategically implemented attentional 
orienting plays a role only later in processing in an attempt to optimize 
performance according to the situational circumstances. 
Another key aspect is that temporal information provided here by the 
ERP measures also enables the dissociation of processes related to cue 
evaluation from the preparatory processes it triggers. Specifically, our data 
indicates that early cue evaluation is particularly sensitive to possible reward 
availability, whereas cued task demands do not play a major role until late in 
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the actual task-preparation process as the target is about to occur. 
Furthermore, the finding that the late CNV amplitude, which has been 
consistently linked to task preparation, was maximal for high-difficulty 
reward trials, speaks to an additional critical issue. Specifically, as alluded to 
in the introduction, neuroeconomic experiments usually conceptualize high 
task demands as costs that get discounted (e.g., Croxson et al., 2009; 
McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This should even more so be the case in the 
present experiment, as reward probability was lower in high-difficulty than 
low-difficulty trials. Even in this situation, we found the largest CNV 
amplitude in high-difficulty reward trials. If this had been merely an effect of 
expected reward value, the low-difficulty reward trials should have triggered 
the largest CNV wave. An important difference to the earlier neuroeconomic 
experiments was that in the present study participants had to start preparing 
for the upcoming task in response to the cue, which in our opinion relies on a 
neural network that overlaps with reward-related processes (see also Stoppel 
et al., 2011).  
Subsequent to the preparation phase, the early perceptual processing 
of the target was not affected by the reward or difficulty manipulation, which 
is consistent with earlier reports (Baines et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012) 
that could not find an early reward impact in the target P1-N1 component in 
their cueing paradigms. The earliest manipulation effects in the current study 
were observed 200 ms after target onset. In particular, the P2 amplitude was 
largest for low-difficulty reward trials and for the N2 and the P3 components 
a main effect of reward was observed, with an enhanced positive wave for 
reward trials. These findings match with the results of several recent ERP 
studies investigating reward, suggesting that attention to or attentional 
capture by rewarding or affective stimuli was increased (e.g., Baines et al., 
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2011; Hajcak et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2012; Krebs et al., 2013). The 
amplitude of the P3 in the present study was also larger in the low-difficulty 
condition compared to the high-difficulty condition, perhaps due to reward 
expectancy being higher in the low-difficulty trials (Goldstein et al., 2006; 
Gruber & Otten, 2010; Wu & Zhou, 2009). Also, similar results have been 
found in other discrimination tasks, showing a diminished visual or auditory 
evoked P3 amplitude in difficult discrimination trials (Hoffman et al., 1985; 
Palmer et al., 1994; Polich, 1987; Senkowski & Herrmann, 2002). This has 
been related to decreased decision certainty (i.e. ‘equivocation’), since 
confidence in the decision made is reduced when discriminations are more 
difficult (Palmer et al., 1994; Ruchkin & Sutton, 1978). Moreover, both the 
reward and difficulty main effect might be partly explained by the relation of 
the target P3 to response execution (Doucet & Stelmack, 1999), with larger 
P3 amplitudes for faster responses. Hughes et al. (2012) also showed that the 
target-locked P3 amplitude was larger for easy compared to difficult 
detected target pictures in a rapid serial visual presentation task and results 
suggested that the P3 amplitude on single trials reflected the confidence in 
detecting a target. Hence, the P3 modulation probably reflects a combination 
of reward expectancy, confidence in correct responding, and facilitated 
response execution.  
Targets were followed by a feedback presentation, for which we had 
to limit our analysis to correct feedback due to trial-number limitations. The 
feedback elicited a broad centro-parietal component, which probably reflects 
a feedback-related P3 component. The response to the different kinds of 
positive feedback in the present experiment displayed sensitivities to reward 
in general, as well as to the difficulty of the task. The P3 component is 
generally known to be sensitive to expectancy (Courchesne et al., 1977; 
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Johnson & Donchin, 1980; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010) and more 
specifically with regard to feedback, the P3 amplitude has been observed to 
be larger for unpredicted outcomes compared to predicted outcomes (Hajcak 
et al., 2005, 2007). Since in the current experiment correct feedback is more 
unexpected in high-difficulty trials than in low-difficulty trials, the main 
effect of task-difficulty might reflect this subjective expectation. The current 
findings related to reward are also consistent with previous reports showing 
larger P3 amplitude following reward feedback than no-reward feedback 
(Hajcak et al., 2007), which might indicate higher motivational significance 
of reward feedback (see Sato et al., 2005). Finally, the response also 
displayed an interaction pattern, wherein the difference between low- and 
high-difficulty trials was larger for rewarded trials. This latter interaction 
seems to represent a combination of performance monitoring of correct 
performance on the one hand, and of reward outcome evaluation on the 
other. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To summarize, in the present study we investigated the time course of 
task preparation as a function of anticipated reward and anticipated 
attentional task demands. While preparing for the target, reward influenced 
neural processes more rapidly, with large effects in both the early and late 
stages of preparation. In contrast, it seems that processing resources were 
only later allocated in a strategic fashion that also incorporated anticipated 
task difficulty. These findings provide evidence that effects of voluntary 
attentional demands and reward can be temporally dissociated, not only 
during task execution but also during task preparation.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
PREPARING FOR (VALENCED) ACTION – THE ROLE OF 
DIFFERENTIAL EFFORT IN THE ORTHOGONALIZED 
GO/NO-GO TASK 1 
Associating reward to task performance has been shown to benefit scores 
of cognitive functions. Importantly, this typically entails associating reward 
to the execution of a response, hence intertwining action-related processes 
with motivational ones. However, recently, preparatory action requirements 
(go/no-go) and outcome valence (reward/punishment) were elegantly 
separated using a cued orthogonalized go/no-go task. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging results from this task showed that typical areas of the 
‘reward network’ like the dopaminergic midbrain and the striatum 
predominantly encode action rather than valence, displaying enhanced 
activity when preparing for action (go) compared to inaction (no-go). In the 
current study we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to probe for 
differences in preparatory state related to cognitive effort in this task, which 
has similarly been linked to “reward-network” activity. Importantly, the 
contingent negative variation (CNV), which is linked to effortful cognitive 
preparation processes during cue-target intervals, was clearly observed in 
go trials but not in no-go trials. Moreover, target-locked ERP results (N1 
and P3) suggested that attention to the target was enhanced when an action 
had to be performed (go trials), and typical inhibition-related ERP 
components were not observed in no-go trials, indicating a lack of active 
response inhibition. Finally, feedback P3 results suggested that correct 
feedback was valued more in motivated go trials, again implying that more 
effort was required to correctly perform the task. Together, these results 
indicate that the anticipation of action compared to inaction simultaneously 
entails differences in mental effort, highlighting the need for further 
dissociation of these concepts.  
                                                     
1 Schevernels, H., Bombeke, K., Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N. Preparing for 
(valenced) action – the role of differential effort in the orthogonalized go/no-go task. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyday behavior requires flexible behavioral control that is sensitive 
to changes in the environment. When the environment or context suggests 
the availability of reward or punishment, people strive for minimization of 
punishment and the maximization of reward. As such, it has been shown that 
the prospect of reward enhances performance in a wide range of behavioral 
tasks (Adcock et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2010; Etzel et al., 2015; Locke & 
Braver, 2008; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). However, in these tasks usually a 
predefined motor response has to be executed in order to receive a reward, 
thereby coupling reward to action execution (and the respective anticipation 
thereof). Hence these studies cannot distinguish valence (i.e. reward vs. 
punishment) and action effects (i.e. action execution vs. inhibition) and their 
underlying neural substrates. This is of particular importance considering 
that in Pavlovian control valence and action are inherently linked since 
stimuli that are appetitive (either in nature or via classical conditioning) 
automatically invigorate approach behavior or action and aversive stimuli 
promote withdrawal or inhibition. This relation between reward and the 
execution of a motor response (go) and between punishment and the 
inhibition of motor actions (no-go) has also been suggested in previous 
studies investigating learning and decision making (Chiu et al., 2014; Frank 
et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 2015; Gray & Mcnaughton, 2000).  
One group of studies (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 
2011, 2012a, 2012b; Richter et al., 2014) that has elegantly investigated the 
effects of action requirements and reward value and their interaction has 
crossed both factors in a cue-based paradigm (the so-called ‘orthogonalized 
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go/no-go task’). This led to four conditions indicated by different cues: go to 
win, go to avoid losing, no-go to win and no-go to avoid losing, which were 
used to compare differential anticipatory neural activity related to action and 
valence (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012a). The behavioral data favored an 
inherent association between reward and go indicated by an interaction 
between action and valence. Nevertheless, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) results mostly demonstrated a main effect of action, in 
particular in parts of the typical “reward network” including the substantia 
nigra/ventral tegmental area (SN/VTA) and striatum that were found to 
predominantly encode action anticipation irrespective of valence (Guitart-
Masip et al., 2011, 2012a).  
However, recent evidence shows that the same neural system is also 
involved in effort-based management of neural resources. For example, 
Boehler et al. (2011) found that even in the absence of reward or any other 
type of direct extrinsic motivator the dopaminergic midbrain is more active 
when subjects prepare for a cognitively demanding task compared to a less 
demanding task. Moreover, it has been found that the dopaminergic 
midbrain regions and important dopaminergic target areas like the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and striatum are not only activated during the 
anticipation of reward but also during the anticipation of (cognitive and 
physical) effort in a perceptual task (Krebs et al., 2012), a cognitive task 
(Vassena et al., 2014) and a physical instrumental task (Kurniawan et al., 
2013). Hence these results suggest that the dopaminergic midbrain is not 
only involved in the processing of reward but also in the control of cognitive 
processing resources (see also Nieoullon, 2002; Salamone et al., 2005). As 
such, it is important to note that the action manipulation as described in the 
studies of Guitart-Masip and colleagues seems to simultaneously entail 
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differences in mental effort. More specifically, in go trials mental 
preparation is likely pronounced since subjects have to attend to the 
upcoming target in order to perform the task correctly (and quickly), which 
is not the case for no-go trials. Hence, activity enhancements of the striatum 
and dopaminergic midbrain during action-related preparation can 
alternatively or additionally represent changes in preparatory state.  
In order to probe whether different levels of task preparation might 
have contributed to the results by Guitart-Masip’s group (2011, 2012a, 2014) 
in the current study we recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) activity 
while participants performed the orthogonalized go/no-go task of Guitart-
Masip et al. (2011, 2012a). To further test whether there is any preparatory 
effort during anticipation of no-go trials, we also included cued catch trials 
in which participants knew that no target would be presented (see also 
Grent-’t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007). Moreover, two other baseline conditions 
were included, i.e. neutral go and neutral no-go, in which trials were never 
rewarded or punished.  
One event-related component that is particularly interesting with 
regard to the goal of the current study is the contingent negative variation 
(CNV) since it is supposed to reflect changes in preparatory activity (Walter 
et al., 1964). The CNV is a fronto-central negative-going component 
observed between a warning and imperative stimulus that starts to appear 
around 1 sec preceding target presentation and is supposed to reflect 
processes related to anticipatory attention, motor preparation and arousal 
(Birbaumer et al., 1990; Connor & Lang, 1969; Tecce, 1972; van Boxtel & 
Brunia, 1994). In a number of studies the CNV was investigated using a 
cued go/no-go paradigm and they found that the CNV is larger when 
anticipating go trials compared to no-go trials suggesting enhanced 
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preparatory cortical activity (e.g. Filipović et al., 2001; Funderud et al., 
2012; Rosahl & Knight, 1995). Moreover, the CNV has been shown to be 
sensitive to the anticipation of different levels of task demands or cognitive 
effort (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; McEvoy et al., 1998; Schevernels et al., 
2014; but see Vuillier et al., 2015), which may again largely reflect 
differences in preparatory state or the amount of resources allocated to a 
cognitive process (see also Rösler et al., 1997). Therefore, if different levels 
of task preparation are involved, we would expect larger CNV amplitudes in 
anticipated go trials than in no-go trials (as suggested by previous studies). 
Since the CNV has been shown to be affected by extrinsic motivation 
(Hughes et al., 2012; Pierson et al., 1987; Schevernels et al., 2014; van den 
Berg et al., 2014; but see Goldstein et al., 2006; Sobotka et al., 1992), we 
also expected a larger CNV amplitude in go to win and go to avoid losing 
trials (which may or may not differ from each other) compared to go neutral 
trials. We also investigated the cue-evoked parietal P3 (which largely 
precedes the CNV) since this component has been shown to be affected by 
reward anticipation, suggesting its role in motivated attention (Goldstein et 
al., 2006, 2008; Hughes et al., 2012; Kohls et al., 2011; Schevernels et al., 
2014).  
The level of preparation should also affect processing of the 
subsequent target and thus we also investigated target-evoked event-related 
potentials (ERPs) related to early visual processing and attention. Moreover, 
it is unclear how much active response inhibition precued no-go trials 
require (since the tendency to initiate a motor response is preempted by the 
cue) in which case one should not observe typical inhibition-related ERP 
effects, like modulations of the frontal target-evoked frontal N2 and P3 in 
no-go trials (Bokura et al., 2001; Bruin et al., 2001; Eimer, 1993; Falkenstein 
88    CHAPTER 3 
et al., 1999; Gajewski & Falkenstein, 2013; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; van 
Boxtel et al., 2001). Finally, the P3 related to positive feedback has been 
shown to be larger in high-demand tasks and thus it has been suggested that 
reward feedback is more valued when subjects had to put in a lot of effort 
(Ma et al., 2014; Schevernels et al., 2014). Thus, we expected larger P3 
amplitudes evoked by correct feedback in go trials than in no-go trials. 
Together, with this study we sought to use ERPs related to the cue, target 
and feedback to investigate whether the action-dominated activity as found 
by Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a) might also partly arise from 
differences in preparatory mental effort.  
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-one subjects participated in the experiment (17 women, mean 
age = 25.2 years, SD = 5.4 years). They were all right-handed, had correct or 
corrected-to-normal vison and reported no history of psychiatric or 
neurological disorders. Prior to participation written informed consent was 
obtained according to the procedure approved by the local ethics committee. 
After finishing the task, each subject received a financial compensation of 
25€ plus an additional bonus depending on their task performance (maximal 
10€).  
Paradigm 
In the present study we used a modified version of the orthogonalized 
go/no-go task of Guitart-Masip et al. (2011). In this experiment cues indicate 
whether the upcoming trial will be a go or no-go trial. In go trials subjects 
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have to respond as quickly as possible according to the location of the target 
(left or right), while in no-go trials no button has to be pressed when the 
target appears. Cues also indicate the potential valence of the trial (i.e., the 
outcome depending on task performance). In addition to the two original 
valence-related cues (reward and punishment) we included neutral cues in 
which performance outcome was not related to reward or punishment to be 
able to further investigate motivational effects by comparing against a 
neutral baseline. Moreover, we implemented cued catch trials in which 
participants knew that no target was presented, and which therefore should 
not trigger any preparatory activity. Except for catch trials, participants 
received feedback about the outcome at the end of each trial. Stimulus 
presentation durations and timing differed from the original experiment since 
they were optimized for an EEG setting (see Figure 1). In contrast to the 
studies of Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a), who used 50% cue-only trials 
in order to disentangle hemodynamic activity related to cue processing from 
subsequent processes, the high temporal resolution of EEG (combined with 
the relatively slow succession of events) allows us to distinguish motor-
related from preparatory-related activity directly, hence largely abolishing 
the need for this procedure. 
Different fractal images (5°x7°) served as cues indicating the trial 
type. We kept the four conditions implemented in the study of Guitart-Masip 
et al. (2011): respond quickly and correctly to obtain a reward (go to win), 
respond quickly and correctly to avoid punishment (go to avoid losing), do 
not respond to obtain a reward (no-go to win) and do not respond to avoid 
punishment (no-go to avoid losing). Furthermore three other trial types were 
included serving as baseline conditions: respond quickly and correctly 
although there is no prospect of reward or punishment (go neutral), do not 
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respond although there is no prospect of reward or punishment (no-go 
neutral), and attentively wait for the next cue since no target will appear 
(cued catch). Hence, in total there were seven different fractal images. Each 
fractal cue was presented for 800 ms and occurred for an equal number of 
times. 
After a variable delay of 1200 to 1500 ms (only showing a fixation 
cross) the next cue appeared in cued catch trials and a target was presented 
for 1000 ms in non-catch trials. Targets were circles (radius 3°) that were 
randomly displayed on the left or right side (5°) of a central fixation cross. In 
go trials subjects had to press the letter ‘A’ with their left index finger when 
the circle was displayed on the left side of the screen while they had to press 
the letter ‘L’ with their right index finger when the circle was shown on the 
right side of the screen (QWERTY-layout keyboard). Moreover, in go trials 
responses had to be made quickly since a fixed response time-out was 
implemented (which was not the case for no-go trials). This time-out varied 
between subjects since it was based on their performance in the second 
training run (see below). More specifically, the maximal time to respond in 
go trials was defined by taking the average of response times on correct go 
trials in this training run plus 50 ms2. 
At the end of each non-catch trial feedback was presented for 800 ms 
following a varying interstimulus interval of 300 to 800 ms. A green upward 
pointing arrow indicated a gain of 10 eurocents, a red downward pointing 
arrow signaled a 10 eurocents loss and a yellow horizontal bar was shown 
                                                     
2 We implemented this subject-based time-out instead of a fixed maximum response 
time of 700 ms (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011), which turned out to be too long during 
piloting this task, in order to assure that similar accuracy levels would be reached as 
in the study of Guitart-Masip and colleagues.   
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when subjects did not lose or win any money. This outcome was dependent 
on the trial type as well as on the subject’s performance. However, in win 
and avoid losing coditions the outcome was furthermore probabilistic in the 
sense that even when subjects performed the task correctly only 70% of 
correct reactions in win trials were rewarded and only 70% of correct 
reactions in avoid losing trials were not punished (consistent with the 
paradigm of Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012a). Hence, in 70% of the trials 
subjects would gain a reward in win trials and avoid punishment in avoid 
losing trials when they gave a fast and accurate response in go conditions 
and withheld their response in no-go conditions. In neutral task conditions a 
horizontal bar was always presented indicating that no money had been won 
or lost. 
Before starting the experiment, task requirements were explained and 
subjects were instructed to minimize eye movements and blinking. Subjects 
were explicitly told that they could win extra money contingent on their task 
performance and they were informed about the probabilistic feedback. 
Furthermore subjects had to memorize the meaning of all seven cues, which 
was also repeated at the beginning of every experimental run. To ensure that 
subjects had learned the cue meanings, we implemented a first practice 
session including 10 trials per condition (70 trials in total), in which neither a 
response time-out nor a probabilistic outcome was applied, and the Dutch 
words ‘goed’ (correct) or ‘fout’ (incorrect) were presented to provide 
additional feedback. In case accuracy was worse than 75% in one of the 
conditions we restarted this practice block. Subsequently, subjects performed 
a second practice run in which trials were presented in the same way as in 
the experimental task (with probabilistic outcome). In the experimental 
session seven runs of 70 trials were performed with 10 trials per condition 
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presented equally often in a randomized order. This resulted in a total of 490 
trials with 70 trials per condition. In each run a self-paced break was 
implemented after 35 trials. Moreover, after every run subjects were 
informed about the amount of money they had already won. Two versions of 
the experiment were created to counterbalance the meaning of the fractal 
cues across participants.  
 
Figure 1. Task procedure. At the start of each trial a cue signaled the possible value 
of the trial (win, avoid losing or neutral) and indicated whether the subject would 
have to respond (go trials) or not (no-go trials) to the upcoming target. In go trials 
subjects had to press a button according to the location of the target. In cued catch 
trials subjects knew that no target would be presented after the cue. At the end of 
each non-catch trial feedback was presented dependent on the trial type and 
performance. A green arrow pointing upwards meant that subjects won 10 
eurocents, while a red arrow pointing downwards indicated a 10 eurocents loss. A 
yellow horizontal bar signaled that no money was won or lost. The feedback was 
probabilistic so that only 70% of correct and fast responses in go trials and 70% of 
correct withholding responses in no-go trials were rewarded (win trials) or not 
punished (avoid losing trials).  
EEG acquisition and preprocessing 
EEG signals were recorded using a Biosemi ActiveTwo system (CLS-
DRL reference) and sampled at 256 Hz. Data were recorded from 64 Ag-
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AgCl scalp electrodes positioned according to the international 10-20 
location configuration. External electrodes were attached to the left and right 
mastoid for offline re-referencing. Horizontal and vertical eye movements 
were measured using electrodes placed at the external canthus of the left and 
right eye and directly above and below the left eye, respectively. Subjects 
were tested in a dimly-lit electrically-shielded room. 
A combination of EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB 
(Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) was used to analyze the collected EEG data. 
As a first step, we re-referenced the data to the average of the left and right 
mastoid. Subsequently, data was low-passed filtered (30 Hz) and eye blinks 
were removed using independent component analysis. Channels that were 
very noisy were interpolated (only 6 channels in total across all datasets). 
Baseline-corrected epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the cue, 
target and feedback with a time window of -200 ms to 2300 ms, -200 ms to 
1000 ms and -200 ms to 800 ms, respectively. Epochs containing eye 
movements (step function with threshold 60 μV and window size 400 ms in 
the bipolar HEOG channel) and extreme values in scalp electrodes (> +-150 
μV) were automatically removed and afterwards all epochs were visually 
inspected for possible additional missed artifacts. This resulted on average in 
4.4% rejected cue-locked epochs, 2.4% rejected target-locked epochs and 1.9 
% rejected feedback-locked epochs. 
Data analysis 
Behavior 
Accuracy, i.e. a correct button press within the response time-out 
window in go trials and not responding in no-go trials, was investigated 
using a repeated-measures ANOVA (rANOVA) with within-subject factors 
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action (go/no-go) and valence (win/avoid losing/neutral). In case Mauchly’s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity did not hold, degrees of 
freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity. The number of reactions that exceeded the response time-out and 
reaction times in correct go trials (i.e. only including reaction times within 
the response window) were analyzed using paired-sample t-tests. If tests 
were significant we also report effect sizes (Cohen’s d and partial eta 
squared, 2pK ). 
ERPs 
For both cue-locked and target-locked ERPs mean amplitude 
measurements were derived within a specific time range and region of 
interest. ERPs related to cues and targets only included trials in which 
subjects responded accurately (i.e. within time-out window for go trials). 
Feedback-related analyses included trials in which responses and feedback 
were correct (no incorrect feedback). All analyses were performed on 30 Hz 
low-passed filtered data, but for illustration purposes a 15 Hz low-pass filter 
was applied in the figures. Amplitudes were analyzed using rANOVAs with 
the factors action (go/no-go) and valence (win/avoid losing/neutral) and 
applying the Greenhouse-Geisser degrees of freedom correction whenever 
necessary. Hence, in case Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant we 
report uncorrected F-values, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values and 
Epsilon (ε). Post-hoc tests were performed to further investigate significant 
effects. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d and partial eta squared) are reported when 
statistical results were significant. ERPs related to cued catch trials were not 
included in the statistical analyses but they are displayed in the figures as a 
reference. 
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The parietal cue-evoked P3 was maximal at electrode sites Pz, P1 and 
P2 between 400 and 600 ms after cue onset (mainly for go trials). 
Subsequently a large negative component, i.e. the CNV, was detected 
between 1000 and 2000 ms (earliest onset of the target) mainly in go 
conditions at frontocentral locations (FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, C1 and C2). 
Consistent with earlier studies (Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006; 
Jonkman et al., 2003; Schevernels et al., 2014) this prolonged negativity was 
separated in an early and late CNV from 1000 to 1500 ms and 1500 to 2000 
ms, respectively.  
Since we were also interested in early effects of different kinds of cues 
on visual processing of the target circle we also analyzed different target-
related components. Early positive (P1) and negative waves (N1) were 
maximal in posterior regions on the contralateral side of target presentation. 
Hence P1 and N1 components were observed in PO7 when the circle was 
presented on the right and in PO8 when the circle was presented on the left 
side of the screen, within a time-window of 80 to 120 ms for P1 and 140 to 
180 ms for N1. Also a clear broad centroparietal P3 was quantified between 
250 and 450 ms on electrode sites Pz, P1 and P2. The processing of correct 
feedback gave rise to a prominent P3 that was maximal between 300 and 450 
ms at parietal electrode sites (Pz, P1, P2, POz, PO3, PO4).  
RESULTS 
Behavior 
Analyses related to behavioral accuracy revealed a significant main 
effect of action (F(1,20)=42.48, p<0.001, 2pK =0.68) showing higher 
96    CHAPTER 3 
accuracy for no-go trials compared to go trials. However, although reaching 
similar overall accuracy rates, we failed to replicate an important feature of 
the behavioral results of (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011) in that we neither found 
a significant main effect of valence nor a significant interaction (both 
p’s>0.15). This pattern also didn’t change when including responses that 
exceeded the response-time out window seeing that the number of go trials 
that exceeded the maximal response time was similar for different types of 
valence conditions (p’s>0.2; average: 7.4 ±0.6). In contrast, in correct go 
trials subjects did respond slower in the neutral condition compared to the 
avoid losing (t(20)=2.95, p=0.008, d=0.64) and win condition (t(20)=4.63, 
p<0.001, d=1.01), but reaction times in the latter two conditions did not 
differ (p>0.4). These behavioral results are summarized in table 1. 
 
 
ERPs 
Cue-locked ERPs 
The cue-locked P3 amplitude was considerably larger for cues 
signaling go trials (F(1,20)=57.36, p<0.001, 2pK =0.74; see Figure 2). Also, a 
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main effect of valence was observed (F(2,40)=4.26, p=0.021, 2pK =0.18), but 
valence also significantly interacted with action (F(2,40)=3.67, p=0.048, 
ε=0.77, 2pK =0.16) due to a larger P3 amplitude in go to win trials compared 
to go to avoid losing trials (t(20)=4.07, p=0.001, d=0.89) and go neutral 
trials (t(20)=3.31, p=0.004, d=0.72) but a similar P3 amplitude in the 
different no-go conditions (see Figure 2B). Both early and late CNV 
amplitude showed a clear main effect of action (F(1,20)=11.8, p=0.003, 2pK
=0.37 and F(1,20)=20.07, p<0.001, 2pK =0.52) with larger negative-going 
waves for cues signaling go trials (see Figure 2), whereas neither the main 
effect of valence nor the interaction between the factors was significant (all 
p’s>0.1). 
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Figure 2. Cue-locked ERP results. (A) Topographical maps reflecting the P3, early 
CNV and late CNV in go and no-go trials and the corresponding differences 
indicating the main effect of action. Note that the topographical maps of the (early 
and late) CNV in go and no-go trials reflect the difference between go or no-go trials 
on one hand and cued catch trials (which should not induce any preparatory activity) 
on the other hand. Go trials elicited larger positivities than no-go trials between 400 
and 600 ms (P3). Moreover, in go trials a clear (early and late) CNV is observed, 
which is not the case for no-go trials. (B) Grand-average ERP waves locked to the 
cue over electrode sites Pz, P1 and P2 show larger P3 amplitudes in go trials and 
especially in go to win trials compared to go to avoid losing and neutral trials. 
Moreover, grand-average waveforms over fronto-central sites (FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, 
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C1 and C2) are depicted for each condition, reflecting the early and late CNV 
component in go trials. Frames indicate the time range of the different components 
(as included in the analyses). 
 
Target-locked ERPs 
The posterior target-locked P1 did not show any significant 
differences (p-values>0.2), but the visual N1 was larger in go trials 
compared to no-go trials (F(1,20)=11.48, p=0.003, 2pK =0.37; see Figure 3A). 
We did not find a significant main effect of valence (p>0.4) nor a significant 
interaction (p>0.1) related to the N1 component. The target-locked parietal 
P3 amplitude showed a large main effect of action (F(1,20)=161.03, 
p<0.001, 2pK =0.89) and an interaction between action and valence 
(F(2,40)=3.88, p=0.029, 2pK =0.16). Figure 3A illustrates that these effects 
reflect significantly larger P3 amplitudes in go trials and especially in go to 
win and go to avoid losing trials, while there was no difference between the 
no-go conditions.  
Feedback-locked ERPs 
The feedback-evoked P3 showed a significant main effect of the 
factors action (F(1,20)=9.55, p=0.006, 2pK =0.32) and valence 
(F(2,40)=39.19, p<0.001, 2pK =0.67), but also a significant interaction 
(F(2,40)=3.92, p=0.028, 2pK =0.16). As can be observed in Figure 3B, win 
feedback (arrow pointing upwards) elicited the largest P3s when subjects 
had to perform an action (go trials). Moreover, the P3 amplitude related to 
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positive feedback was significantly larger in go compared to no-go trials not 
only in the win condition (arrow pointing upwards) but also in the avoid 
losing condition (horizontal bar) (both tests: t(20)=2.93, p=0.008, d=0.64). 
On the other hand, the P3 was smallest for correct feedback in neutral trials 
and it did not significantly differ between neutral go and no-go trials (p>0.1).  
 
Figure 3. (A) Target-locked ERPs. Waveforms averaged over PO7 for targets 
presented on the right side of the screen and PO8 for targets presented on the left 
side of the screen, showing enhanced target-locked N1 in go trials (left panel). 
Grand-average target-locked ERPs over parietal regions (Pz, P1 and P2) reflecting 
the target P3 between 250 and 450 ms, illustrating enhanced P3 amplitudes in go 
trials and especially in go to win and go to avoid losing trials (right panel). (B) 
Correct feedback-locked ERPs. Over parietal regions (Pz, P1, P2, POz, PO3 and 
PO4) grand-average ERPs show more positive P3 components evoked by correct 
feedback in go trials compared to no-go trials only in the go to win and avoid losing 
conditions. Frames indicate the time range of the different components (as included 
in the analyses). 
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DISCUSSION 
The goal of the current study was to investigate differential 
involvement of (preparatory) mental effort in the orthogonalized go/no-go 
task of Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a) using ERPs. In line with the idea 
that preparing for a go trial is more demanding than preparing for a no-go 
trial, we found diminished cue-evoked P3 amplitudes and an absence of the 
preparation-related CNV component for the expectation of no-go targets. 
Moreover, visual attention to the target was decreased in no-go trials as 
indicated by smaller N1 and P3 amplitudes. Finally, the P3 amplitude related 
to correct feedback was significantly larger in go trials, which might suggest 
more positive subjective appraisal of correct feedback for a more effortful 
task. All these results together point in the direction of differential cognitive 
resource engagement during preparation, task performance and feedback 
evaluation in anticipated go trials compared to anticipated no-go trials. 
Main effects of action and effort anticipation 
The key focus of our experiment lies in the manipulation of action and 
in line with the effect found by Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012a) we 
observed higher accuracy in no-go trials (nearly 100% correct) suggesting 
that these trials were less difficult than go trials. Importantly, the cue-locked 
P3 as well as the CNV component showed highly significant effects of 
action with larger amplitudes for the anticipation of go trials compared to 
no-go trials. The P3 has been suggested to reflect activity in the locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system that is involved in stimulus 
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evaluation and decision making thereby guiding attention allocation in favor 
of goal-relevant stimuli (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Hence, the large 
difference in P3 amplitude between go and no-go trials might suggest that go 
trials are identified as being more task-relevant promoting more attention to 
the go stimuli. 
More importantly, we did find a substantially larger early and late 
CNV in go trials than in no-go trials. For the latter we in fact found that the 
CNV was practically absent (compared to catch trials), in line with previous 
findings showing a significant cue-related action effect (Filipović et al., 
2001; Funderud et al., 2012; Randall & Smith, 2011; Rosahl & Knight, 
1995). This difference probably entails more motoric preparation but also 
more cognitive preparation in go trials considering that it has been shown 
that the CNV also or mainly reflects effortful cognitive preparation 
processes, and that participants in the current task cannot prepare for a 
specific response yet (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Cui et al., 2000; 
Falkenstein et al., 2003; Gómez et al., 2007; Lorist et al., 2000; Rösler et al., 
1997; Wild-Wall et al., 2007). Hence, these results are in favor of our 
hypothesis that no-go cues differ from go cues in mental preparatory 
activation going beyond merely motor preparation. Importantly, this effect 
could very well link back to the action-dominated activity in the 
dopaminergic source and target regions found by Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 
2012a) given evidence for a link between the CNV and central dopaminergic 
activity3 (Amabile et al., 1986; Fan et al., 2007; Gerschlager et al., 1999; 
Linssen et al., 2011; Oishi et al., 1995), and the fact that these areas have 
                                                     
3 Of course, the CNV does not directly signal subcortical dopamine release (Cohen 
et al., 2011) but it could rather reflect its effects on cortical brain areas via 
dopaminergic pathways. 
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been found to be sensitive to differences in preparatory effort (e.g., Boehler 
et al., 2011; see also below). 
The target-related ERPs provided further evidence for differences in 
effort-related processes. Specifically, we found a diminished contralateral 
posterior N1 component in no-go trials, implying decreased early visual 
attention to the circle target when subjects did not have to perform an action 
(and thus did not need to discriminate the target’s location; see e.g., Vogel & 
Luck, 2000). In addition, the subsequent parietal P3 amplitude was enhanced 
in go trials compared to no-go trials consistent with ERP results found in 
studies using the go/no-go task showing a more parietal scalp distribution for 
go trials (Bokura et al., 2001; Bruin & Wijers, 2002; Liu et al., 2011; Tekok-
Kilic et al., 2001). The parietal go P3 component has been distinguished 
from the frontal no-go P3 (Bokura et al., 2001; Pfefferbaum & Ford, 1988; 
Tekok-Kilic et al., 2001) with the first being more similar to the classical 
P300, likely reflecting target detection and evaluation, response production, 
and executive control processes (Eimer, 1993; Liu et al., 2011; Pfefferbaum 
et al., 1985; Tekok-Kilic et al., 2001). Remarkably, in no-go trials we did not 
observe any typical inhibition-related components like the no-go related 
frontal N2 or frontocentral P3 (Bokura et al., 2001; Bruin et al., 2001; Eimer, 
1993; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Gajewski & Falkenstein, 2013; Kok, 1986; 
Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; Randall & Smith, 2011; Smith et al., 2008), 
suggesting that there is little active inhibition involved in cued no-go trials. 
Moreover, correct feedback4 elicited a parietal P3 which was more positive 
in go trials than in no-go trials in both win and avoid losing conditions but 
not in neutral conditions, which implies an effect of action when motivation 
                                                     
4 Error feedback was not analyzed due to very low error rates, especially in no-go 
trials. 
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is high. Considering that the feedback P3 is involved in high-level affective 
evaluation of the outcome (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Wu & Zhou, 2009; 
Zhou et al., 2010), studies that found enhanced correct-feedback P3 
amplitudes in more difficult tasks have explained this in terms of more 
positive evaluation of the feedback stimulus after one had to put in more 
effort to correctly perform the task (Ma et al., 2014; Schevernels et al., 
2014), which is again consistent with the notion that effort differed between 
cued go and no-go trials in the present experiment5.  
Thus, the enhanced activity in the SN/VTA and the striatum in 
expected go trials compared to no-go trials that was found by Guitart-Masip 
et al. (2011, 2012a) might not only represent anticipated action effects but 
also differences in anticipated mental effort or resource allocations. This is 
in line with previous findings demonstrating dopaminergic and striatal 
involvement in the (preparatory) control of cognitive resources in order to 
achieve goals and optimize behavioral outcomes (Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs 
et al., 2012; Nieoullon, 2002; Plichta et al., 2013; Vassena et al., 2014). 
Related to this idea, Kurniawan et al. (2013) implemented a very similar 
paradigm but they orthogonalized physical effort and valence in a pure go-
trial context by showing fractal cues that indicated the required force with 
                                                     
5 The feedback-related P3 amplitude has also been shown to be enhanced when 
events are unlikely or unexpected (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2005, 
2007; Wu & Zhou, 2009). In the current task accuracy was lower in go trials 
compared to no-go trials and thus correct feedback could be experienced as more 
unexpected. However, the correct-feedback P3 did not significantly differ between 
go trials and no-go trials in neutral conditions for which the frequency proportion is 
similar as in win and avoid losing conditions. Furthermore, the subjective frequency 
difference might have been reduced given that 30% of correct responses were not 
rewarded or punished in both go and no-go trials (probabilistic feedback). Hence, we 
favor the stimulus-evaluation over the expectancy account to explain the action-
related differences in correct feedback-P3 amplitudes in the current task. 
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which subjects had to squeeze a handgrip (high effort or low effort) and the 
probability to win or lose money. They found increased BOLD signals when 
anticipating higher effort in the ACC and the dorsal striatum, two typical 
reward-related brain areas. Although in the current study we investigate 
mental effort and not physical effort (as in the study of Kurniawan et al., 
2013), it has been shown that they partly rely on similar underlying 
mechanisms and brain structures (like the ventral striatum) that 
motivationally drive both task-specific systems (Schmidt et al., 2012). Also, 
In many studies it has been advocated that dopaminergic activity is involved 
in motivated behavior and specifically in the exertion of effort to overcome 
work-related requirements or costs (Kurniawan et al., 2011; Salamone & 
Correa, 2012; Salamone et al., 2005, 2007). However, whether this link 
between dopamine and effort can only be established when an action is 
required or whether it also plays a role in action inhibition or withdrawal is 
not clear. Hence, it would be interesting to manipulate (preparatory) task 
demands. Yet, in the current basic task design there seems to be no feasible 
way to create more difficult anticipated no-go trials without lowering 
stopping probability below 100%. 
The contribution of effort-related processes aside, a direct coupling 
between action and valence could of course still exist (in which dopamine 
might be involved, see also Frank et al., 2004, 2007). This has also been 
suggested by other previous studies investigating instrumental learning, 
where it was shown that subjects were more successful in learning to 
withhold a response (no-go) when anticipating punishment and to actively 
respond (go) when anticipating reward (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Chowdhury 
et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012b, 2014; Richter et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, in the current study action and effort are clearly intertwined 
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and anticipation of no-go does not necessarily induce (preparation for) active 
inhibition or withdrawal, but rather altogether diminished (preparatory) 
cognitive resources devoted to the task.  
Effects of valence and interaction effects  
Behaviorally, we did not replicate the asymmetrical valence effect in 
that there was no significant difference in accuracy levels or reaction times 
between go to win and go to avoid losing conditions (although numerically 
going in the expected direction). This might be due to an overall difference 
in reaction time, since in the current experiment subjects responded on 
average approximately 200 ms faster compared to the studies of Guitart-
Masip et al. (2011, 2012a). The generally slower response speed in the 
previous studies might be explained by the fMRI versus EEG scanning 
environment, differences in task instructions, task design or training levels of 
subjects. Moreover, differences in response time-out might be relevant. In 
particular, our time-out procedure might have been too strict and could have 
pushed subjects to respond very fast and therefore leaves a smaller margin 
for improvements over conditions. Moreover the implementation of a neutral 
condition might have increased the motivational value of the avoid losing 
condition to a similar level as the win condition which is suggested by 
smaller reaction times on both go to win and go to avoid losing trials 
compared to go neutral trials. Of note, similar behavioral results for potential 
monetary gain and potential monetary loss have been found previously 
(Carter et al., 2009; Engelmann et al., 2009; but see Ivanov et al., 2012; 
Paschke et al., 2015; Potts, 2011). Given these differences, our failure to 
replicate the asymmetrical valence effect on go accuracy might very well not 
translate into a challenge of its validity (also note that on the neural level we 
did observe some interactions between action and valence, see below).  
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The cue-locked P3 amplitude in go trials was increased for win trials 
compared to avoid losing and neutral trials, thereby confirming the 
sensitivity of this component to reward (Goldstein et al., 2006, 2008; Hughes 
et al., 2012; Pfabigan et al., 2014; Schevernels et al., 2014), particularly in 
cues signaling go trials (Kohls et al., 2011). However, although we expected 
to find a motivational effect on the preparatory CNV component (mainly in 
go trials), we did not find a significant amplitude difference between 
anticipated gain, loss and neutral trials. However, results of previous studies 
investigating the role of reward and/or punishment during target preparation 
are also inconsistent, with some studies reporting a lack of motivational 
influences on the CNV amplitude (Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006; 
Sobotka et al., 1992) but others finding larger CNV amplitudes for cues 
indicating reward and/or punishment availability (Hughes et al., 2012; 
Pfabigan et al., 2014; Schevernels et al., 2014; Vuillier et al., 2015). In 
contrast to the current paradigm, these previous studies however usually 
investigated reward effects on the CNV amplitude in classic monetary 
incentive delay tasks that always involve the execution of an action. 
Regarding target processing, the current study shows that the target-
evoked go P3 is also affected by motivation, with larger amplitudes in both 
punishment and reward conditions compared to neutral conditions. The 
target P3 has been previously shown to be sensitive to reward likely 
reflecting increased attention to the target when it is highly significant or 
motivationally relevant (Baines et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012; Krebs et 
al., 2013; Schevernels et al., 2014). Turning to feedback processing, the 
parietal P3 evoked by correct feedback showed a main effect of valence with 
a decrease in P3 amplitudes from win trials to avoid losing trials to neutral 
trials. This is consistent with previous studies that have observed larger P3 
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amplitudes for reward compared to no-reward feedback (Bellebaum et al., 
2010; Hajcak et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2005; Schevernels et al., 2014) 
illustrating this component’s sensitivity to the magnitude of the reward 
outcome and thus suggesting its involvement in motivated significance (for 
an overview see San Martín, 2012).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Together, the present behavioral and ERP results pattern points in the 
direction of effort-related differences between go and no-go trials in the 
orthogonalized go/no-go paradigm of Guitart-Masip (2011, 2012a). Most 
importantly, the absence of a CNV in no-go trials suggests a lack of 
involvement of preparatory cognitive processes. In turn, early and late visual 
attention during target processing was decreased and no typical inhibition-
related components were detected after no-go cues. Finally, even the 
feedback-related ERP results implied a role of effort in that correct feedback 
seemed to be valued more positively in go trials. Therefore we conclude that 
the established dominance of anticipated action (over valence) in typical 
reward-related brain networks simultaneously entails differences in mental 
effort engagement. From a more general perspective, our results suggest that 
action- and effort-related factors are difficult to disentangle and raise the 
question whether action effects would still hold when the amount of 
(anticipated) effort is held constant. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE 
INVOLVEMENT OF PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE 
CONTROL IN A REWARDED STOP-SIGNAL TASK 1 
Reward availability is known to facilitate various cognitive operations, 
which is usually studied in cue-based paradigms that allow for enhanced 
preparation in reward-related trials. However, recent research using tasks 
that signal reward availability via task-relevant stimuli suggests that reward 
can also rapidly promote performance independent of global strategic 
preparation. Notably, this effect was also observed in a reward-related stop-
signal task, in which behavioral measures of inhibition speed were found to 
be shorter in trials signaling reward. Corresponding fMRI results implied 
that this effect relies on boosted reactive control as indicated by increased 
activity in the ‘inhibition-related network’ in the reward-related condition. 
Here, we used EEG to better characterize transient modulations of 
attentional processes likely preceding this ultimate implementation of 
response inhibition. Importantly, such modulations would probably reflect 
enhanced proactive control in the form of more top-down attention to 
reward-related features. Counter to the notion that behavioral benefits 
would rely purely on reactive control, we found increased stop-evoked 
attentional processing (larger N1 component) on reward-related trials. This 
effect was accompanied by enhanced frontal P3 amplitudes reflecting 
successful stopping, and earlier and larger ERP differences between 
successful and failed stop trials in the reward-related condition. Finally, 
more global proactive control processes in the form of a reward context 
modulation of reward-unrelated trials did not have an effect on stopping 
performance but did influence attentional processing of go stimuli. Together, 
these results suggest that proactive and reactive processes can interact to 
bring about stimulus-specific reward benefits when the task precludes 
differential global preparation. 
                                                     
1 Schevernels, H., Bombeke, K., Van der Borght, L., Hopf, J.-M., Krebs, R. M., 
Boehler, C. N. Electrophysiological evidence for the involvement of proactive and 
reactive control in a rewarded stop-signal task. Manuscript submitted for 
publication.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life it is important to adapt behavior to changing 
situational demands, a function that has been broadly labeled cognitive 
control. A central component thereof is the ability to rapidly withhold an 
already-initiated motor action when needed. This inhibition process has been 
investigated frequently using the stop-signal task, in which responses to a go 
stimulus occasionally have to be cancelled upon the rapidly following 
presentation of a stop signal (Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984). The 
processes underlying this task are usually explained by the well-validated 
horse-race model which assumes that the behavioral outcome (successful or 
unsuccessful stopping) is determined by a race between a go and a stop 
process, that are largely independent (Logan & Cowan, 1984, see also 
Boucher et al., 2007). Based on this model a measure for the duration of the 
implementation of response inhibition can be derived, the so-called stop-
signal response time (SSRT), which has been shown to be prolonged in 
several neuropsychiatric disorders such as attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, obsessive-compulsivity disorder and schizophrenia (Bekker et al., 
2005b; Chamberlain et al., 2006a; Lijffijt et al., 2005; Lipszyc & Schachar, 
2010). 
While different cognitive functions, including cognitive control, are 
usually studied in settings devoid of explicit extrinsic motivation, it has been 
shown that reward prospect can have beneficial effects on a range of 
cognitive functions like working memory (Beck et al., 2010; Gilbert & Fiez, 
2004), memory formation (Adcock et al., 2006), and attention (Krebs et al., 
2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Schevernels et al., 2014; Stoppel et al., 
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2011). In these studies, motivation is usually implemented using a cue 
indicating that a reward can be obtained if the upcoming task is performed 
correctly (monetary incentive delay task; Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser & 
Hommer, 2000). Hence, reward effects have usually been investigated with 
respect to preparatory proactive processes showing that reward prospect 
improves behavioral performance largely via enhanced top-down 
preparatory control (Chelazzi et al., 2013; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). The 
few studies that have looked at reward effects on response inhibition thus far 
have used such task contexts that allow for differential preparation by 
implementing cues indicating reward availability (e.g., Greenhouse & 
Wessel, 2013; Rosell-Negre et al., 2014; Scheres et al., 2001). Breaking with 
this traditional setup, we have recently shown that reward can also influence 
response inhibition without the involvement of global preparatory functions 
(Boehler et al., 2012b, 2014, but see also Wilbertz et al., 2014). Instead of 
pre-cueing reward prospect, the color of the stop signal itself indicated 
whether successful stopping would be rewarded. Despite the fact that 
participants could not globally prepare for rewarded trials in advance, 
response inhibition was facilitated (shorter SSRTs) for reward-related trials. 
Moreover, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) results suggested 
that this behavioral benefit was due to enhanced reactive control 
mechanisms as indicated by reward-related enhancements in right-lateralized 
medial and lateral prefrontal brain regions that are considered to be central to 
response inhibition in general (Boehler et al., 2014).  
Yet, it is possible that this enhanced control was not completely 
independent of additional proactive processes. Specifically, although global 
proactive control enhancements were precluded because reward-related trials 
were unpredictable, stimulus-specific proactive control could still have been 
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involved if observers strategically screened for the reward-related color. This 
may have increased the sensory response to the reward-related stop signal. 
Given the tight timing of different processing stages in this task, it is quite 
possible that fMRI would not be sensitive to transient changes in attentional 
processes. Here, methods with higher temporal resolution like 
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG) might 
be more suitable, and have in fact already been used to establish a general 
role of attentional processes in the dynamics of the processes underlying the 
stop-signal task. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that the size of the 
sensory stop signal-locked N1 component is related to ultimate stopping 
success, with larger N1 amplitude being found for successful stop trials 
(Bekker et al., 2005a; Boehler et al., 2009). This effect likely indicates that 
more attention was devoted to the stop-stimulus, possibly at the cost of 
paying less attention to the preceding go-stimulus, and that the distribution 
of attentional resources is likely under active top-down control (Boehler et 
al., 2009). In line with this notion, in a recent study of Greenhouse and 
Wessel (2013) that implemented a paradigm in which cues indicated the 
relative value of stopping and going, it was observed that the N1 component 
was enhanced when cues emphasized stopping over going. In this case N1 
amplitudes were enhanced for successful and unsuccessful stop trials 
implying a generally enhanced deployment of top-down visual attention to 
the stop signal in this condition. Hence, in the current study we implemented 
our previous rewarded stop-signal paradigm (Boehler et al., 2012b, 2014) in 
an EEG setting to be able to identify transient modulations of attention that 
might precede the implementation of response inhibition. More specifically, 
we expected  an enhanced stop-locked N1 component in successful stop 
trials in line with previous studies (Bekker et al., 2005a; Boehler et al., 
2009). Furthermore, if the current event-related reward manipulation 
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induced changes in proactive attentional control (in the form of enhanced 
top-down attention) we expected larger stop-evoked N1 amplitudes in stop 
trials that signal reward availability. 
Besides the possible role of stimulus-specific attentional control, 
global preparatory control processes could still generally occur in our task. 
Specifically, even though our task equates such processes between reward-
related and reward-unrelated trials, global preparation can play a role in the 
form of a general context effect in the current task. For example, Jimura and 
colleagues (2010) showed that when reward-unrelated trials were intermixed 
with reward-related trials (which triggered a proactive control mode), 
working memory improved also for reward-unrelated trials. Moreover, other 
studies have shown that behavioral measures for cognitive functions, like 
conflict adaptation (Braem et al., 2012) and action-effect binding (Muhle-
Karbe & Krebs, 2012), can be altered for reward-unrelated trials in a 
rewarded context. These results suggest that a reward context can create a 
global state of sustained strategic proactive control (see also Locke & 
Braver, 2008). In order to investigate whether such global processes also 
occur in our task and whether they influence response inhibition, in the 
present study we added a control block in which none of the trials were 
associated with reward. Behaviorally this context effect should show up 
when comparing inhibition-related parameters, in particular the SSRT, in no-
reward trials from the no-reward block with no-reward trials from the reward 
block. Specifically, if the reward-unrelated trials in the reward block would 
benefit from being in a rewarded task context, we should also find improved 
behavioral performance in these trials (compared to trials in the no-reward 
block). Given that the introduction of different contexts or blocks can create 
changes in the sustained attentional state that might affect the processing of 
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all stimuli including go signals, we also explored the early attention-related 
go-locked N1, which has been related to strategic deployment of visual 
attention to the go stimulus (Boehler et al., 2009). 
In addition to the specific interest in attentional components possibly 
reflecting proactive control, EEG offers a rich view on the process dynamics 
in the stop-signal task, allowing us to also study possible modulations of 
later, presumably control-related, components in relation to the reward 
availability and context manipulation. Most studies using event-related 
potentials (ERPs) in the stop-signal and go/no-go task, have focused on the 
frontal N2 and P3, labeled the N2/P3 complex (e.g. Bekker et al., 2005a; 
Bokura et al., 2001; Eimer, 1993; Huster et al., 2010, 2011; Kok et al., 2004; 
Ramautar et al., 2006a; Schmajuk et al., 2006; van Boxtel et al., 2001; van 
Gaal et al., 2011). Recent studies have found that the N2 is usually larger in 
unsuccessful than in successful stop trials suggesting a general role in 
response control, conflict monitoring and error processing (Dimoska et al., 
2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Huster et 
al., 2013). In contrast, particularly the frontal P3 has been argued to reflect 
actual reactive inhibition in the stop-signal task (e.g. Bekker et al., 2005a; 
Dimoska et al., 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Lansbergen et al., 
2007). Thus, in line with these previous studies, we expected larger N2 
amplitudes in unsuccessful stop trials and larger P3 amplitudes in successful 
stop trials (e.g. Dimoska et al., 2006; Greenhouse et al., 2013; Senderecka et 
al., 2012). Moreover, concerning reward modulations, the aforementioned 
study by Greenhouse and Wessel (2013) showed that the frontal stop-evoked 
P3 was larger when stopping was successful compared to unsuccessful, and 
that this difference was larger when stopping was rewarded over going. 
Hence, boosted reactive control in reward-related stop trials, as indicated by 
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our previous fMRI study (Boehler et al., 2014), might be mainly reflected by 
modulations of the stop P3 component. Also previous studies have observed 
earlier peak latencies for the N2 and P3 components (Kok et al., 2004) and 
earlier onsets of the P3 (Wessel & Aron, 2014) in successful compared to 
failed stop trials, suggesting that an earlier implementation of the internal 
response to the stop signal increases the likelihood of successful stopping.  
Therefore, reward-related differences in reactive response inhibition could 
also entail latency differences of the successful and unsuccessful stop-related 
N2 and P3. Hence, the overall aim of the current study was to investigate 
reactive control processes that have been shown to be susceptible to reward 
manipulations in a broader mechanistic context which includes a possible 
role of transient and sustained attentional processes. 
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty healthy right-handed students were recruited for the 
experiment (6 males, mean age = 22 years, range = 18-26 years). Subjects 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of psychiatric or 
neurological disorders. Prior to participation they all gave written informed 
consent. After finishing the experimental task of approximately one hour, 
participants received a compensation of 20€ and an additional performance-
dependent bonus between 2.5 and 4€. 
Stimuli and procedure 
For the present study we used a modified version of the rewarded 
stop-signal paradigm previously used in Boehler  et al. (2012, 2014). In 
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contrast to that earlier work, we optimized the experiment for an EEG 
setting, and added a no-reward block to be able to investigate reward context 
effects (see figure 1). Throughout the experiment a black rectangular box 
and a white fixation dot were presented centrally on a gray background. As 
in a typical stop-signal task (Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984), subjects 
had to perform a simple discrimination task on most trials (go trials), but 
were asked to inhibit their response to the go stimulus whenever an 
infrequent stop signal was presented shortly thereafter (stop trials). Go 
stimuli were green traffic light symbols pointing to the left or the right. The 
target go stimulus was presented centrally above the fixation dot and 
surrounded by 2 additional green traffic symbols on both sides that were to 
be ignored. Participants were asked to respond rapidly with the index finger 
(left mouse button) or middle finger (right mouse button) of their right hand 
according to the orientation of the central go traffic sign. A typical ‘don’t-
walk’ traffic sign was used as a stop stimulus, and importantly the color of 
this signal could either be blue or pink with a matching number of 
occurrences. In both go and stop trials the total stimulus presentation 
duration was 600 ms, followed by a variable inter-stimulus interval of 1000 
to 1400 ms (randomly distributed). Participants had to complete two blocks, 
a reward block and a no-reward block. Only in the reward block the color of 
the stop signal was relevant, since it indicated whether a correct stop would 
be rewarded or not. 
Participants started with a short practice run to get acquainted with the 
task. This session included 34 go trials and 20 stop trials with 10 blue stop 
signals and 10 pink stop signals. In stop trials the interval between a go and 
stop stimulus (go-stop delay) was constantly adapted to create a 50% 
proportion of correct stopping.  To this end, a staircase procedure was 
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implemented in which the go-stop delay was increased by 34 ms after a 
successful stop trial (SST) and decreased by 34 ms after an unsuccessful stop 
trial (UST), with a minimum of 34 ms and a maximum of 567 ms delay 
(initial value: 200 ms). Pink and blue stop trials shared the same staircase, 
thereby controlling the stopping-success rate over all stop trials within a 
block. Reward was only assigned to one of the two colors of the stop signal 
at the start of the reward block. The order of the reward and no-reward 
blocks (reward block first or no-reward block first) and the color of reward-
predictive stop signals (pink or blue) were counterbalanced across subjects, 
and only two long blocks were used to minimize carry-over effects related to 
reward-related colors. Both the experimental reward and no-reward block 
consisted of 5 runs of 100 trials, yielding a total of 320 go trials and 180 stop 
trials (90 trials for each color) for each block. In the reward block 
participants could win points if inhibition was successful in reward-related 
stop trials, but not in reward-unrelated stop trials. At the end of every run the 
amount of points gathered in that run was shown. Participants were also 
explicitly told that these points would be added up at the end of the block 
resulting in an extra bonus of between 0€ and 6€ depending on their 
performance in reward-related stop trials, and they were informed about the 
exact transformation from points to money. Subjects were also asked to 
respond as fast as possible and not to slow down their responses during the 
experiment. Additionally, to further prevent slowing, we told participants 
that the collected points in that run would be set to zero in case they 
responded too slowly on average in a given run. Since this procedure turned 
out to be quite effective, this latter correction was never actually used. 
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Figure 1. Procedure rewarded stop-signal task. In most of the trials participants had 
to press left or right according to the direction of the central go stimulus (go trials). 
However, occasionally a stop signal was presented shortly after a go stimulus with a 
variable go-stop delay indicating that the response had to be withheld (stop trials). 
The color of the stop signal was either pink or blue. In the reward block the reward-
related (RR) color indicated that succesful stopping would be rewarded, while in 
reward-unrelated (RU) stop trials no reward could be earned. In the no-reward block 
the color of the stop signal had no additional meaning since no money could be won 
for either of the two kinds of trials (both RU stop trials). The order of the blocks and 
the reward color were counterbalanced across participants. R block: reward block; 
NR block: no-reward block; RR: reward-related; RU: reward-unrelated; ISI: inter-
stimulus interval. 
 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 
EEG data was collected with a Biosemi ActiveTwo system (Biosemi, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands) using 64 Ag-AgCl scalp electrodes positioned 
according to the standard international 10-20 system. In addition to these 
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scalp electrodes external electrodes were attached to the left and right 
mastoid. Moreover, to monitor horizontal and vertical eye movements 
electrodes were placed at the outer canti of both eyes and directly above and 
below the left eye. Signals were recorded with a sampling rate of 256 Hz. 
Because of a relatively high number of missed go trials, which were 
furthermore unbalanced over the two blocks, the data of one participant were 
excluded. 
Data was processed and analyzed using EEGLAB (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014). Data was re-
referenced offline to the average of the left and right mastoid and a low-pass 
FIR filter was applied at 30 Hz (-6 dB attenuation at 33.7 Hz) was applied. 
Moreover, blinks were removed using independent component analysis. 
Epochs were created locked to all relevant stimulus types, with a time 
window from -200 (for baseline correction) to 1000 ms for go-locked epochs 
and a time window of -200 to 1500 for stop-locked epochs. Automatic 
artifact rejection was performed on these epochs with a subsequent visual 
inspection to reject missed artifacts. The automatic rejection involved 
removing trials with extreme values (larger than -/+ 150μV) in the EEG 
signal of the 64 scalp electrodes. Furthermore, epochs including horizontal 
eye movements were detected by a step function in the bipolar eye channel 
(with a threshold of 60μV, window size of 400 ms and window step of 10 
ms). Together, this resulted in on average 5.4% rejected epochs locked to the 
go stimulus and 5.1% removed stop-locked epochs in stop trials.  
In a stop trial the presentation of the go stimulus is usually very 
rapidly followed by the stop signal (typically around 200 ms after go-
stimulus onset). One apparent problem that arises when using the stop-signal 
task in an EEG setting is that the processing of the go-stimuli is still ongoing 
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when the stop stimulus is presented. In particular, the signal overlap will 
differ for conditions that feature different go-stop delays, as is the case for 
successful and unsuccessful stop trials. As a consequence this overlap 
coming from the go stimulus should be removed to be able to examine 
processing that is specifically related to the stop signal. To this end, a 
difference wave was created by subtracting overlapping go ERP components 
from the stop-locked ERPs based on a procedure introduced by de Jong et al. 
(1990) and Kok et al. (2004)2 (that was also successfully implemented by 
Krämer et al. 2011, 2013 and Ramautar et al. 2004, 2006a). First, since the 
overlap depends on the stimulus onset asynchrony between go and stop 
stimulus and the stop signal usually follows the go stimulus slightly more 
quickly in successful than failed stop trials, we matched go-stimulus trials in 
terms of the go-stop delays of stop-signal trials in the reward and no-reward 
block. Hence, in go trials we set a mock S2 event that is matched in time 
with regard to the stop-signal delay of the stop ERP which the go activity is 
subtracted from. This means that for each delay separately we subtracted the 
delay-matched go-trial activity. Second, it is important to realize that not 
only stimulus-based processes differ across the different conditions, but 
                                                     
2 Another technique that has been used to remove go-processing overlap from stop 
trails is ADJAR (Woldorff, 1993) (e.g. Bekker et al., 2005a, 2005b; Lansbergen et 
al., 2007; Schmajuk et al., 2006). While more finessed approaches might also allow 
for an adaptive adjustment of the go-stop delay, typically ADJAR involves a 
systematic jittering between the two successive events it separates (here, go and 
stop). In contrast, here we used a simple adaptive procedure (i.e. a dynamic staircase 
procedure including a fixed number of go-stop delays) without additional temporal 
jittering in order to stay close to our earlier studies investigating the present reward 
effect on response inhibition (Boehler et al., 2012b, 2014). In general this dynamic 
procedure of adjusting the go-stop delay is preferable since it brings all participants’ 
stopping success rate to approximately 50%, which furthermore helps to reliably 
estimate the SSRT. 
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likely also response-based ones. Specifically, since a horse-race model is 
assumed to underlie the stop signal task, motor response buildup in USTs 
correspond more closely to fast go trials, whilst SSTs correspond to go trials 
with slow responses. Therefore we matched go and corresponding stop trials 
according to their reaction time distribution (e.g. Kok et al., 2004; Ramautar 
et al., 2004, 2006a). Hence, slow and fast go trials were created  for every 
go-stop delay according to the proportion of successful and failed stops per 
participant and accordingly subtracted (UST-go fast and SST-go slow) 
separately for the reward and no-reward block. 
In addition to the temporal overlap of go- and stop-related signals, 
visual inspection of the stop-locked signals also suggested spatial overlap. 
Some components were not clearly distinguishable since they arose in 
relative close proximity of each other at similar points in time, like the visual 
posterior N1 and the frontocentral N2 and the frontocentral stop P3a and 
parietal P3b. To disentangle these components we applied a Laplacian filter 
to the stop-locked data using the CSD toolbox (Kayser, 2009; Kayser & 
Tenke, 2006) thereby enhancing the spatial resolution and intensity of ERP 
components. Two recent studies (Krämer et al., 2013; Rangel-Gomez et al., 
2015) have also successfully applied surface Laplacian transformation to 
stop-locked ERPs that were corrected for residual go activity using a similar 
subtraction method as the one used here. Specifically, they have shown the 
value of this technique for separating stopping-related frontal and occipito-
parietal negativities. More generally, Kayser and Tenke (in press) have also 
demonstrated that Laplacian transformation is useful to dissociate P3a and 
P3b components. Using this Laplacian transformation, current source 
densities (CSDs) were calculated according to the spherical spline algorithm 
of Perrin et al. (1989), using a default smoothing constant of 1.0-5 and a 
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head radius of 10 cm. Note that transformation via CSDs results in 
reference-free ERP data. Although stop-locked ERPs refer to CSDs, for 
simplicity reasons we speak of the related components without always 
explicitly mentioning the underlying transformation. 
Analyses 
The SSRT was measured using the integration approach, which has 
been shown to be the most reliable approach in particular in the presence of 
non-identical stopping-success rates across different conditions (Boehler et 
al., 2012a; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; 
Verbruggen et al., 2013). In this method go-trial reaction times are rank-
ordered and the reaction time (RT) corresponding to the percentage of failed 
stop trails is identified for each run and each subject separately. Next, the 
average duration of the go-stop delay for both kinds of stop trials (blue and 
pink) in each run is subtracted from this percentile-based go-RT value. 
Accuracy, RTs, and SSRTs were analyzed using paired sample t-tests and 
repeated-measures analyses of variance (rANOVAs). All statistical tests 
were performed two-tailed unless stated otherwise. 
All analyses related to the EEG signal of the unsuccessful stop 
condition exclusively included trials with “correct” responses to the go 
stimulus to avoid additional error-related signals. ERP measurements locked 
to the go stimulus focused on stop trials and were limited to the N1 because 
this component occurs clearly before the average onset of the stop signal, 
thus influences from processing the stop signal will be minimal, and has 
been shown before to play a role in stopping performance (Boehler et al., 
2009; Knyazev et al., 2008). Time points and a region of interest for each 
component were defined based on the average ERP over all conditions in 
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waveforms and topographical maps. Mean amplitudes and local peak 
latencies (over ±11.7 ms and using an absolute peak in case no local peak is 
found) were measured at this location and within this given timeframe. 
In stop trials the N1 component that was time-locked to the go 
stimulus preceding the stop signal peaked over bilateral posterior regions 
(channels PO7 and PO8) between 140 and 180 ms. A rANOVA was 
performed on the amplitude and latency of this go-locked component related 
to stop trials with factors success (UST, SST), which indicates whether a 
given stop trial was ultimately successful or not, and block (no-reward, 
reward). Turning to the processing of the stop stimulus, stop-locked P1 was 
quantified between 90 and 130 ms at PO7 and PO8, whilst N1 amplitude 
was observed at PO7 and PO8 between 160 and 210 ms. The frontocentral 
stop-related N2 occurred at FCz at distinctively different time points for SST 
and UST and consequently amplitudes were analyzed between 140 and 180 
ms for SST and 150 and 230 ms for UST. A subsequent frontocentral 
positivity clearly peaked at FCz, extending from 230 to 370 ms for SST and 
from 270 to 410 ms for trials in which stopping failed. No evidence was 
found for general reward context effects in behavior (i.e. no difference 
between reward-unrelated trials in the reward and no-reward block, see 
section 5.1), which mostly speaks to the specificity of the event-related 
reward effect (i.e. the influence of the reward-related stimulus color) and 
implies that reward-unrelated trials in the reward block provide a good 
baseline condition to identify these specific reward-related effects. Hence to 
prevent an unnecessary increase in the complexity of the results and a 
decrease of the sensitivity to detect event-related reward effects, we only 
investigated ERPs for stop signals in the reward block.  Therefore, 
components were analyzed using a rANOVA with factors success (UST, 
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SST) and reward (reward-related, reward-unrelated) in the reward block. 
However, in figures we do illustrate ERPs locked to stop signals in the no-
reward block for reference. 
In keeping with the notion that response-inhibition processes are 
probably more (efficiently) involved in successful than in failed stop trials, 
we contrasted ERP waveforms from successful and unsuccessful stop trials 
in reward-related and reward-unrelated conditions to be able to investigate 
differential inhibition-related activity (ERPs related to trials in the no-reward 
block were again included in the figure as a visual reference). This identified 
a large positivity over electrode site FCz between 100 and 350 ms. 
Moreover, we performed a two-tailed permutation test based on the tmax 
statistic (Blair & Karniski, 1993) using the Mass Univariate ERP Toolbox 
(Groppe et al., 2011) to be able to detect when ERPs related to SSTs differ 
reliably from USTs waveforms both for trials locked to reward-related stops 
and to reward-unrelated stops in the reward block. To limit the number of 
comparisons and increase power we downsampled the data to 128 Hz and 
tested all time points between 100 and 350 ms at electrode FCz, resulting in 
a total of 33 comparisons. The null distribution was derived from 2500 
within-subject random permutations. It has to be noted that this permutation 
test strongly controls the familywise-error rate and consequently is one of 
the best methods to establish the onset of an effect since a significant 
outcome at a certain time point is quite reliable. However, this also means 
that it has less statistical power compared to other related techniques (like 
cluster-based permutations tests) and thus likely provides slightly delayed 
onset measures (for a more detailed discussion see Groppe et al., 2011).  
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RESULTS 
Behavior 
Accuracy 
The percentage of correct responses on go trials did not differ 
significantly between the no-reward and reward block (t(18)=0.42, p=0.68). 
Also, the number of successful stop trials did not differ overall between 
blocks (t(18)=1.29, p=0.21). Importantly, results showed significantly more 
successful stops for reward-related than reward-unrelated stop trials 
(t(18)=2.88, p=0.005, one-tailed) within the reward block (see table 1). A 
slightly different stopping-success rate in the two types of stop trials is 
possible due to the joint staircase procedure, which only controls the overall 
stopping-success rate (50%) and was expected based on our earlier work 
(Boehler et al., 2012). 
Reaction times and SSRTs 
Correct RTs in go trials were similar in the reward block compared to 
the no-reward block (t(18)=1.79, p=0.091). In line with previous results and 
the horse-race model, participants responded significantly faster in USTs 
compared to go trials (F(1,17)=268.49, p<0.001, see table 1). In contrast, 
there was no effect of reward color in the reward block for UST reaction 
times (t(18) = 0.49, p=0.63). Importantly, we found faster inhibition in the 
reward-related stop condition compared to the reward-unrelated stop 
condition (t(18)=2.15, p=0.023, one-tailed) corroborating the differential 
stopping-success rate which implies a faster stopping process for reward-
related trials, thereby replicating the behavioral findings  of Boehler et al. 
(2012, 2014). The SSRT in reward-unrelated stop trials in the reward block, 
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in turn, did not differ from the SSRT in the no-reward block (t(18)=0.65), 
indicating the absence of a behavioral context effect in which stop trials 
could have globally benefited from the context of reward-related trials.  
 
Table 1. Summary of behavioral results (average ± SEM). R block: reward block; 
NR block: no-reward block; RR: reward-related; RU: reward-unrelated; RT: 
reaction time, SSRT: stop-signal response time.Visual Cues. Five possible cues were 
presented to the participant. 
 
Event-related Potentials 
Go-locked ERPs 
Regarding the go stimulus only the N1 was analyzed which appears 
before the average go-stop delay and has been shown to be relevant for 
stopping performance (Boehler et al., 2009; Knyazev et al., 2008). As is 
evident in figure 2, the amplitude of the N1 component time-locked to the go 
stimulus in stop trials was larger in the reward block compared to the no-
reward block (F(1,18)=13.52, p=0.002). Furthermore there was a trend 
towards an effect of success (F(1,18)=3.69, p=0.072) suggesting larger go-
induced N1 amplitudes in trials resulting in a failed stop.  
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Figure 2. Go-locked N1 in stop trials. Grand-average ERP waveforms time-locked 
to the onset of the go stimulus in stop trials averaged over electrodes PO7 and PO8 
are shown. Go-locked N1 amplitudes are clearly larger in the reward block 
compared to the no-reward block, as is depicted in the topographic map reflecting 
the related reward difference between 140 and 180 ms. Positive plotted upwards; R: 
reward block; NR: no-reward block; SST: successful stop trial; UST: unsuccessful 
stop trial. 
 
Stop-locked CSDs 
Bilateral visual P1 components did not show any significant effects in 
amplitude (all p-values>0.1), nor in latency (all p-values>0.15). The stop-
evoked N1 amplitude was larger for USTs compared to SSTs in the reward 
block (F(1,18)=5.4, p=0.032). Interestingly within the reward block, reward-
related stop-stimuli elicited larger N1s than reward-unrelated ones 
(F(1,18)=5.39, p=0.032). We found no significant interaction effect between 
the factors reward and success (F(1,18)=0.46, p=0.5). Although there was no 
significant effect of overall stopping success on latency over the two kinds 
of blocks, within the reward block N1s appeared slightly earlier in SSTs than 
in USTs (F(1,18)=4.82, p=0.041). These effects are displayed in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Stop-locked early visual components. Event-related CSDs elicited by stop 
signals related to the different conditions over posterior electrodes PO7 and PO8, 
depicting P1 and N1. Topographic maps of the N1 component on the right result 
from condition-wise contrasts from 160 to 210 ms showing an effect of the reward-
signaling color of the stop signal and a main effect of stopping success. Positive 
plotted upwards; R: reward block; NR: no-reward block; SST: successful stop trial; 
UST: unsuccessful stop trial; RR: reward-related; RU: reward-unrelated. 
 
Figure 4A shows that the frontocentral stop-related N2 peaks (and 
turns towards a positive polarity probably due to P3 overlap3) substantially 
earlier in time in SSTs compared to USTs in the reward block, with peaks 
appearing  around  160 ms for SSTs and 200 ms for USTs trials 
(F(1,18)=39.06, p<0.001). Therefore, comparing amplitudes between these 
types of trials requires considering different time windows (140-180 ms for 
SSTs and 150-230 ms for USTs). This strongly limits the comparability 
between amplitudes of SSTs and USTs, since they might be related to 
                                                     
3 Although with the CSD analyses we tried to disentangle different components, the 
frontal stop-locked N2 and P3 appeared in very close proximity to each other, both 
in time and space, and are thus hard to separate. The N2 latency effect showing 
earlier peak latencies in successful stop trials might thus be due to an earlier onset of 
the overlapping P3.  
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distinctive underlying processes, but not between trial types within these two 
conditions (reward-related SSTs vs reward-unrelated SSTs and reward-
related USTs vs reward-unrelated USTs). When nevertheless comparing the 
values from these different time windows, N2 amplitudes showed significant 
stopping-success effects (F(1,18)=10.47, p=0.005) with larger negativities in 
USTs (see figure 4A). The frontocentral P3 appeared considerably later 
when inhibition failed, peaking around 300 ms for SSTs and 340 ms for 
USTs (F(1,18)=45.43, p<0.001). Amplitudes (over different time-windows 
for USTs and SSTs) revealed a significant main effect of stopping success 
(F(1,18)=14.12, p=0.001) and a marginally significant main effect of reward 
(F(1,17)=4, p=0.061) implying a larger positivity in SSTs and in reward-
related trials in the reward block respectively. Interestingly, reward and 
stopping success significantly interacted (F(1,18)=22.13, p<0.001) indicating 
that the stop P3 amplitude difference between reward-related and reward-
unrelated trials was opposite in SSTs compared to USTs (see figure 4A) with 
larger amplitudes for reward-related than reward-unrelated stop trials when 
stopping was successful (t(18)=3.55, p=0.002) and the other way around for 
USTs (t(18)=-2.4, p=0.03). 
To further investigate inhibition-related processes we subtracted ERPs 
of stop trials that were unsuccessful from waveforms related to successful 
stopping. As is shown in figure 4B this resulted in a frontocentral positivity 
comparable to the P3a discussed above that is larger for reward-related stop 
trials compared to reward-unrelated stop trials (t(18)=3.9, p=0.001). 
Moreover, a tmax permutation test showed that the difference between USTs 
and SSTs exceeds the critical t-value earlier and more extended in time in 
reward-related stop trials (around 172-313 ms) compared to reward-
unrelated stop trials (around 211-290 ms) in the reward block (see first two 
142    CHAPTER 4 
rows of the raster diagram in figure 4B). Furthermore, when directly 
comparing the difference wave in reward-related and reward-unrelated stop 
trials this double difference reaches significance after approximately 211 ms 
(see last row of the raster diagram in figure 4B).   
 
Figure 4. Stop-locked frontocentral components. (A) Event-related CSDs locked to 
the stop signal at electrode site FCz for all conditions, showing an earlier stop N2 
and P3 peak for successful (solid line) compared to failed stop trials (dashed line). 
The topographic map on the right indicates that the stop P3 component is larger 
when the color of the stop signal is indicative of reward in SST in the reward block 
during the SST timeframe (between 230 and 370 ms). (B) Grand average SST-
minus-UST difference waveforms at electrode FCz and the topographic map of this 
difference between 100 and 350 ms (average over all conditions), showing its 
frontocentral location. Moreover, a raster diagram illustrates different time points at 
which the t-value of the differences between SST and UST reaches significance 
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according to a tmax permutation test, showing an earlier significant difference in 
reward-related stop trials (top row) compared to reward-unrelated stop trials (second 
row) in the reward block. In the third row of the diagram the results of directly 
subtracting the stopping-success difference in the reward-related and reward-
unrelated stop trials are depicted. Positive plotted upwards; R: reward block; NR: 
no-reward block; SST: successful stop trial; UST: unsuccessful stop trial; RR: 
reward-related; RU: reward-unrelated. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The current study examined the temporal dynamics of motivational 
effects on inhibition-related processes using ERPs in a rewarded stop-signal 
task. Our behavioral results confirm that reward can facilitate response 
cancellation as indicated by a larger percentage of successful stops and 
shorter SSRTs on reward-related stop trials. Although our ERP results were 
less clear concerning inhibition-related components, we did find some 
evidence for a reward-related facilitation effect on inhibition in the form of 
larger stop-locked P3 amplitudes in successful stop trials and a larger, also 
seemingly earlier, frontocentral positivity reflecting the difference between 
successful and failed stop trials in the reward-related condition. Importantly, 
this effect was preceded by a larger stop-evoked bilateral posterior N1 
component for the reward-related color. We think that this modulation likely 
reflects enhanced top-down attention to the reward-related feature, which 
likely aids later processes that implement response inhibition. Finally, being 
in a reward-related task context did not seem to generally benefit response 
inhibition, whereas visual processing of go stimuli was generally enhanced 
as indicated by a larger posterior go N1 component in the reward block.  
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Reward effects on response inhibition 
In the current study we replicated the behavioral results of our 
previous studies (Boehler et al., 2012, 2014; but see also Wilbertz et al., 
2014), showing that reward can accelerate motor cancellation even in the 
absence of classic preparatory control since reward prospect was not pre-
cued. Although we focus our discussion on reward effects, we do note that 
reward might not affect results in a unique and direct way in this context. 
Rather, we assume that reward increases extrinsic motivation and that it is 
likely that alternative motivational manipulations would yield similar results. 
Given the fact that response inhibition in the stop-signal task is traditionally 
considered a reactive control function (Aron, 2011), we expected our ERP 
results to corroborate boosted reactive inhibitory control in reward-related 
stop trials corresponding to our previous fMRI results (Boehler et al., 2014). 
To this end we focused mainly on the frontal N2 and P3 since these 
components are supposed to reflect brain activity linked to response 
inhibition  (e.g. Bekker et al., 2005a; Ramautar et al., 2006a; Schmajuk et 
al., 2006; van Boxtel et al., 2001). To isolate processes specifically triggered 
by the stop signal, like inhibition-related brain responses, we temporally 
removed residual go-related ERP waveforms and we minimized spatial 
overlap trough a CSD analysis. Both the frontal N2 and P3 peaked earlier for 
successful stop trials than unsuccessful stop trials, which was also found in 
some previous studies (Dimoska et al., 2003; Kok et al., 2004; Ramautar et 
al., 2004) and is in line with the horse-race model assuming that when the 
inner stop process occurs early it is more likely to finish before the go 
process (resulting in a successful stop). 
We did not find a differential effect of reward-related stop trials in the 
stop N2 component. Furthermore, the stop-N2 amplitude was larger when 
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stopping failed, although this comparison was based on different time-ranges 
and thus might reflect fundamentally different process dynamics. This 
amplitude difference has been observed previously (Dimoska et al., 2003, 
2006; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Krämer et al., 2011; Ramautar et al., 
2004, 2006a, 2006b; Senderecka et al., 2012; but see Liotti et al., 2007, 
2010; Schmajuk et al., 2006), and recent studies suggest that the N2 
component is involved in monitoring of stopping performance, conflict 
monitoring and error processing (Dimoska et al., 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et 
al., 2010; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Huster et al., 2013; Krämer et al., 
2011). Additionally, we found that the frontal stop-evoked P3 did not only 
peak earlier, but was also more pronounced when inhibition was successful, 
in line with previous studies suggesting that in particular the P3 reflects 
reactive motor inhibition processes (Bekker et al., 2005a; de Jong et al., 
1990; Dimoska et al., 2003, 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; 
Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Huster et al., 2013; Lansbergen et al., 2007; 
Overtoom et al., 2002; Ramautar et al., 2004; Senderecka et al., 2012). In the 
current study, we observed larger P3s in reward-related successful stop 
trials, which might indicate enhanced reactive control in this condition. In 
conflict with this interpretation, however, one should note that  this frontal 
positivity peaks after the completion of the stopping process as indicated by 
the SSRT (also noted by e.g. Dimoska et al., 2003 and Huster et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, the stop P3 in successful trials can still reflect the outcome of 
the inhibition process, like inhibitory effects on motor cortex (Band & van 
Boxtel, 1999), or the evaluation of stopping (Bruin et al., 2001). It has also 
been shown that differences in early P3 amplitude and onset might reflect 
the implementation of inhibition (Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Kok et al., 
2004; Lansbergen et al., 2007; Wessel & Aron, 2014). 
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Evidence for enhanced response inhibition in reward-related stop trials 
is also suggested by the present ERP difference between successful and 
failed stop trials. This difference resulted in a frontocentral positive 
component that peaked around 250 ms, encompassing larger positivities in 
successful stop trials overlapping with the stop-evoked N2 and P3 
component. This component was also described  in earlier studies (e.g. de 
Jong et al., 1990; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013) and was shown to be larger 
for controls compared to people with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
who have problems with  inhibitory control (Bekker et al., 2005b; Overtoom 
et al., 2002; Senderecka et al., 2012). Yet, although probably implying 
enhanced inhibition, we note that larger positivities for successful stop trials 
might also reflect differences in error- and motor-related brain activity4. This 
difference component showed larger amplitudes for reward-related stop 
trials and results indicated that the stopping-success difference appeared 
earlier and was more extended in reward-related compared to reward-
unrelated stop trials in the reward block. More specifically, the SST-minus-
UST component was significantly different from zero starting around 170 
                                                     
4 Specifically, failed stop trials also evoke error-related activity (like the 
frontocentral error-related negativity) in contrast to successful stop trials. Moreover, 
to remove overlap from the go stimulus we subtracted delay-matched ERPs related 
to slow go trials from ERPs related to trials in which stopping was successful. 
However, go trials contain an executed motor response while motor activation is not 
completed in successful stop trials, thus the subtraction procedure likely introduced 
a polarity-inverted (positive) motor component in successful stop trials (see also 
Kok, 1986). Ideally, in successful stop trials only the build-up of motor processes 
and not the activity related to the actual execution of the motor response is to be 
subtracted, which unfortunately is not easily implemented. Yet, we did try to limit 
the influence of motor-related processes by also taking go-trial response speed into 
account (fast and slow go trials subtracted from unsuccessful and successful stop 
trials respectively). 
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ms for reward-related trials and around 210 ms for reward-unrelated trials in 
the reward block. Since we used a tmax permutation statistic, which strongly 
controls the familywise-error rate, the actual onset latency of this stop-
evoked component is probably earlier (Groppe et al., 2011). Also 
electrophysiological research with animals studying inhibition of saccades 
and modeling studies have shown that neuronal activity on inhibition trials 
differs from activity on no-stop trials only immediately before the end of the 
SSRT (see Boucher et al., 2007). Hence the onset of this component could 
be early enough to reflect the implementation of response inhibition.  
As can be seen in figure 4, both the successful stop P3 and SST-
minus-UST wave indicate that processing of the rewarded stop signal is 
special since it is different from reward-unrelated trials in the reward and no-
reward block, with no obvious difference between the latter two. This was 
expected based on our behavioral data showing facilitated inhibition in 
reward-related trials, but not for reward-unrelated trials in the reward versus 
the no-reward context. Hence, the observed reward effect in these 
components may suggest earlier and enhanced inhibition processes in 
reward-related stop trials. Although both effects have a very similar 
topography (as can be observed in figure 4) they might also (partially) reflect 
differential underlying mechanisms and brain activity.  For example, the 
difference in P3 amplitude between reward-related and reward-unrelated 
successful stop trials might also relate to differences in the evaluation of the 
stimulus or response, which could e.g. originate from more ventromedial 
areas. However, based on the present EEG data, we cannot easily investigate 
this issue.  
In our previous fMRI study brain regions that were more active in 
reward-related trials in both successful and unsuccessful stop trials within 
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the stopping network were taken to represent enhanced inhibitory control 
independent of the behavioral outcome. In the current results however, we 
only observed enhanced stop P3 amplitudes for reward-related trials when 
stopping was successful. This suggests that fMRI results might be more 
sensitive to detect generally boosted reactive control processes since it has a 
better spatial resolution, while ERPs might reveal more information related 
to the timing of inhibitory control processes. Also beyond the description of 
subtle and transient modulations of neural activity like the ones described 
here, fMRI seems limited concerning its ability to separate go-related and 
stop-related processes. One way of separating such processes is to look at 
proactive inhibition wherein response inhibition is studied indirectly during 
go trials under different stopping probabilities. Although this is an 
interesting research line that has generally shown overlap between proactive 
and reactive inhibition (e.g. Aron et al., 2014; Chikazoe et al., 2009), there is 
still debate on which processes are exactly reflected in different brain areas 
during proactive inhibition (e.g. Vink et al., 2015; Zandbelt et al., 2013) and 
the details of this topic are beyond the scope of our work here.  
The role of reward in visual processing of the stop stimulus  
Importantly, in addition to the modulations of the N2 and P3 discussed 
above, our Laplacian-transformed ERP results clearly showed larger 
posterior N1 amplitudes in response to reward-related stop-stimuli. This 
suggests that the actual implementation of response inhibition is preceded by 
enhanced visual attention for the reward-related color. Such N1 modulations 
in response to the stop stimulus have been suggested before to reflect 
strategic orienting of attention (Bekker et al., 2005a; Boehler et al., 2009; 
Pessoa, 2009), and have been found to be enhanced when the value of 
stopping is increased (Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; see also Krebs et al., 
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2013). Given that in the present data the N1 modulation was specific for the 
reward-related condition, we take this to suggest that participants 
strategically screened for this feature in a voluntary top-down, and hence 
proactive fashion. One should note, however, that there is the alternative 
possibility that the enhanced sensory response to the reward-related stop-
stimulus reflects enhanced non-strategic bottom-up saliency of a feature that 
is consistently (Anderson et al., 2011a, 2012; Krebs et al., 2013; Theeuwes 
& Belopolsky, 2012) or previously paired with reward (Hickey & van Zoest, 
2012; Hickey et al., 2010). Although in these studies reward information is 
usually task-irrelevant and not in line with subjects’ goals, reward does 
influence task performance and stimulus processing in an involuntary way. 
However, many of these studies mainly investigated effects of reward 
feedback on subsequent target selection in a visual search tasks and although 
paradigmatical differences are quite pronounced, EEG work investigating 
the automatic influence of reward on visual attention has documented effects 
on the P1, for which we did not find any significant effects (Hickey et al., 
2010). Also, other studies have shown that reward effects (even in the 
extrastriate visual cortex) can be under top-down attentional control 
(Buschschulte et al., 2014; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007). Both the strategic 
top-down and involuntary bottom-up account would predict better 
behavioral performance because reward information is also relevant to task 
goals in the current study. Although the current paradigm is not set up to 
dissociate these alternative underlying mechanisms, here we consider the 
strategic top-down modulation as the more likely explanation since the stop-
evoked N1 modulations as observed in the stop-signal task have usually been 
explained in terms of strategic attentional control. We think that in the 
current task sustained proactive control interacts with and possibly supports 
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reactive (inhibitory) control mechanisms by strategically screening for a 
reward-related feature and thereby enhancing its processing. 
Surprisingly, not only the color of the stop signal, but also stopping 
success was reflected in the amplitude of the stop-evoked N1 with larger 
negativities for trials in which response suppression was eventually 
unsuccessful. This is opposed to what has been found previously in ERP and 
MEG studies (Bekker et al., 2005a, 2005c; Boehler et al., 2009; Dimoska & 
Johnstone, 2008; Lansbergen et al., 2007). Mostly this has been explained by 
assuming that more pronounced sensory processing of or increased visual 
attention to the stop signal will more likely result in successful stopping. 
Interestingly, the study of Greenhouse and Wessel (2013) investigating the 
role of reward-related preparation in stopping showed that the visual N1 was 
larger when correct stopping was rewarded over going, but did not find 
statistical differences between successful and unsuccessful stop trials in both 
conditions. Hence, our stopping-success effect on the N1 amplitude is not in 
line with previous findings, whereas a slightly earlier peak for successful 
stopping seems to be in line with the general notion of enhanced attention to 
the stop-stimulus in successful trials. Importantly, no difference between 
successful and failed stop trials was observed for trials in the no-reward 
block. A possible hypothesis is that the stopping-success effect found in the 
N1 actually reflects activity from the stopping-success effect in the 
frontocentral N2 that is leaking into the N1 because they could not be clearly 
separated in time and space, which EEG will be more susceptible to than 
MEG (see Boehler et al., 2009, which featured the most comparable 
paradigm). Yet, based on the present data, we can also not rule out that the 
stopping-success effect on the N1 amplitude is valid and reflects some 
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interaction between reward information and the process dynamics of 
attention and response inhibition. 
Context effects 
Previously it has been shown that changes in motivational state can 
alter sustained brain activity and influence processing of all stimuli even 
when they are not motivationally relevant themselves (Jimura et al., 2010; 
Locke & Braver, 2008). In our study SSRTs did not differ significantly 
between reward-unrelated stop trials in the reward block and in the no-
reward block, thus behaviorally there was no indication of a global reward 
effect on inhibitory control. On the other hand, we found a larger visual 
posterior go-evoked N1 component5 in the reward context compared to the 
no-reward context, so it seems that visual attention is generally boosted 
when the task context is motivationally relevant. This suggests that a 
rewarded or motivationally relevant context likely triggered changes in 
sustained proactive control as suggested previously (Jimura et al., 2010; 
Locke & Braver, 2008). Thus, although there is evidence for changes in 
sustained motivation, stopping probably can’t be globally enhanced easily, 
which could relate to the very small amount of time that is available for 
bringing about any enhancements (around 200 ms). This also suggests that 
enhanced processing of the reward-related color specifically, as was 
described above, might be particularly important in this task. 
                                                     
5 We note that this posterior negativity might also represent (at least in part) a 
selection negativity (SN) instead of a N1 component; yet, even if true, this does not 
substantially changes the interpretation of the results because the selection negativity 
is also believed to reflect attentional target-processing (e.g. Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 
1998).  
152    CHAPTER 4 
The idea that visual processing of the go stimulus can be under 
(partial) top-down proactive control was already introduced by Boehler et al. 
(2009). In this previous MEG study it was shown that the go-locked N1 in 
future stop trials was more pronounced when stopping would be 
unsuccessful. Although only marginally significant, we replicated this effect 
in this ERP study. Moreover, in the MEG study it was found that trial-by-
trial adjustments likely reflecting strategic top-down control modulations 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Fecteau & Munoz, 2003; Laming, 1979), like 
reaction time slowing to go trials after stop trials, was reflected in the go N1 
with smaller negativities in go trials following stop trials compared to go 
trials. It was concluded that the amount of resources are devoted strategically 
to visual processing of a stimulus and changes can be made within and 
between trials (see also Barceló et al., 2000; Hopf et al., 2002). Given that 
larger go N1s make ultimate stopping success less likely, the present reward 
modulation seems a bit counter-intuitive. At the same time, participants were 
not allowed to strategically slow down their go responses, so that the overall 
N1 effect probably relates to a state of generally heightened attention that is 
not necessarily directly helpful in stopping. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the current behavioral results show selective 
motivational effects on inhibitory control restricted to trials in which the stop 
stimulus really signaled reward prospect, which was also hinted at by our 
ERP results.  Specifically, there were subtle modulations of ERP 
components that are typically associated with (reactive) response inhibition. 
Importantly, this facilitation was preceded by enhanced selective attention 
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to, and thus more profound visual processing of, the stop stimulus for 
reward-related trials. This implies that the sensory processing of the reward-
related feature is increased probably by proactively screening for this 
feature, which consequently might assist reactive inhibitory control. 
Furthermore, ERP-related block effects showed that being in a rewarded 
context already influences visual processing of go stimuli in stop trials. 
Hence, a motivationally significant environment might introduce changes in 
the global state, perhaps towards a sustained strategic proactive control mode 
(Locke & Braver, 2008), thereby having an impact on all stimuli and trials 
that are comprised in this environment.  Yet, this global effect did not seem 
to be able to facilitate response inhibition in general, suggesting that context 
does not always exclusively influence the potentially rewarded process (here 
stopping). 
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 CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF VAGUS NERVE STIMULATION ON 
RESPONSE INHIBITON 1 
Previous research has suggested that the noradrenergic system plays 
an important role in the ability to withhold a response, usually by 
pharmacologically increasing extracellular noradrenaline (NA) 
concentrations. In the current study we explored whether vagus nerve 
stimulation (VNS) in epileptic patients, which is believed to increase NA 
levels via activation of the locus coeruleus, would also positively affect 
response inhibition. Moreover, we tried to identify the dynamics of the 
underlying neural processes by also investigating event-related potentials 
(ERPs). Patients performed an auditory stop-signal task once when 
stimulation was switched on and once when the vagus nerve was not 
stimulated. This task allows us to estimate the stop-signal response time 
(SSRT), which is a measure for how rapidly an already-initiated motor 
response can be cancelled. The results show that the behavioral SSRT 
benefit (i.e. the amount of SSRT reduction in VNS ON compared to VNS 
OFF) was correlated with the percentage of seizure reduction. Hence, 
patients who clinically profit more from VNS treatment show a larger 
advantage, in terms of faster inhibition, when the vagus nerve is being 
stimulated, probably due to more effectively boosted NA. Furthermore, ERP 
results implied earlier sensory processing of the stop signal and more 
pronounced reactive inhibition (or the evaluation thereof) when stimulation 
was switched on, which however was independent of the individual amount 
of seizure reduction. We conclude that these results further support the 
significant involvement of the noradrenergic system in response inhibition, 
and identify enhanced response inhibition as a possible positive 
neurocognitive effect of VNS. 
                                                     
1 Schevernels, H., van Bochove, M. E., De Taeye, L., Bombeke, K., Vonck, K., van 
Roost, D., Santens, P., Raedt, R., Boehler, C. N. The effect of vagus nerve 
stimulation on response inhibition. Manuscript in preparation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For obvious reasons, it is important for successful navigation of 
everyday life situations to be able to rapidly inhibit a response when 
environmental stimuli indicate that the current action is no longer 
appropriate or even deleterious. In psychological research, response 
inhibition has frequently been investigated using the stop-signal task (Logan 
et al., 1984). In this task a go stimulus is usually presented to which subjects 
have to respond quickly by pressing a button. However, occasionally a stop 
signal is displayed rapidly after the go stimulus in which case responses are 
to be withheld. Hence, in stop trials action-related processes that were 
already initiated by the go stimulus need to be suppressed. Importantly, by 
implementing this task one can estimate the stop-signal reaction time 
(SSRT), which is a measure for how long a participant needs to inhibit a 
response. This estimation is usually based on a horse-race model that 
assumes that there is a competition between two parallel processes (going 
and stopping) and whichever finishes first will determine the behavioral 
outcome (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994; see also Boucher et al., 
2007). Studies have found longer SSRTs and/or decreased stopping success 
in people with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (e.g. Lijffijt 
et al., 2005; Murphy, 2002; Senderecka et al., 2012), Parkinson’s Disease 
(Gauggel et al., 2004) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Menzies et al., 
2007). In parallel, research has begun to identify the neuroanatomical 
networks that underlie inhibitory control, and the consensus seems to be that 
prefrontal areas in the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and/or the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) interact with motoric parts of the basal 
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ganglia in order to cancel a motor response (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Aron et 
al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2009). 
In addition to the neuroanatomical substrates, research has 
investigated which neurotransmitters play a modulating role in response 
inhibition. Here, particularly noradrenaline (NA; also called norepinephrine) 
has been shown to play a significant role (for an overview see Eagle et al., 
2008). Specifically, performance in the stop-signal task in both animals and 
humans has been found to profit from medication that increases extracellular 
levels of NA, like the NA reuptake inhibitors atomoxetine (Bari et al., 2009; 
Chamberlain et al., 2006b; Humby et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2008) and 
methylphenidate (Linssen et al., 2012). Moreover, patients with ADHD, who 
generally are impaired in inhibition capabilities and are assumed to suffer 
from insufficient NA levels, show improved response inhibition when 
medicated with drugs that boost NA (again through reuptake inhibition), like 
desipramine and methylphenidate (Aron et al., 2003; Overtoom et al., 2003). 
Similarly, certain doses of guanfacine impair stopping probably via 
engagement of presynaptic D2-receptors that ultimately decreases NA 
release (Bari et al., 2009, 2011; but see Müller et al., 2005). However many 
of these drugs also affect the levels of other neurotransmitters, in particular 
dopamine (DA) (Bymaster et al., 2002) but also serotonin, acetylcholine and 
histamine (Ding et al., 2014; Horner et al., 2007; Tzavara et al., 2006). Yet, 
results of recent studies suggest that inhibitory performance in the stop-
signal task is mostly sensitive to fluctuations in NA levels (Bari & Robbins, 
2013; Bari et al., 2009, 2011; Eagle et al., 2008).  
In the current study the involvement of NA in response inhibition was 
further investigated by indirectly manipulating NA levels in patients that are 
treated with vagus nerve stimulation (VNS). VNS is applied in suitable 
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patients with drug-resistant epilepsy. It entails a spiral electrode that is 
wrapped around the vagus nerve in the neck and connected to and controlled 
by a pulse generator that is implanted below the skin. In about 50% percent 
of the patients VNS successfully reduces the amount of seizures by a 
significant degree (t 50%) (Englot et al., 2011). Although it is not clear how 
VNS works exactly to achieve this, experimental evidence suggest that the 
noradrenergic system plays an important role, consistent with the fact that 
vagus nerve fibers connect via the nucleus of the solitary tract to the locus 
coeruleus (LC) which is the main source for NA in the forebrain (see Fornai 
et al., 2011). Accordingly, animal studies have found that VNS enhances NA 
concentrations in several brain areas like the cortex, nucleus accumbens and 
hippocampus (Manta et al., 2013; Raedt et al., 2011; Roosevelt et al., 2006). 
Moreover, although results are not conclusive, VNS can also have positive 
effects on cognitive functions that are likely similarly related to changes in 
NA levels (Vonck et al., 2014). Thus we assume that in line with previous 
studies that have manipulated NA levels using drugs, response inhibition 
will benefit when the noradrenergic system is triggered via stimulation of the 
vagus nerve. 
 Here, we did not only investigate behavioral measures of response 
inhibition like the SSRT, but also studied electroencephalographic (EEG) 
signals related to response inhibition given that event-related potentials 
(ERPs) have generally been shown to be sensitive to VNS (Brázdil et al., 
2001; De Taeye et al., 2014; Neuhaus et al., 2007; but see Hammond et al., 
1992). Studies applying EEG in the stop-signal task usually mainly 
investigate the stop N2 component, which peaks around 200 ms after the 
stop-signal at frontal electrodes, and the stop-evoked frontocentral P3 that is 
maximal at approximately 300 ms. Usually the stop N2 has been related to 
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error detection and performance monitoring, given that the N2 amplitude has 
been found to be larger in unsuccessful stop trials compared to successful 
stop trials (Dimoska et al., 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Greenhouse 
& Wessel, 2013; Huster et al., 2013, but see Rangel-Gomez et al., 2015; 
Schmajuk et al., 2006). It is typically found that it is the dopaminergic 
system that is involved in behavioral and error monitoring (Bari & Robbins, 
2013; Barnes et al., 2011; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), but recently it was 
pointed out that also other neurotransmitters including NA might play a role 
in performance monitoring (Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). Hence, it is not 
clear whether VNS will affect the stop-evoked N2. In contrast to the N2, in 
the stop-signal task the frontal P3 is increased in successful stop trials and 
supposed to reflect actual response inhibition and/or the evaluation thereof 
(Bekker et al., 2005a; Dimoska et al., 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; 
Lansbergen et al., 2007; Wessel & Aron, 2014). Hence, given the previously 
mentioned involvement of NA in response inhibition, we expected that VNS 
would have an influence in particular on P3 amplitudes. Both the N2 and P3 
components have also been shown to peak earlier when stopping was 
successful suggesting an earlier internal response to the stop signal (Kok et 
al., 2004; Ramautar et al., 2004, 2006a) and therefore we also analyzed peak 
latencies. 
Furthermore, response inhibition performance might not only be 
dependent on reactive inhibitory processes but also on the attentive 
processing of the task-relevant stimuli. Therefore, we investigated N1 
components related to the processing of both the visual go stimulus and the 
auditory stop signal. The amplitude of the stop-evoked N1 has been found to 
be increased in stop trials that end up being successful, implicating varying 
levels of attention directed to the stop signal in stopping success (Bekker et 
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al., 2005a, 2005c; Boehler et al., 2009; Lansbergen et al., 2007). While 
Bekker et al. (2005b) showed that this difference could not be observed in 
adults with ADHD, indicating that disrupted attentional processing might 
also contribute to impaired stopping in these patients, Overtoom et al. (2009) 
found that such a relationship could be restored by administering 
methylphenidate. In addition, the N1 related to processing of the go stimulus 
has been observed to be enhanced in unsuccessful stop trials suggesting that 
more attention to the go stimulus is more likely to result in later unsuccessful 
stopping (Boehler et al., 2009). Boehler et al. (2009) concluded that changes 
in resource allocation can be made within and between trials and that 
stopping success is thus dependent on attentional resources devoted to the go 
stimulus and the stop signal in each trial. Since the noradrenergic system is 
supposed to be involved in attention and sensory processing (Berridge & 
Waterhouse, 2003), N1components might also be sensitive to changes in NA 
levels induced by VNS. Hence, in the current study we compared behavioral 
and ERP results in the stop-signal task in epileptic patients that were 
implanted with VNS when stimulation was switched on versus off, as an 
indirect way to further explore the role of the noradrenergic system in 
response inhibition. 
MATERIALS & METHODS 
Participants 
After giving written informed consent, twenty patients with refractory 
epilepsy (8 males, mean age = 44 years, range = 21-66 years) participated in 
the current experiment. The study was approved by the ethics board of Ghent 
University Hospital. All patients were treated with VNS stimulation for at 
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least 18 months and had an IQ score of 70 or more on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale. Seizure reduction was calculated by subtracting the 
number of seizures during 3 consecutive months preceding the test period 
(after VNS implantation) from the number of seizures before VNS 
implantation, divided by the total number of seizures before VNS 
(baseline)2. A detailed description of this and other patient characteristics is 
provided in Appendix I. We note that the current study was part of a set of 
experiments that were performed consecutively by all patients (see De Taeye 
et al., 2014, for an additional report on the same cohort). 
VNS apparatus 
All patients had been previously implanted with a VNS device 
(Cyberonics, Houston, TX, USA) containing 2 electrodes at the left vagus 
nerve and a pulse generator positioned below the left collarbone. Each 
participant performed the task once when stimulation was on and once when 
stimulation was off, the order of which was counterbalanced. After 
performing the first session the VNS device was switched on or off and a 
break of at least 20 minutes was included before starting the second task 
session. When stimulating the vagus nerve the duty cycle was set to 7 
seconds ON / 18 seconds OFF, while other device settings could vary 
between patients depending on clinical effectiveness (see Appendix I). 
Stimuli and procedure 
 In the present study a typical stop-signal task with visual go stimuli 
and auditory stop stimuli was implemented. Most trials (67%) were go trials 
                                                     
2 In case the number of monthly seizures decreased by more than 50% after VNS 
implantation, patients were considered responders to the VNS therapy (n=10). 
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in which patients had to respond quickly to a central go stimulus, which was 
a green traffic-light sign. More specifically, participants had to press the left 
or right mouse button according to the orientation of a central green traffic 
light (left or right, with equal probability; response time-out of 1600 ms). 
The central go stimulus was always displayed directly above a fixation dot 
and the target was flanked by two additional green traffic light symbols on 
each side (one pointing in the same direction and the other in the opposite 
direction, and the opposite side displaying the mirror image so that overall 
congruency was always the same) that were to be ignored. In 33% of the 
trials a tone (514 Hz, 200 ms) was presented (stop trial). Upon the 
presentation of this auditory stop signal patients had to try to withhold the 
go-trial response they were about to give.  
 Visual go stimuli were displayed on the screen for 1000 ms. In stop 
trials the tone was presented at a varying stimulus-onset asynchrony (i.e. go-
stop delay). Specifically, a staircase procedure was applied in order to create 
a 50% stopping-success rate. To this end, if stopping was successful the go-
stop delay was increased resulting in a reduced chance of successful 
response inhibition, whereas the go-stop delay was decreased after 
unsuccessful stop trials thereby increasing the likelihood of successful 
inhibition on the next trial. The delay was increased or decreased by 50 ms 
in the first 10 stop trials and by 17 ms in the remaining stop trials (with a 
minimum of 70 ms and a maximum of 800 ms). The inter-trial interval 
varied randomly between 1800 and 2200 ms.   
 Before starting the experiment, task instructions were given and 
patients were asked to try to respond as fast as possible, to limit eye blinking 
and to keep their eyes on the fixation dot. First, patients completed a training 
run of 60 trials (40 go trials and 20 stop trials) to get acquainted with the 
task. Subsequently, two experimental runs, one run ON VNS and one run 
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OFF VNS, were performed. Each experimental run included a total of 160 
go trials and 80 stop trials, that were randomly presented, and a short break 
of 10 seconds was implemented after every 60 trials.  
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 
EEG data was collected with a Micromed System Plus (Micromed, 
Mogliano, Italy) containing 61 Ag/AgCl electrodes, mounted in an electrode 
cap (WaveGuard EEG cap system), that were positioned on the head 
according to the extended international 10-20 system. During recording data 
was referenced to electrode site CPz, while channel AFz was used as a 
ground. Signals were amplified and digitized with a sampling rate of 1024 
Hz, an anti-aliasing filter of 250 Hz, a gain of 50 dB and a resolution of 16 
bits.  
We used EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-
Calderon & Luck, 2014) to preprocess and analyze the data. First, data was 
down-sampled offline to 256 Hz and re-referenced to the average of all 
channels (reinstating channel CPz). Subsequently, a 30 Hz low-pass filter (-6 
dB attenuation at 33.7 Hz) was applied and we corrected for eye blinks using 
independent component analysis (ICA). Epochs were then created from -200 
to 600 ms locked to the onset of the go stimulus and from -200 to 800 ms 
locked to the onset of the stop signal. These epochs were baseline corrected 
using the 200 ms pre-stimulus period. We automatically rejected epochs 
including extreme values (> +/- 150μV) and additionally visually inspected 
EEG signals for any missed artifacts. 
Given that the auditory stop signal is presented rapidly after the go 
stimulus, ERPs locked to the stop signal might in part reflect continuing 
processing of the preceding go stimulus. Hence, to be able to investigate 
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activity exclusively related to the processing of the stop signal, we removed 
temporal overlap coming from the go stimulus by applying a subtraction-
based correction procedure (see also de Jong et al., 1990; Kok et al., 2004; 
Krämer et al., 2011, 2013; Ramautar et al., 2004, 2006). Specifically, we set 
a mock S2 event in go trials and accordingly subtracted ERPs locked to this 
event from stop-locked ERPs in stop trials. Before performing this 
subtraction two things were taken into consideration. Firstly, the go-related 
overlap varies according to the go-stop delay. This means that the overlap is 
different for successful and failed stop trials given that in successful stop 
trials the stop signal is usually presented more quickly after the go stimulus 
than in unsuccessful stop trials. Thus, we inserted an artificial S2 event in 
correct go trials that were matched for the go-stop delays of the stop trials 
before subtraction. Secondly, since a horse-race model is assumed to 
underlie the stop-signal task, motor responses in unsuccessful stop trials are 
more comparable to those in fast go trials, while the motor build-up in 
successful stop trials more closely resembles that in slow go trials (seeing 
that a successful and failed stop trial would have been respectively a slow 
and fast go trial if no stop signal would have been presented). Hence, for 
each patient (separately for ON and OFF VNS) fast and slow go trials were 
created for each go-stop delay according to the proportion of unsuccessful 
and successful stop trials, respectively, in the go reaction-time distribution. 
Thus, we subtracted delay-matched fast go trials from unsuccessful stop 
trials and delay-matched slow go trials from successful stop trials. 
However, different components related to the processing of the stop 
signal (like the auditory N1 and stop N2 and the anterior inhibition-related 
P3a and parietal P3b) also spatially overlap. Therefore, we applied a surface 
Laplacian filter to the stop-locked EEG signals in order to disentangle these 
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components. Recently, studies have shown that Laplacian transformations 
can successfully separate P3a and P3b components (in a typical oddball task, 
Kayser & Tenke, in press) and distinguish components in the stop-signal 
task (e.g. Krämer et al., 2013; Rangel-Gomez et al., 2015). Hence, in the 
current study we calculated Laplacian-transformed current source densities 
(CSDs) using the CSD toolbox for EEGLAB (Kayser & Tenke, 2006; 
Kayser, 2009). The spherical spline algorithm of Perrin et al. (1989) was 
applied with a default smoothing constant of 1.0-5 and a head radius of 10 cm 
resulting in reference-free CSDs. To simplify, we speak of the related stop-
locked components without always explicitly referring to the underlying 
Laplacian transformation. 
Statistical analyses 
In total, data of four participants had to be removed (R1, R3, R8, 
NR4). One dataset (R8) was not included because the patient showed less 
than 50% correct in-time go-trial responses. Data of patient R3 was rejected 
given that she had an implausible SSRT probably because of approximately 
40 unsuccessful stop trials in a row (including 25 trials with the minimal go-
stop delay). Furthermore, two other datasets (R1, NR4) were excluded 
because of very noisy EEG data. Hence, data of sixteen patients (6 males, 
mean age = 42 years, range = 21-66 years) were included in the analyses. 
Behavior 
Our main variable of interest was the SSRT, which was calculated 
using the integration method that has been shown to yield reliable SSRT 
estimates, especially when the stopping-success rate differs between 
conditions (Boehler et al., 2012a; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen et al., 2013). Hence, following this procedure for 
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each participant and each session (ON and OFF VNS) reaction times on go 
trials are rank-ordered and missed go trials are assigned the maximal 
response-time value (1600 ms). Subsequently, the average go-stop delay is 
subtracted from the nth reaction time that corresponds to the percentage of 
unsuccessful stop trials. A repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(rANOVA) was performed with SSRT as a dependent variable and factor 
VNS (ON, OFF) and covariate (percentage of) seizure reduction3. 
Furthermore, go-trial accuracy, reaction times in correct go trials and go-stop 
delays in stop trials were also analyzed with a rANOVA including factor 
VNS (ON, OFF) and covariate seizure reduction. In case effects including 
the covariate seizure reduction were at least borderline significant, we 
further explored the direction of this effect using a Kendall’s tau (W) 
correlation coefficient since data was not fully normally distributed, and 
contained some patients with the same values (since more than one patient 
had 100% and 0% seizure reduction, respectively). 
Event-related potentials 
We exclusively studied electrophysiological data in stop trials (both 
go-stimulus-locked and stop-stimulus-locked components). Unsuccessful 
stop trials included stop trials in which participants pressed the correct 
mouse button. For each component we defined a region of interest and time 
window based on topographical maps and previous related studies. Mean 
amplitude measurements and local peak latencies (over ±11.7 ms) were 
analyzed using a rANOVA with factors success (unsuccessful stop trials, 
                                                     
3 We preferred to include the covariate seizure reduction instead of the dichotomous 
variable responder (responder, non-responder; see e.g., De Taeye et al., 2014) since 
this is a more fine-grained measure of the subject-dependent effect of VNS 
treatment and avoids a possibly arbitrary dichotomy. 
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successful stop trial), VNS (ON, OFF) and the covariate seizure reduction. If 
we observed a significant effect of seizure reduction, Kendall’s tau 
correlational analysis was performed to establish the direction of the effect 
given that the covariate seizure reduction did not show a normal distribution. 
15 Hz low-pass filtered data are displayed in all figures for illustration 
purposes, but the statistical analyses were performed on data that were only 
low-pass filtered with 30 Hz. 
In stop trials the go-locked visual N1 peaked between 160 to 200 ms 
at electrode sites PO7 and PO8. This component is related to visual 
processing of the go stimulus and arises clearly before the subsequent stop 
signal (average go-stop delay = 382 ms) and should hence not be affected by 
it. Turning to the processing of the stop stimuli, CSDs evoked by the stop 
signal showed a clear bilateral auditory N1 at central electrode sites (C3, C4, 
C5, C6, FC3, FC4, FC5 and FC6) between 110 and 160 ms. The frontal stop 
N2 was quantified at electrode FCz from 160 to 220 ms. Moreover, the 
inhibition-related frontal P3 was observed mainly in successful stop trials at 
the same electrode site (FCz) starting at 250 ms until 350 ms. 
RESULTS 
Behavior 
Accuracy and reaction times in go trials did not differ significantly 
between the VNS ON and VNS OFF condition (p’s>0.8), nor was there a 
significant main effect of seizure reduction or interaction (p’s>0.26). In stop 
trials, stop-signal delays and the percentage of successful stop trials were 
similar in all conditions independent of seizure reduction (p’s>0.36). 
Importantly, SSRTs were not significantly decreased when the vagus nerve 
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was stimulated (F(1,14)=1.28, p=0.28), but it did marginally significantly 
interact with seizure reduction (F(1,14)=3.27, p=0.092, see table 1 for an 
overview of behavioral results). We further explored this effect by 
correlating the amount of seizure reduction with the SSRT benefit, i.e. the 
SSRT difference between VNS ON and VNS OFF (negative values reflect 
the expected decrease in SSRT when VNS was switched on) using a one-
tailed Pearson-correlation test, based on the a-priori hypothesis that patients 
that profit more from the VNS treatment should also show a larger 
behavioral benefit. Seizure reduction significantly correlated with SSRT 
benefit scores (W=-0.34, p=0.037) indicating that a larger seizure reduction 
after VNS implantation was associated with an increased benefit for 
stopping speed in terms of SSRT when VNS was switched on compared to 
off (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Correlational analysis. A negative correlation between the variables 
seizure reduction and SSRT benefit was found reflecting that patients with a higher 
percentage of seizure reduction (i.e. a decreased amount of seizures) after VNS 
implantation also show more reduced SSRTs when VNS is on compared to off. 
Event-related Potentials 
We analyzed ERPs using a rANOVA with factors VNS (ON, OFF), 
success (unsuccessful stop trials, successful stop trial) and the covariate 
seizure reduction, both regarding amplitude and latency. Given the 
behavioral results, we again suspected effects of VNS to depend on the 
percentage of seizure reduction, indicated by an interaction between VNS 
and seizure reduction. In stop trials, the go-locked posterior N1 amplitude 
did not show a significant main effect of success (F(1,14)=0.98, p>0.3) nor 
of VNS (F(1,14)=1.7, p>0.2), and also no effect of seizure reduction or any 
interactions (p’s>0.25). For go-evoked N1 latency we did not find any 
effects (all p’s>0.1) except for a significant main effect of seizure reduction 
(F(1,14)=4.62, p=0.049) indicating later go N1 peaks when subjects 
responded more to VNS treatment (W=0.36, p=0.06). The amplitude of the 
180    CHAPTER 5 
auditory N1 time-locked to the stop signal was similarly large in successful 
and unsuccessful stop trials (F(1,14)=1.3, p>0.25), also no other main or 
interaction effects were detected (p’s>0.2). The N1 peaked slightly earlier 
when VNS was switched on compared to off, but this effect was only 
marginally significant (F(1,14)=3.44, p=0.085). All other results did not 
reach significance levels (p’s>0.1). The frontal stop N2 amplitude only 
showed a borderline significant main effect of success (F(1,14)=3.48, 
p=0.083), but success also interacted with VNS (F(1,14)=3.76, p=0.073) 
indicating a similar N2 amplitude in successful and unsuccessful stop trials 
in VNS ON conditions but a larger amplitude in unsuccessful stop trials in 
VNS OFF conditions (see figure 2). Concerning the latency of the N2, we 
observed a main effect of success (F(1,14)=4.93, p=0.043) with an earlier 
N2 peak in successful stop trials (183.6 ms) compared to failed stop trials 
(187.9 ms). Yet, success also marginally significantly interacted with VNS 
(F(1,14)=.3.97, p=0.066) suggesting that the stop N2 peaked earlier in 
successful stop trials compared to unsuccessful stop trials only when VNS 
was switched off (see figure 2). Moreover, a marginally significant 
interaction between success and seizure reduction was observed 
(F(1,14)=3.78, p=0.072) implying larger success effects (unsuccessful-
minus-successful) in peak latencies in patients that do not respond highly to 
VNS treatment (W=-0.38, p=0.053). Other results related to N2 latency were 
not significant (p’s>0.1). The stop-locked frontal P3 amplitude was larger 
(and more clearly detected) in successful stop trials than in unsuccessful stop 
trials (F(1,14)=11.54, p=0.004, see figure 2). Moreover, the P3 was 
enhanced in case VNS was on compared to off (F(1,14)=7.03, p=0.019, see 
figure 2), but there was no interaction between VNS and seizure reduction 
(F(1,14)=2.4, p=0.15) or any other effect (p’s>0.5). We did not observe any 
significant results related to stop P3 latencies (p’s>0.13). 
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Figure 2. Stop-locked components. Topographical maps of the stop-evoked N1, N2 
and P3 are shown separately for successful and unsuccessful stop trials. On the right, 
CSD waveforms locked to the stop stimuli at electrode FCz reflect the stop N2 and 
P3 component in all four experimental conditions. OFF = VNS OFF, ON = VNS 
ON, SST = successful stop trials, UST = unsuccessful stop trials. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The central goal of this study was to investigate effects of VNS on 
inhibitory performance and its underlying mechanisms using ERPs. 
Behaviorally, we found that the size of the SSRT difference between VNS 
ON and VNS OFF conditions correlated with the percentage of seizure 
reduction. Specifically, patients that showed a larger therapeutic effect of 
VNS (i.e. more seizure reduction after VNS implantation) were also able to 
faster inhibit responses when VNS was switched on. ERP results were less 
clear given that no interaction between VNS and seizure reduction was 
found. We observed some general VNS effects (independent of seizure 
reduction) including earlier stop-evoked N1 peaks and larger stop P3 
amplitudes when the vagus nerve was stimulated. Also, related to the stop 
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N2, VNS seemed to influence the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful stop trials implying changes in performance monitoring. 
In line with studies that reported improved inhibition performance 
when drugs increased NA levels (see e.g. Eagle et al., 2008; Ilieva et al., 
2015), results indicated beneficial effects of VNS on SSRTs in subjects that 
responded more to VNS treatment while go accuracy and reaction times 
remained similar, speaking to the specificity of the effect. Given that VNS 
likely reduces seizures by activating the LC-NA system (Fornai et al., 2011; 
Krahl et al., 1998), NA concentrations are probably more enhanced in 
patients that show more seizure reduction. This is consistent with the 
observation that NA effects in pharmacological studies arise mainly for 
higher doses of NA-related medication. For example it has been shown that 
only relatively large doses of such pharmaceuticals result in significantly 
reduced SSRTs compared to placebo, while stopping performance after 
administering lower doses is not statistically different from that in placebo 
conditions (Linssen et al., 2012; Overtoom et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 
2008; but see Humby et al., 2013, for a more complex pattern possibly 
indicating an inverted U relation). However, we do note that the correlation 
between seizure reduction and SSRT benefit is also driven by patients that 
do not have a clinical VNS treatment effect (seizure reduction of 0%) who 
seem to show a reversed pattern in SSRT performance, i.e. slightly increased 
SSRTs in VNS ON compared to VNS OFF conditions. It is not clear how 
stimulation of the vagus nerve might induce a detrimental effect on response 
inhibition in these patients, hence interpretation should be taken with care, 
and more data would be helpful to confirm this correlational pattern.  
In the EEG data we did not find an effect that mimicked the behavior 
results (i.e. no interaction between the factors VNS and seizure reduction). 
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However, the stop-locked N1 seemed to peak slightly earlier when VNS was 
on compared to off, possibly suggesting earlier processing of the auditory 
stop signal in this condition. Such a head-start could be behaviorally relevant 
given the dynamic nature of the horse-race model that describes the 
underlying processes. Furthermore, in addition to the expected enhancement 
of the frontal inhibition-related P3 amplitude in successful stop trials (e.g. 
Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Lansbergen et al., 2007; Ramautar et al., 2004, 
2006), we also found larger P3 amplitudes when stimulation was switched 
on. Hence, although these effects did not interact with seizure reduction, 
they might reflect a generally favorable impact of VNS on response 
inhibition that cannot be detected in behavioral performance. These findings 
imply that VNS-induced boosted NA might result in earlier attentive sensory 
processing of the stop signal and enhanced (evaluation of) reactive response 
inhibition. Although it might seem implausible that patients without seizure 
reduction show VNS effects as well, having no treatment effect does not 
necessarily mean that stimulation has no influence at all on different 
processes in the brain (like NA transmission). Rather, these 
neurophysiological effects might not (reach a certain threshold to) translate 
into seizure reduction. 
Some of the current ERP results however are not in line with previous 
studies. For one, in contrast to the results of the MEG study of Boehler et al. 
(2009) that showed an increased go N1 in unsuccessful stop trails and an 
enhanced stop N1 in successful stop trials, in the present study we failed to 
detect a success effect in both the visual go-locked N1 amplitude and 
auditory stop N1 amplitude. Moreover, the overall N1 amplitude and the 
relation between successful and failed stop trials were not dependent on the 
activation of VNS in the current manuscript. Hence, a simple model in 
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which attention is globally boosted by VNS seems unlikely to explain the 
data in their entirety. Overtoom et al. (2009) reported that the difference in 
stop P3 amplitude between successful and unsuccessful stop trials was 
reduced in people with ADHD receiving methylphenidate. On the other 
hand, Logemann et al. (2013) showed that this success effect in stop P3 
decreased when NA transmission was attenuated via clonidine (partial D2-
recepter agonist). However, VNS-induced DA levels did not affect the 
success effect in the stop P3 amplitude here. Of course there are a number of 
differences between the design of the current study and these previous 
studies that limit comparability. For example, Overtoom and colleagues 
tested people with ADHD who have difficulties with response inhibition to 
begin with (e.g. Lijffijt et al., 2005; Murphy, 2002; Senderecka et al., 2012), 
which to our knowledge is not the case for epileptic patients. Moreover, 
these researchers did not apply a Laplace transformation and quantified the 
stop N1 at central electrode sites (and thus stop N1 and N2 components 
might be difficult to disentangle). The main limitation of the current study, 
that also played a role in some of these previous studies and might 
particularly affect the reliability of the ERP results, is the relatively small 
sample size (n=16) which reduces the signal-to-noise ratio and the chance of 
finding significant correlations. In the current design however we tried to 
restrict the influence of other confounds like variation in age, type of 
epilepsy, anti-epileptic drugs (AEDs), location of the seizures and brain 
lesions, by comparing the same subject in VNS ON and VNS OFF 
conditions thereby keeping patient characteristics constant. 
Although the current ERP results imply earlier processing of the stop 
signal and enhanced reactive control in case the vagus nerve was stimulated 
in epileptic patients, we could not detect a general improvement in inhibitory 
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behavioral performance when stimulation was on compared to off 
(independent of seizure reduction). This might in part be due to processes 
that are only accessory to response inhibition, like impaired monitoring 
functioning as suggested by the stop N2. More specifically, the larger 
amplitude (and earlier peak) when stopping is unsuccessful compared to 
successful that is usually observed in the stop-evoked N2 component (e.g. 
Dimoska et al., 2006; Krämer et al., 2011; Ramautar et al., 2004; but see 
Schmajuk et al., 2006) was only detected when stimulation was off. Also the 
peak difference in successful compared to failed stop trials was larger when 
patients responded more to VNS treatment. These findings might imply 
diminished error/conflict detection or performance monitoring with 
increasing levels of NA. Thus far the role of the noradrenergic system in 
performance monitoring has not been extensively studied (Jocham & 
Ullsperger, 2009), yet Riba et al. (2005) reported that enhanced NA release 
by administering yohimbine (that blocks D2-noradrenergic receptors) 
increases the error negativity (Ne), which is supposed to reflect error 
processing and response monitoring (Falkenstein et al., 1991, 2000; Gehring 
et al., 1993) and in the stop-signal task might (partly) overlap with the 
unsuccessful stop N2 (also suggested by e.g. Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; 
Ramautar et al., 2006). Hence, it does not seem likely that larger NA levels 
interfere with response monitoring. However, many other neurotransmitters, 
in particular dopamine but also serotonin and GABA (see Jocham & 
Ullsperger, 2009), are probably engaged in human action monitoring. Given 
that VNS also has been shown to affect these other neurotransmitters 
(although maybe to a lesser extent) (Ben-Menachem et al., 1995; Manta et 
al., 2013; Nemeroff et al., 2006), especially dopamine increase in prefrontal 
cortex (Manta et al., 2013) or a complex interplay between different 
neurochemical systems might result in decreased monitoring functions 
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(Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). Furthermore, we note that although VNS 
might also induce changes in other neurotransmitters and mainly in serotonin 
because of enhanced firing of serotonergic neurons in the raphe nucleus 
(Dorr & Debonnel, 2006; Manta et al., 2013; Nemeroff et al., 2006), the 
positive effects of VNS on response inhibition are most likely due to 
modulations of NA release given that in particular boosted NA and not 
serotonin has been found to decrease SSRTs in the stop-signal task (Bari et 
al., 2009; Clark et al., 2005; Drueke et al., 2010; Eagle et al., 2009).  
CONCLUSION 
In summary, behaviorally response inhibition seemed to benefit from 
VNS but only in the epileptic patients that showed the largest seizure 
reduction after VNS treatment. Given that response inhibition is a central 
cognitive-control ability, this finding represents an important neurocognitive 
benefit of the procedure, albeit being limited to patients for whom it is also 
clinically particularly effective. Although ERP results were more difficult to 
interpret they suggest that performance monitoring (stop N2) could be 
impaired but the auditory stop signal is detected and processed earlier (stop 
N1 latency) and reactive inhibition processes are boosted (stop P3) in case 
the vagus nerve was stimulated. These results further support the hypothesis 
that NA plays a significant role in response inhibition. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Appendix 1. Patient characteristics. Patients of which data were removed from the 
analyses are displayed in light grey font color. VNS = vagus nerve stimulation;  
M = male; F = female; Impl = implantation; Freq = frequency; HEZ = hypothesized 
epileptogenic zone; FL = frontal lobe; TL = temporal lobe; PL = parietal lobe;  
OL = occipital lobe; AEDs = anti-epileptic drugs; CBZ = carbamazepine;  
CLB = clobazam; CZP = clonazepam; LCZ = lacosamide; LTG = lamotrigine;  
LEV = levetiracetam; OXC = oxcarbazepine; PB = phenobarbital; PHT = phenytoin; 
PGB = pregabalin; RG = retigabine; VPA = valproic acid; VGB = vigabatrin. 
 
 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The central goal of the current research project was to dissociate 
processes related to proactive and reactive control in different motivational 
task contexts. This dissociation was largely accomplished by describing 
different temporal dynamics, which was possible through the use of EEG 
because of its high temporal precision. Moreover, we explored the impact 
and functioning of reward, an important motivator for the implementation of 
cognitive control, on functional processes related to both types of control. In 
the first two chapters we mainly focused on effortful cognitive preparation 
(which represents a principal function of proactive control) and its relation to 
reward and (indirectly) to the dopaminergic system. In the last two chapters 
the emphasis was placed primarily on (the systems involved in) response 
inhibition as a form of reactive control and the potential interaction with 
proactive control via global and selective attention.  
RESULTS: AN OVERVIEW 
Mental preparation as an important proactive control function 
Reward-triggered preparation, anticipation of task-demands (reflecting 
top-down attentional preparation) and proactive cognitive control have all 
been related to the dopaminergic system (see CHAPTER 1, introduction). 
This suggests that reward and top-down attentional processes might be 
linked by effortful resource allocation during preparation in function of 
optimizing performance especially when the outcome is valuable. In 
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CHAPTER 2, reward and task demands were therefore systematically crossed 
by the implementation of a cued attentional paradigm with different levels of 
anticipated target-discrimination difficulty and availability of reward (see 
also Krebs et al., 2012) while simultaneously EEG was recorded. Results 
indicated that the expectancy of reward influenced relatively early evaluation 
processes of the cue (like the P2 and P3). Furthermore, effortful cognitive 
and response preparation as reflected by the CNV was also mainly 
dominated by reward. Nevertheless, in later preparatory stages reward and 
task difficulty interacted with maximal CNV amplitudes in difficult reward-
anticipation trials while amplitudes were similarly lower in easy and difficult 
trials when motivation was low (i.e. cues indicated no reward could be won). 
Also, in line with previous studies (e.g. Birbaumer et al., 1990; Fan et al., 
2007; Wascher et al., 1996), the difference in late CNV amplitude between 
easy and difficult trials in the reward condition correlated with the same 
difference in reaction time.  
These results stress the importance of effortful preparation for 
subsequent target-discrimination performance. Also, reward effects seem to 
be (temporally) distinguishable from task-difficulty effects during cue-target 
intervals and thus likely cannot be reduced to top-down attentional 
mechanisms involved in task-difficulty preparation. Rather, reward already 
affected the evaluation of the cue consistent with a more bottom-up impact 
of reward on attention (possibly in line with studies suggesting enhanced 
non-strategic saliency of features that are consistently or previously coupled 
to reward; e.g. Anderson et al., 2011; Hickey et al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2013). 
Yet, in a late preparation phase reward and task-difficulty information are 
integrated implying more effortful preparatory control when the task will be 
difficult, particularly when correct performance will be rewarded. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION    201 
Furthermore, the finding that the modulation of CNV amplitude was 
primarily driven by reward information in the cue confirms the important 
link between reward (motivation) and effortful preparatory control.  
In a series of previous studies using an orthogonalized go/no-go task it 
was suggested that the dopaminergic midbrain is predominantly engaged in 
preparing for action execution over inhibition rather than reward 
anticipation. Yet, in CHAPTER 3 we tested the potential involvement of 
effortful preparation in this task, inspired by the findings in the previous 
chapter and the idea that dopaminergic activity might particularly signal the 
willingness to overcome effort (e.g. Kurniawan et al., 2011; Treadway et al., 
2012) and motivated resource allocation during preparation (e.g. Boehler et 
al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012). We implemented the orthogonalized go/no-go 
task of Guitart-Masip in an EEG setting and added three baseline conditions. 
Importantly, the CNV was only observed when cues indicated subjects 
would have to perform an action (press left or right) upon target presentation 
(go trials). On the other hand, if cues signaled that no response had to be 
made (no-go trials) the CNV component was not detected, similar to catch 
trials in which no target would be presented, implying a lack of task 
preparation. The even earlier cue-evoked parietal P3 also showed clearly 
larger amplitudes in go trials compared to no-go trials and catch trials 
indicating increased attention to/more profound processing of go stimuli 
probably because they are recognized as particularly task-relevant. In 
subsequent target processing an enhanced visual N1 component illustrated 
that top-down attention was increased to circle targets in go trials (compared 
to no-go trials). Furthermore, as expected, no reactive inhibitory processes 
seemed to be engaged in no-go trials indicated by the absence of the 
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inhibition-related anterior N2/P3 complex that is typical observed in no-go 
trials (e.g. Bokura et al., 2001; Eimer, 1993; Gajewski & Falkenstein, 2013). 
Together these findings speak against the notion that active (preparing 
for) target processing and response inhibition is involved in anticipated no-
go trials. Thus, people might only mentally prepare for an upcoming target 
when they really need to process it (in order to correctly perform the task). 
To conclude, in this chapter we have successfully shown that effortful 
cognitive preparation can be an additional or alternative explanation for the 
increased dopaminergic activation when anticipating action (Guitart-Masip 
et al., 2011, 2012a), in line with previous studies linking effort and 
dopamine (e.g. Boehler et al., 2011; Kurniawan et al., 2011). Hence, it is not 
clear whether the dopaminergic dominance of action execution over 
inhibition would persist when the amount of (anticipated) effort would be 
matched. 
Neuromodulatory and reward influences in reactive control 
In the studies of Guitart-Masip and colleagues an asymmetric link 
between action and valence was also suggested since in go trials 
performance was enhanced when cues signaled reward compared to 
punishment (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012a) and learning to go was shown to be 
improved when anticipating reward while learning to withhold responses 
was more successful when anticipating punishment (e.g. Cavanagh et al., 
2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012b). Yet, recently response inhibition has also 
been shown to benefit from reward (Rosell-Negre et al., 2014) even when 
reward information is not cued and thus global preparatory changes are not 
possible (e.g. Boehler et al., 2012, 2014). We showed that the latter finding 
was related to boosted reactive control as specified by increased activity in 
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the ‘inhibition network’ upon the presentation of a rewarded stop signal 
(Boehler et al., 2014). Given the important link between reward and 
proactive processes, in CHAPTER 4 we explored whether these reward effects 
on response inhibition were solely related to reactive processes or whether 
variations in latent proactive control might also be involved. As predicted, 
when the color of the stop signal indicated reward could be won in case 
stopping was successful in the current trial (reward-related stop trial), 
reactive inhibition was enhanced implied by shorter SSRTs and also by 
enhanced successful stop P3 amplitudes and an increased (as well as earlier) 
frontocentral positivity reflecting the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful stop trials. More importantly, we furthermore found boosted 
stop-elicited N1 amplitudes in reward-related stop trials, likely reflecting 
proactive attentional screening for the reward-signaling color. Furthermore, 
stopping performance in reward-unrelated stop trials was not affected by the 
mere presence of a reward context, i.e. similar SSRTs in reward-unrelated 
trials in a reward block and no-reward block. Nonetheless, go-evoked N1 
amplitudes were larger in the reward block compared to the no-reward 
block, which demonstrates that being in a reward context might not always 
exclusively influence the rewarded behavior but that it might create a 
sustained proactive control mode as suggested previously (Jimura et al., 
2010; Locke & Braver, 2008) thereby affecting the processing of all stimuli 
within the context. Yet, behaviorally, such an effect was not detected in our 
study, possibly due to the fact that in the stop-signal task, going and stopping 
stand in opposition, so that a global performance-enhancing effect might not 
clearly manifest for either process, depending on its exact nature. 
Hence, although at first glance reward effects might exclusively be 
due to reactive processes, given that there was no possibility to differentially 
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prepare for different conditions in a global fashion as in pre-cueing designs, 
it is important to acknowledge that latent proactive processes can still be 
engaged for example via specific strategic attention or in general via 
sustained activity dynamics triggered by the context. These proactive 
processes might consequently also support reactive control in order to 
optimize performance and reach predefined goals. 
In CHAPTER 5 we further explored processes underlying response 
inhibition. Evidence supports a rather specific role of the noradrenergic 
system in response cancellation (see Eagle et al., 2008). This has usually 
been demonstrated by the finding that drug-induced increase of 
noradrenaline concentrations results in improved stopping (e.g. Bari et al., 
2009; Chamberlain et al., 2006; Overtoom et al., 2003; Robinson et al., 
2008). To further support this hypothesis we explored the impact of vagus 
nerve stimulation (VNS) in epileptic patients on response inhibition given 
that VNS is believed to increase noradrenaline levels via indirect projections 
to the locus coeruleus, which is probably also a critical mediator in the 
reduction of seizures in these patients (Fornai et al., 2011). Most notably, we 
found that the percentage of seizure reduction (which indicates whether VNS 
treatment is effective for a given patient) was correlated with the amount of 
reduction in SSRT when VNS was switched on compared to off. More 
specifically, patients with an increased treatment effect showed more 
improvement in response inhibition in terms of SSRTs when the vagus nerve 
was stimulated. To be able to more closely examine (proactive and reactive) 
mechanisms involved in this effect we also analyzed ERPs. These results 
were less straightforward but seemed to indicate slightly earlier attentional 
processing of the auditory (earlier N1 latency) in VNS ON compared to 
VNS OFF conditions, which could be potentially relevant given the assumed 
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race between going and stopping. Moreover, enhanced reactive response 
inhibition was suggested by increased P3 latency when the stimulator was 
on. Since these effects of VNS were irrespective of the percentage of seizure 
reduction, they suggest a general influence of VNS that did not translate 
directly into behavioral performance benefits. Furthermore, these positive 
effects might be opposed by decreased performance monitoring (indicated 
by the stop N2) when stimulation was on.    
Though some caution should be taken when interpreting these results 
because there were some limitations to this study (like noisy ERPs and 
seemingly detrimental inhibition effects of stimulation for patients that did 
not clinically profit from the VNS treatment), the findings of CHAPTER 5 
were in line with studies suggesting a role of the noradrenergic system in 
response inhibition. Also, they point in the direction of a possible cognitive 
advantage of VNS in particular in patients that already benefit most in terms 
of reduced seizures. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The anticipation of cognitive and physical effort 
The concept of cognitive effort is believed to reflect the level of 
cognitive engagement in a certain task (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). If one 
puts more effort into a task, this probably translates into increased 
engagement of top-down attentional processes and might consequently also 
improve behavioral performance. In CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3, we 
showed the importance of cognitive effort during preparation and results of 
CHAPTER 2 indicated that increased motivation can lead to enhanced levels 
of preparatory cognitive effort. Yet, it is not clear whether these effects 
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would extent to (the anticipation of) physical effort, which refers to the 
degree of muscle activity that one has to exert in a task. Schmidt et al. (2012) 
directly compared brain regions involved in physical and mental effort 
during task execution. These authors showed that although they mostly 
engage distinct task-specific brain activity, mental and cognitive effort seem 
to rely on a common motivational center, specifically the ventral striatum. 
During preparation phases, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
striatum (which are both important target regions of the dopaminergic 
system) have been shown to be involved in the anticipation of physical effort 
with more activation when preparing for highly demanding physical tasks 
(e.g. Kurniawan et al., 2013). Importantly, anticipation of increased mental 
effort has been related to similar brain regions (e.g. Boehler et al., 2011; 
Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). Also Kurniawan et al. (2011) 
suggested based on several studies that the ACC and basal ganglia (in 
relation to the dopaminergic pathways) play an important role in 
anticipating, choosing or executing effortful actions. In line with this idea we 
assume that these regions are engaged as a general motivator to sustain 
effortful preparation (or task execution) independent of whether this effort is 
physical or cognitive in nature.  
Interestingly, Kurniawan et al. (2013) explored anticipation of 
physical effort using a design that was based on the orthogonalized go/no-go 
task of Guitart-Masip et al. (2011) and thus was very similar to the 
procedure that we used in CHAPTER 3. In the fMRI study of Kurniawan et al. 
(2013) fractal cues similarly indicated the valence of the upcoming trial, but 
instead of action anticipation these cues additionally signalled the amount of 
physical effort one would have to exert in the upcoming trial. They only 
found main effects of task difficulty during anticipation with increased ACC 
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and striatal activity when preparing for higher physical effort. Given that in 
CHAPTER 3 we found evidence for the idea that that the anticipation of no-go 
trials could also involve a lack of cognitive effort, this could be related to 
ACC activity (as indicated by studies suggesting the ACC, as part of a 
thalamocortical circuit, could be a generator of the CNV; see e.g. Nagai et 
al., 2004) and thus possibly also relate back to the ACC as a general node for 
effortful preparation.  
Reward and punishment as motivators 
In the current work the emphasis was mostly placed on reward (in the 
form of gaining money) and how it affects proactive and reactive control. 
Yet, we argue that the observed effects are likely not specific to reward 
given that we assume a more strategic attentional role of reward in all our 
studies. Consistent with this idea Maunsell (2004) stated that reward effects 
can be established via enhanced top-down attention and that in many 
previous studies these factors cannot be clearly distinguished. Hence, it is 
conceivable that other motivators such as punishment could use the same 
route (i.e. via strategic attentional control). Alternative manipulations like 
punishment (and even intrinsic goals) would thus probably similarly boost or 
energize control processes. As such, (the avoidance of) punishment has also 
been shown to enhance cognitive control, mostly in the same extent as 
reward (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009; Krawczyk & 
D’Esposito, 2013; Savine et al., 2010; Small et al., 2005), and also similarly 
enhance brain networks related to top-down attention (Engelmann et al., 
2009; Krawczyk & D’Esposito, 2013; Small et al., 2005). Interestingly, 
Krawczyk performed two very similar studies in which working memory 
was tested: in one of the studies a cue indicated the amount of money that 
could be won in case a correct response was given (Krawczyk et al., 2007), 
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in the other study the amount of money that someone could avoid losing was 
cued (Krawczyk & D’Esposito, 2013). When a cue predicted the potential of 
losing money, enhanced activity in the striatum and amygdala was detected 
consistent with potential monetary gains (but see Knutson et al., 2001). 
Moreover, in reward conditions and avoiding punishment conditions 
respectively, encoding of information was improved via top-down effects 
(indicated by boosted activity in the prefrontal cortex) by increasing 
attention towards relevant stimuli. Furthermore, Carter et al. (2009) showed 
that brain areas that typically respond to the anticipation of gains (like the 
ventral tegmental area and nucleus accumbens) were also enhanced when 
anticipating losses. Together these results suggest that (the anticipation of) 
reward and punishment serve as motivators that can drive control processes 
through very similar mechanisms. Yet, we note that although punishment 
and reward can have similar effects on behavior and control-related 
networks, these influences could also possibly be obtained via different 
routes (Small et al., 2005). 
In the design described in CHAPTER 2 cues actually both signaled 
reward and punishment since correct fast performance was rewarded and 
incorrect or too slow responses were punished (similar manipulation see e.g. 
Taylor et al., 2004). The results are thus related to enhanced motivation 
probably due to both reward and punishment expectation, yet we described 
reward as a key concept in this study. Specifically, participants not only 
knew that a certain compensation for participation would be paid 
independent of task performance, but also that the reward procedure would 
in any case lead to an additional monetary bonus, so that the overall 
expectation was clearly one of receiving additional reward of a variable 
amount, of which only the size depended on their performance. In CHAPTER 
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3 we implemented a study that included both anticipated reward (‘win cues’) 
and punishment (‘avoid losing cues’). Reward and punishment avoidance 
did not seem to influence preparatory effort in a different way (i.e. similar 
CNV amplitudes, see also Broyd et al., 2012; Pfabigan et al., 2014). 
However, during cue evaluation P3 amplitudes were particularly increased 
when cues signaled reward in comparison to punishment and neutral 
conditions. A particular sensitivity of the cue P3 to the anticipation of gain 
over the anticipation of loss has been reported before (Broyd et al., 2012; 
Pfabigan et al., 2014) and could be related to increased saliency of/attention 
to the reward stimulus. These results suggest that reward and punishment 
can slightly differently affect cue evaluation, yet it seems that they usually 
do not affect proactive processes in a substantially different way.  
The direction of the link between reward and effort   
Motivation is easily thought of as a mediator of effort in the sense that 
when one is motivated to succeed in a task, one is probably more likely to 
engage more effort. This idea is in line with the ERP results mentioned in 
CHAPTER 2 in that more preparatory effort is exerted in case correct 
performance of the upcoming task is particularly worthwhile. Unexpectedly, 
in CHAPTER 3 we did not find modulations in go CNV amplitudes in 
reward/punishment trials compared to neutral trials. There might be a 
number of reasons why this motivational effect was not observed. For 
example, the go task (pressing left or right according to the location of a 
circle) might have been too easy so that differential preparation might not be 
considered necessary (and thus performance could possibly mostly rely on 
reactive control processes). Also the employed probabilistic feedback might 
support this effect since subjects were informed about this probability 
feature and thus they might have assumed that negative feedback was always 
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misleading rather than being due to too slow performance. Furthermore, in 
the literature mixed findings are reported with some studies showing an 
effect of reward/punishment on CNV amplitudes (e.g. Hughes et al., 2012; 
Pfabigan et al., 2014; van den Berg et al., 2014) whereas others do not (e.g. 
Broyd et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2006). This might be related to certain 
task features as described above, yet future studies are necessary to confirm 
this effect. 
According to the effort-discounting principle effort is inherently 
negative and thus reward is devaluated when high effort is required to 
achieve it. In humans mainly dopaminergically-innervated subcortical and 
cortical regions (like the striatum and the ACC), as well as possibly the 
dopaminergic source regions themselves, have been supposed to reflect the 
net value of reward indicated by increased activity when less effort is 
required to obtain a similar rewarding outcome (Botvinick et al., 2009; 
Croxson et al., 2009). Also Prévost et al. (2010) suggested that these regions 
coded for the devaluation of reward. This is in contrast to studies that have 
found increased activation in these dopamine-related brain structures when 
high effort needs to be engaged implying a role of motivated resource 
allocation to overcome effort to achieve goals (e.g. Boehler et al., 2011; 
Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014; see also Kurniawan et al., 2011).  
In our work, results were consistent with the latter idea rather than 
supporting the discounting principle. This is, in CHAPTER 2 we found 
maximal CNV amplitudes in reward trials when subjects anticipated a high-
difficult trial (requiring more cognitive effort) instead of a low-difficult trial. 
This reflects the involvement of motivated anticipatory processes even more 
so given that low-difficult trials are more likely to be performed correctly 
and thus be rewarded. Also in CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3, we observed 
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enhanced feedback-related P3 components in hard (high-difficult and go 
trials respectively) compared to easy trials (low-difficult and no-go trials 
respectively) especially in highly motivating conditions (reward and 
reward/punishment respectively). This could imply that subjects value 
correct feedback more when they have put a lot of effort into correctly 
performing the task, particularly in motivationally significant conditions (see 
also Ma et al., 2014) which is in line with the effort justification hypothesis 
(see the cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger, 1957).  
Finding evidence in favor of effort discounting or motivated effort 
engagement might depend on certain task-related characteristics. As such, 
some studies have investigated the relation between reward and effort in 
decision-making tasks. In this line of research it is explored how willing 
humans or animals are to engage in highly demanding tasks. Thus, in these 
paradigms subjects can freely choose the difficulty level of the upcoming 
trial in anticipation of potential differential rewards (see e.g. Kurniawan et 
al., 2010; Prévost et al., 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013). However, different 
results could be observed when implementing no-choice tasks (e.g. Krebs et 
al., 2012) as also suggested by Schouppe et al. (2014) who found differential 
effort-related striatal activity in choice and no-choice tasks). Importantly, 
motivated effort engagement might be particularly relevant in a phase were 
subjects can actively prepare for the upcoming target in a way that improves 
performance and is contingent upon task performance (in contrast to non-
contingent rewards, see e.g; Botvinick et al., 2009), as was the case in 
CHAPTER 2. Hence, dopaminergically-innervated brain regions might be 
involved in both effort discounting and motivated resource allocation 
dependent on the phase/context animals or humans are in.  
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Electrophysiology in the stop-signal task 
 In CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 control processes related to response 
inhibition were examined in the stop-signal task. In this regard ERPs are 
very useful given that they provide additional information on the timing and 
nature of the underlying processes that might support behavioral 
performance. Given that components in the stop-signal task have been 
thought to reflect specific functions (such as more proactive attention-related 
N1 components and reactive N2 and inhibitory P3 components), this 
paradigm was particularly useful to investigate reactive and proactive 
control. However, there are also some complications when investigating 
ERPs in the stop-signal task. As such, given that they are presented close in 
time, stop-evoked signals suffer from temporal overlap of the go stimulus, 
which furthermore can differ between conditions, and several stop-evoked 
components also overlap in space (like the frontal stop P3 and parietal go 
P3). We tried to deal with these issues by correcting for both types of 
overlap. This might limit the comparability of results over studies that use 
different overlap-removal techniques or studies that only correct for one type 
of overlap or apply no correction.  
This might be one of the reasons why in some research the stop N2 
was observed over right frontal electrodes (e.g. Logemann et al., 2013; 
Schmajuk et al., 2006) while other authors reported a frontocentral stop N2 
component (Kok et al., 2004; Ramautar et al., 2006a). These components 
might reflect different functions with the right N2 being more related to 
reactive inhibition in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) since the right N2 
is larger in successful stop trials (Schmajuk et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
seeing that the central N2 is enhanced in unsuccessful stop trials, this 
component might be more related to conflict detection and performance 
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monitoring (e.g. Dimoska et al., 2006; Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Kok et 
al., 2004; Ramautar et al., 2006a) in the ACC and/or inferior frontal gyrus 
(Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Ramautar et al., 2006b). In CHAPTER 4 and 
CHAPTER 5 we observed the typical frontocentral N2 that was usually larger 
for unsuccessful stop trials. Yet, when in epileptic patients the vagus nerve 
was stimulated this difference between successful and unsuccessful stop 
trials in N2 amplitude could not be detected signifying decreased monitoring 
in this condition (see CHAPTER 4).  
Furthermore, although previous work has noted that the stop P3 might 
appear too late to reflect the initiation of reactive inhibition (Dimoska et al., 
2003; Huster et al., 2013), many studies have suggested that the P3, which 
shows larger amplitudes on successful stop trials, most likely reflects 
reactive inhibitory processes (Bekker et al., 2005a; de Jong et al., 1990; 
Dimoska et al., 2003, 2006; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Greenhouse & 
Wessel, 2013; Lansbergen et al., 2007; Overtoom et al., 2002; Ramautar et 
al., 2004; Senderecka et al., 2012). Moreover, Wessel and Aron (2014) have 
shown that the P3 onset is typically still in time to reflect response 
inhibition. Results of CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 suggest that the P3 might 
indeed be related to reactive inhibition since they are consistent with 
(although not identical to) effects observed in SSRTs. As such, we found 
amplified successful P3 amplitudes in reward-related stop trials (CHAPTER 
4) and enlarged P3 components when vagus nerve stimulation was switched 
on (CHAPTER 5), suggesting improved reactive response inhibition.  
ERPs in these chapters also allowed us to investigate N1 components 
as a function of proactive control. Recently, it has been emphasized that 
attentional processing of the stop signal is a significant aspect in (successful) 
stopping (Verbruggen et al., 2014). Boehler et al. (2010) found larger 
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activation in the occipital cortex for visual stop signals in successful stop 
trials compared to unsuccessful stop trials, which might indicate more 
profound processing of the stop stimulus. Also previous results highlighted 
the role of the go and stop N1 in successful stopping performance (Bekker et 
al., 2005a; b; Boehler et al., 2009). However, in CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 
we failed to detect enhanced stop N1 amplitudes in successful stop trials. We 
speculate that this effect might be quite sensitive to task manipulations or 
that there might be subtle individual differences in (the intensity/frequency 
of) the use of attentional adjustments. Still, effects in N1 amplitude in 
CHAPTER 4 showed that top-down attention to the reward-related color of 
the stop stimulus was increased and general attention (to the go stimulus) 
was boosted in the reward block.    
In CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 we successfully demonstrated 
neuromodulatory and motivational influences on reactive and proactive 
inhibitory control. Thus, although there are some (largely technical) 
difficulties related to it, investigating ERPs in the stop-signal task might be 
particularly valuable to detect the role of underlying proactive and reactive 
process within the same trial that might otherwise not be revealed. 
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings presented in the current thesis contribute to the 
knowledge about neural mechanisms underlying motivation and control 
processes. This is of particular interest not only to gain insights into healthy 
brain functioning, but also to neurological disorders that show difficulties 
with one (or both) of these functions. As such, the dysregulation of 
motivation is critically involved in several disorders like depression (e.g. 
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Yang et al., 2014), attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; e.g. 
Cubillo et al., 2012), Alzheimer disease (e.g. Landes et al., 2001), 
schizophrenia (e.g. Strauss et al., 2014) and Parkinson’s disease (e.g. 
Pagonabarraga et al., 2015). Also cognitive control functions are diminished 
in, for example, people with Huntington and Parkinson’s disease (e.g. Brown 
& Marsden, 1990; Lawrence et al., 1996; Sawamoto et al., 2008), 
schizophrenia (e.g. Lesh et al., 2011), depression (e.g. Austin, 2001) and 
patients with frontal lobe damage (e.g. Stuss & Benson, 1984); for an 
overview see also Elliott (2003). More specifically, reactive response 
inhibition has been shown to be affected in people with ADHD (Barkley, 
1997; Chambers et al., 2009; Lijffijt et al., 2005; Murphy, 2002; Senderecka 
et al., 2012), obsessive compulsive disorder (Menzies et al., 2007), 
Parkinson’s Disease (Gauggel et al., 2004) and ADHD (Barkley, 1997; 
Chambers et al., 2009). In our work (see CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5) we 
have demonstrated that reactive inhibitory control can be supported by 
proactive processes and thus that stopping possibly also depends on sensory 
and attentional processes. Hence, studies could further reveal the influence 
of these processes in the inhibitory impairments that are observed in these 
studies (see for example Bekker et al., 2005b). Moreover, in CHAPTER 5 it 
was suggested that the noradrenergic system could also play an important 
role in reactive response inhibition and VNS could improve stopping 
performance. Regarding proactive processes, the CNV was found to be 
attenuated in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Gerschlager et al., 1999; 
Lukhanina et al., 2006; Wascher, 1997), implicating the relation between 
this component and the dopaminergic system (see also Linssen et al., 2011) 
and decreased cognitive and motor preparation in these patients. Hence, 
defining the processes affecting the CNV (like in CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 
3) might also have further implications for these patients.  
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the current dissertation we have shown that proactive and reactive 
control are important functions that can both be affected by motivation. 
Although we found that proactive and reactive control can be engaged in the 
same task, and have speculated that they can interact with each other, more 
research is needed to confirm whether there is a direct link between these 
two control functions and how exactly it operates under different conditions. 
Moreover, although EEG has high temporal precision, its spatial resolution 
is rather low. Thus, combined EEG and fMRI could provide more insight 
into the brain activation pattern that is associated with proactive and reactive 
control. Also, more clarity is needed to define the interplay between 
proactive and reactive control given that some researchers have proposed 
that enhanced proactive control alleviates the need for reactive control 
processes indicated by reduced activity in reactive control regions during 
task execution (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011), while other 
results suggested that proactive control can actually boost reactive control 
networks (Rosell-Negre et al., 2014). 
As already stated in the previous sections, the current findings are 
particularly related to mental effort and reward. Future studies should 
provide more evidence for the idea of a single node for (preparatory) effort 
by simultaneously investigating physical and mental effort and how this 
might be reflected by the CNV component. Also, the possibly unique as well 
as shared mechanisms and influences of reward, punishment and even 
intrinsic motivation in energizing different control functions could be further 
explored. Moreover, although a coupling was supposed between action 
execution and reward and action inhibition/withdrawal and punishment 
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(Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 2012b, 2014), we have shown that reactive 
response inhibition can also benefit from reward. Hence, it would be 
interesting to also include punishment in a stop-signal paradigm and 
investigate its impact on reactive and proactive processes and capture 
whether these are comparable to reward effects. Furthermore, in our work 
reward information is always tied to a feature of the cue or target. Although 
ERP results mainly suggested higher functions of reward in the form of 
motivation, rewarded features have also been suggested to engage more 
automatic processes (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Hickey et al., 2010). To 
confine these bottom-up attentional influences it would be interesting to 
have reward availability communicated by an additional stimulus that is not 
task-relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
In the current dissertation we have shown that proactive and reactive 
control are important functions that can both be affected by motivation 
(likely via fluctuations in the dopaminergic system), while the noradrenergic 
modulatory system seems be particularly involved in reactive response 
inhibition. Moreover, our results suggest that both forms of cognitive control 
are not mutually exclusive since they can be engaged within the same trial, 
raising the possibility that they furthermore interact with each other in order 
to optimally tweak performance under varying motivational and situational 
settings.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
INTRODUCTIE 
Het is uiterst belangrijk dat we ons in het dagdagelijkse leven kunnen 
aanpassen aan onze omgeving op een manier die consistent is met onze 
vooropgestelde doelen. Deze vaardigheid wordt in de psychologie cognitieve 
controle genoemd en is een centraal begrip in deze onderzoeksthesis. 
Cognitieve controle is een concept dat verschillende processen omvat (zoals 
werkgeheugen, selectieve aandacht, responscontrole en responsinhibitie) en 
is voornamelijk gelinkt aan activatie in de prefrontale cortex (Miller, 2000). 
We maken een onderscheid tussen twee vormen van cognitieve controle: 
proactieve en reactieve controle (gebaseerd op een theorie van Braver 
namelijk ‘the dual mechanism of control theory’, zie Braver, 2012; Braver et 
al., 2007).  
Proactieve controle houdt in dat we dankzij een bepaalde context of 
cue ons mentaal en/of fysiek reeds kunnen voorbereiden op een nakende 
gebeurtenis zodat we onze doelen (beter) kunnen bereiken. Bijvoorbeeld, stel 
dat je als autobestuurder iets verder een voetganger de weg ziet oversteken 
dan kan je hierop anticiperen door reeds te vertragen (het gaspedaal los te 
laten). Verschillende cognitieve functies kunnen hierbij een rol spelen, zoals 
het actief herhalen en bijhouden van doelen, wijzigen van de aandachtsfocus 
en het invoeren van strategieën. Reactieve controle daarentegen treedt op als 
een laattijdig correctiemechanisme in situaties waarbij we niet kunnen 
anticiperen op een gebeurtenis. Bijvoorbeeld, veronderstel dat je even niet 
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aan het opletten bent tijdens het autorijden en plots steekt een voetganger de 
weg over, dan moet je onmiddellijk de rem kunnen induwen. Dus, bij 
reactieve controle worden processen die specifiek gerelateerd zijn aan het 
uitvoeren van de taak slechts geactiveerd wanneer ze noodzakelijk zijn. 
Bijgevolg zijn deze twee vormen van cognitieve controle voornamelijk te 
onderscheiden in functie van tijd, dit wil zeggen wanneer de 
controleprocessen ingevoerd worden. 
Hoewel ze langdurig afzonderlijk werden bestudeerd, wordt 
tegenwoordig het belang van de interactie tussen motivatie en cognitieve 
controle erkent (Botvinick & Braver, 2014). Cognitieve controle wordt 
immers gedreven door motivationele factoren, dit wil zeggen dat wanneer 
iemand meer gemotiveerd is om een bepaald doel te bereiken zal hiervoor 
ook meer controle uitgoefend worden. Verschillende soorten motivators 
kunnen leiden tot veranderingen in cognitieve controle. In de studies 
beschreven in het huidige werk werd voornamelijk de rol van beloning als 
een motivator voor controle onderzocht gezien mensen en dieren inherent 
streven naar het maximaliseren van positive resultaten (zoals beloning) en 
het minimaliseren van negatieve resultaten (zoals straf).  
Het is algemeen geweten dat de neurotransmittor dopamine een 
belangrijke rol speelt in beloningsgerelateerde processen. Schultz en zijn 
collega’s kwamen tot de cruciale bevinding dat dopaminerge neuronen in 
apen niet enkel actief zijn bij het krijgen van een beloning, maar ook bij het 
zien van een bepaalde stimulus die een beloning voorspelt (Mirenowicz & 
Schultz, 1994; Schultz et al., 1997, 1998). Dit werd later bevestigd bij 
mensen door studies gebruik makend van functionele magnetische 
resonantie beeldvorming (fMRI) waarin verhoogde activatie in dopaminerge 
hersenregio’s gevonden werd wanneer cues voorspelde dat een geldbeloning 
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gewonnen kon worden bij het correct uitvoeren van de taak (zie Knutson et 
al., 2000). Dopamine lijkt echter ook voornamelijk een rol te spelen wanneer 
een inspanning geleverd moet worden om een beloning te verkrijgen 
(Kurniawan et al., 2011). Deze inspanning kan zowel fysiek als mentaal zijn 
en beschrijft in welke mate iemand geëngageerd is om een moeilijke taak uit 
te voeren (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Aangezien cognitieve controle een 
complexe functie is, vereist deze mentale inspanning om zo het 
vooropgestelde doel te kunnen bereiken. 
Beloning heeft doorgaans een positieve invloed op cognitieve functies 
zoals bijvoorbeeld werkgeugen (Jimura et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2004), 
responsinhibitie (Boehler et al., 2012; Rosell-Negre et al., 2014), aandacht 
(Kiss et al., 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010) en 
langetermijn geheugen (Wittmann et al., 2005).  Meestal worden deze 
positieve gedragseffecten gevonden in situaties waarbij men zich kan 
voorbereiden of een verandering in aandachtsfocus kan implementeren, zoals 
in paradigma’s die gebruik maken van een belonende cue of context (Jimura 
et al., 2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Pochon et al., 2002; Rosell-Negre et 
al., 2014). Dit impliceert een sterke link tussen beloning en proactieve 
controle (zie ook Braver, 2012). Echter, er zijn ook enkele studies die 
aantonen dat beloning een gunstige impact kan hebben op reactieve 
controleprocessen, dit wil zeggen wanneer er geen voorbereiding kan 
plaatsvinden, bijvoorbeeld wanneer beloning gekoppeld wordt aan een taak-
relevante stimulus (Boehler et al., 2012, 2014; Krebs et al., 2010, 2011). 
In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we de onderliggende processen 
gerelateerd aan proactieve en reactieve controle (en hun potentiale interactie) 
en de rol van motivatie hierin. Aangezien we proactieve en reactieve 
controle voornamelijke onderscheiden in functie van tijd, is elektro-
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encephalographie (EEG) een interessante methode omwille van zijn hoge 
temporele precisie. Indien EEG gemeten wordt terwijl een taak wordt 
uitgevoerd, kunnen we ‘event-related potentials’ (ERPs) bestuderen. Deze 
ERPs bestaan uit verschillende componenten die onderliggende elektrische 
hersenactiviteit (en dus cognitieve functies),  uitgelokt door een bepaalde 
stimulus of respons, reflecteren. 
EMPIRISCHE STUDIES 
In de eerste twee empirische studies (zie hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3) 
bestudeerden we voornamelijk een belangrijke proactieve controlefunctie, 
namelijk cognitieve voorbereiding, en welke invloed motivatie hierop kan 
hebben. De mate van cognitieve (en motorische) voorbereiding op een taak 
wordt voornamelijk weergegeven door de ‘contingent negative variation’ 
(CNV), dit is een component die optreedt in het cue-target interval vanaf 
ongeveer 1 seconde voordat de door de cue voorspelde target verschijnt 
(Connor & Lang, 1969; Tecce, 1972; van Boxtel & Brunia, 1994). 
De studie omschreven in hoofdstuk 2 is gebaseerd op het idee dat een 
beloning voorbereidingsprocessen beïnvloedt via top-down 
aandachtsprocesses (zie ook Maunsell, 2004). Immers, een eerdere fMRI 
studie van Krebs et al. (2012) toonde aan dat het anticiperen van beloning en 
taakmoeilijkheid grotendeels gelijkaardige hersengebieden activeert. 
Bovendien werd er in sommige regio’s, zoals de dopaminerge 
middenhersenen, een interactie gevonden met maximale activatie wanneer 
de cue zowel een beloning als een moeilijke trial voorspelde. Echter, gezien 
fMRI een lage temporele resolutie bevat, is het moeilijk om vast te stellen op 
welk moment hersenprocessen geactiveerd zijn en dus mogelijks is er een 
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onderscheid in wanneer de manipulaties in beloning en taakmoeilijkheid een 
effect hebben. Bijgevolg registeerden we EEG-signalen terwijl 
proefpersonen het paradigma van Krebs et al. (2012) uitvoerden waarin een 
cue voorspelt hoe moelijk de taak zal zijn en of er een mogelijkheid is om 
een beloning te winnen bij een correct antwoord. De resultaten impliceerden 
dat tijdens het cue-target interval processen eerder worden gestuurd door 
beloning dan door taakmoeilijkheid. Immers, zowel de evaluatie van de cue 
als vroege cognitieve voorbereiding (vroege CNV) werden enkel beïnvloed 
door beloning. Bovendien observeerden we een interactie in late 
voorbereidingsfases met maximale late CNV amlitudes in moeilijke doch 
belonende condities. We concludeerden dat motivatie een belangrijke impact 
kan hebben op proactieve voorbereidingsprocessen die waarschijnlijk niet 
bepert zijn tot top-down aandachtsmechanismen zoals betrokken in de 
voorbereiding op een moeilijke taak. Echter, in latere stadia van het 
voorbereidingsproces worden belonings- en moeilijkheidsinformatie 
geïntegreerd opdat er enkel meer cognitieve voorbereiding voor een 
moeilijke trial zou worden geïmplementeerd wanneer dit de moeite waard is 
(belonend). 
Het lijkt er dus op dat beloning (en bijgevolg hoogstwaarschijnlijk ook 
het dopaminerge systeem) een belangrijke rol kan spelen in het gemotiveerd 
toewijzen van cognitieve bronnen tijdens de voorbereidingsfase om optimaal 
doelen te kunnen bereiken. In hoofdstuk 3 gaan we hierop verder door het 
belang van mentale voorbereiding als een alternatieve of aanvullende 
verklaring voor te stellen voor de resultaten uit een reeks recent 
gepubliceerde papers van Guitart-Masip et al. (2011, 2012, 2014). Deze 
auteurs vertrokken van het Pavloviaanse idee dat beloning inherent 
gekoppeld is aan benadering of het uitvoeren van actie, terwijl straf 
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gekoppeld is aan vermijding of actie-inhibitie. Bijgevolg stelde zij een 
design op waarbij een cue de valentie (straf of beloning) en actie 
(executie/go of inhibitie/no-go) van de trial aangaf (d.i. de ‘orthogonalized 
go/no-go taak’). Er werd een gedragsmatige link gevonden tussen beloning 
en het uitvoeren van actie gezien er meer correcte antwoorden werden 
gegeven in go trials wanneer de cue beloning voorspelde. Belangrijker echter 
is dat in deze studie onverwachts werd geobserveerd dat tijdens de 
voorbereidingsfase de activatie van de dopaminerge gebieden voornamelijk 
gedomineerd werd door actie, met grotere activatie wanneer men zich 
voorbereidde op een go trial (actie) dan op een no-go trial (inactie), in plaats 
van door beloning. Gezien andere studies van onze onderzoeksgroep hebben 
aangetoond dat deze zelfde dopaminerge gebieden ook actief zijn tijdens het 
voorbereiden op een moeilijke taak (Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012), 
stellen we dat verschillen in geanticipeerde go en no-go trials ook verklaard 
kunen worden door veranderingen in actieve mentale voorbereiding op de 
taak en niet enkel door actievoorbereiding. In de studie omschreven in 
hoofdstuk 3 lieten we daarom proefpersonen de orthogonalized go/no-go 
taak (met enkele extra basiscondities) uitvoeren terwijl we hersenactiviteit 
vastlegden aan de hand van EEG. Zoals verwacht konden we enkel een 
duidelijke CNV observeren in geanticipeerde go trials en niet in no-go trials. 
Bovendien suggereerden ERP componenten gerelateerd aan de target (cirkel 
links of rechts op het scherm) dat er meer visuale aandacht aan de target 
werd besteed in go trials en dat er geen actieve responsinhibitie aanwezig 
was in no-go trials. Dus, deze resultaten bevestigden onze hypothese dat 
wanneer iemand anticipeert op het uitvoeren van een actie in plaats van het 
weerhouden ervan, brengt dit (ook) meer non-motorische mentale 
voorbereiding met zich mee. De toename in activatie in het dopaminerge 
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systeem in geanticipeerde go trials (zie Guitart-Masip et al., 2011) kan dus 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk ook te wijten zijn aan meer cognitieve voorbereiding. 
 
In de laatste twee empirische studies (hoofdstuk 4 en hoofstuk 5) lag 
de nadruk grotendeels op reactieve controleprocessen in de vorm van 
reactieve responsinhibitie. Dit is de vaardigheid om een respons te kunnen 
onderdrukken of annuleren wanneer deze niet langer adequaat is gezien de 
omstandigheden. Reactieve responsinhibitie wordt voornamelijk  onderzocht 
aan de hand van de stop-signaal taak. Hierbij worden vooral go trials 
gepresenteerd waarbij zo snel mogelijk een vooropgestelde respons moet 
gegeven worden bij het zien van de go-stimulus. Echter, af en toe wordt er 
kort na de go-stimulus een stop-signaal weergegeven en moet men trachten 
om de door de go-stimulus uitgelokte actie tijdig te onderdrukken (en dus 
geen respons te geven), dit is een zogenaamde stop trial. De stop-signaal 
reactietijd (SSRT) is een belangrijke maat voor reactieve responsinhibitie 
gezien deze aangeeft hoe lang het duurt om het actieproces te annuleren 
vanaf het verschijnen van het stop-signaal.  
Zoals we reeds aanhaalden wordt beloning voornamelijk gelinkt aan 
het uitvoeren van een actie (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014) en aan proactieve 
controle (zie inleiding en hoofdstuk 2). Echter, in een recente studie toonden 
we aan dat beloning ook een positieve invloed kan hebben op reactieve 
responsinhibitie (in een situatie waarbij geen cues betrokken zijn). Hierbij 
vonden we snellere responsinhibitie (verminderde SSRTs) wanneer de kleur 
van het stop-signaal te kennen gaf dat er geld kon gewonnen worden bij het 
succesvol weerhouden van een respons (Boehler et al., 2012). Bovendien 
verhoogde de activatie in het ‘responsinhibitienetwerk’ in deze 
beloningsgerelateerde stop trials. Hoewel dit duidt op toegenomen reactieve 
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controle, gingen we in hoofdstuk 4 verder na of onderliggende proactieve 
controleprocessen effectief uitgesloten zijn in dit paradigma. Hiervoor 
registreerden we EEG terwijl proefpersonen een belonende stop-signaal taak 
uitvoerden waarin belonende stops afgewisseld werden met niet-belonende 
stops (belonend blok) en een gelijkaardige stop-signaal taak waarin geen 
enkele trial beloond werd (niet-belonend blok). We vonden evidentie voor 
het idee van toenemende reactieve controle in belongingstrials, maar ook 
bleek dat een proactieve strategie werd geïmplementeerd waarin 
proefpersonen strategisch zochten naar de beloningsgereleateerde kleur  en 
dat algemene proactieve aandacht gestegen was in het belonend blok. Dus, 
we concludeerden dat proactieve controleprocessen ook een rol kunnen 
spelen wanneer er geen cue aanwezig is en dus mogelijks reactieve 
controleprocessen ondersteunen om tot een optimaal resultaat te komen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 gingen we verder met het bestudeerden van de 
onderliggende processen van responsinhibitie. Voornamelijk de 
neurotransmittor noradrenaline zou een belangrijke rol spelen in het 
annuleren van een actie. Zo werd aangetoond dat wanneer noradrenerge 
concentraties  in het brein werden verhoogd door middel van medicatie, dan 
verbeterde ook de inhibitiegerelateerde performantie in de stop-signaal taak 
(Bari et al., 2009; Humby et al., 2013; Linssen et al., 2012; see also Eagle et 
al., 2008). We trachtten deze hypothese verder te onderbouwen door 
epileptische patiënten met een ‘vagus nerve stimulator’ (VNS) de stop-
signaal taak te laten uitvoeren. VNS zou immers het aantal epileptische 
aanvallen verminderen voornamelijk door het activeren van noradrenerge 
neuronen in the locus coeruleus (Fornai et al., 2011). We vonden dat 
patiënten die het meeste effect hadden van de behandeling (grootste 
vermindering in het aantal aanvallen na VNS implantatie) ook de grootste 
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voordelige effecten in inhibitie (vermindering in SSRTs) vertoonden 
wanneer VNS was ingeschakeld. Bovendien impliceerde de 
elektrofysiologische data dat stop-signalen iets eerder visueel verwerkt 
werden en meer reactieve inhibitie betrokken was wanneer de vagus zenuw 
gestimuleerd werd. Deze resultaten bieden verdere evidentie voor de rol van 
noradrenaline in responsinhibitie en duiden op een potentieel positief 
neurocognitief effect van VNS voornamelijk bij patiënten die reeds het 
meest therapeutische voordeel hebben. 
ALGEMENE DISCUSSIE 
In het huidige proefschrift trachtten we de onderliggende processen 
betrokken in reactieve en proactieve controle te onderscheiden aan de hand 
van EEG. Bovendien bestudeerden we de effecten van motivatie op beide 
cognitieve processen. In de eerste twee studies benadrukten we het belang 
van cognitieve voorbereiding als een functie van proactieve controle en 
toonden we aan dat beloning hier positieve effecten op kan hebben. Verder 
bevestigden we de rol van noradrenaline en beloning in responsinhibitie en 
toonden we aan dat proactieve en reactieve controle waarschijnlijk kunnen 
samenwerken om vooropgestelde doelen zo goed mogelijk te bereiken. 
In onze studies manipuleerde we motivatie voornamelijk door middel 
van beloning (geld). Echter, we gaan ervan uit dat andere motivators zoals 
straf (en ook intrinsieke factoren) kunnen leiden tot vergelijkbare effecten. 
Zo is reeds aangetoond dat het vermijden van straf ook een positieve invloed 
kan hebben op cognitieve controle, vaak in gelijkaardige mate als beloning  
(Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Engelmann et al., 2009; Krawczyk & 
D’Esposito, 2013; Savine & Braver, 2010; Small et al., 2005). Bovendien 
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wordt de anticipatie van straf en beloning gerelateerd aan activatie in zeer 
gelijkaardige hersengebieden (Carter et al., 2009; Krawczyk & D’Esposito, 
2013). Dus zowel (de anticipatie van) beloning als straf kunnen fungeren als 
motivators om meer controle uit te voeren waarschijnlijk via zeer 
gelijkaardige mechanismen (zoals het verhogen van top-down aandacht). 
Verder vermoeden we ook dat het effect van motivatie niet beperkt is tot 
mentale inspanning (zie hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3)  maar waarschijnlijk 
ook betrekking heeft op fysieke inspanning. Dit komt overeen met een studie 
van Schmidt et al. (2012) die suggereert dat cognitieve en fysieke inspanning 
beroepen op een gemeenschappelijk motivationeel centrum (zoals het 
striatum en/of de anterieure cingulate cortex) dat vervolgens taak-specifieke 
hersenregio’s aanstuurt.  
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 impliceren dat wanneer iemand meer 
gemotiveerd is om een taak tot een goed einde te brengen deze hiervoor ook 
meer moeite zal doen. Bovendien vonden we in hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3 
elektrofyisologische evidentie voor het idee dat correcte feedback meer 
geapprecieerd wordt in een moeilijke taak en dit voornamelijk wanneer de 
uitkomst positief is, d.i. beloning gewonnen of straf vermeden kan worden 
(zie ook Ma et al., 2014), consistent met de ‘effort justification hypothesis’ 
(zie de cognitieve dissonantie theorie van Festinger, 1957). Deze 
bevindingen zijn overeenkomstig met studies die hebben aangetoon dat 
dopaminegerelateerde subcorticale en corticale gebieden een verhoogde 
activatie vertonen wanneer iemand meer inspanning moet leveren om zijn of 
haar doelen te bereiken (e.g. Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012; 
Kurniawan et al., 2011; Vassena et al., 2014). Dit is echter tegengesteld aan 
het ‘effort-discounting’ idee waarbij wordt verondersteld dat inspanning 
negatief is en beloning wordt gedevalueerd naar mate men er meer 
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inspanning voor moet leveren. Dit principe werd ondersteund door studies 
die vonden dat dopaminegerelateerde corticale en subcorticale 
hersengebieden meer geactiveerd zijn wanneer minder inspanning nodig is 
om eenzelfde beloning te verkrijgen (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et 
al., 2009). Of er evidentie gevonden wordt voor effort-discounting of voor 
gemotiveerde inspanning hangt waarschijnlijk af van bepaalde factoren, 
waarbij gemotiveerde inspanning voornamelijk een rol speelt op het moment 
dat men zich kan voorbereiden voor een bepaalde taak, waarbij deze 
voorbereiding bepalend is voor het bereiken van een doel en dus het resultaat 
afhangt van de prestatie op de taak (zoals in hoofdstuk 2). 
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 konden we dankzij elektrofysiologische data 
aantonen dat zowel proactieve als reactieve controle van belang zijn binnen 
eenzelfde paradigma. Proactieve controleprocessen in de stop-signaal taak 
worden gereflecteerd door de mate van aandacht voor of verwerking van de 
stimulus. Zo werd reeds geïmpliceerd dat wanneer het stop-signaal beter 
verwerkt wordt er meer kans is op succesvolle inhibitie (Bekker et al., 2005; 
Boehler et al., 2009; Verbruggen et al., 2014). Wij vonden echter niet dat er 
een verschil was in sensorische verwerking van het stop-signaal in 
succesvolle en gefaalde stop trials. Wel werd het stop-signaal beter verwerkt 
wanneer motivatie hoog was (zie hoofdstuk 4) en iets eerder verwerkt 
wanneer VNS ingeschakeld was (zie hoofdstuk 5). Hoewel er wat 
onduidelijkheid bestaat over welke ERP componenten nu precies reactieve 
responsinhibitie reflecteren, tonen onze resultaten aan dat een specifieke 
component (de frontale stop P3) gelijkaardige (maar niet identieke) 
resultaten vertoont als de gedragsmatige reactieve inhibitiemaat (SSRT) en 
deze suggereerden dat meer reactieve inhibitie geïmplementeerd wordt 
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wanneer iemand gemotiveerd is (hoofdstuk 4), en ook wanneer 
noradrenalineconcentraties verhoogd zijn door VNS (hoofdstuk 5). 
Hoewel we aantoonden dat proactieve en reactieve controle in 
dezelfde taak een rol kunnen spelen (zie hoofdstuk 4), blijft het noodzakelijk 
om een directe link tussen beide vormen van controle vast te stellen. 
Bovendien is het nog steeds onduidelijk op welke manier proactieve en 
reactieve controle interageren. Zo werd er enerzijds verondersteld dat 
wanneer meer proactieve controle uitgeoefend wordt minder reactieve 
controle nodig is tijdens het uitvoeren van de taak (Chikazoe et al., 2009; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2011) en anderzijds zou meer proactieve controle kunnen 
leiden tot meer activatie in het reactieve controlenetwerk om tot optimale 
resultaten te komen (Rosell-Negre et al., 2014; zie ook hoofdstuk 4). 
Toekomstig onderzoek is dus nodig om een antwoord op deze fundamentele 
vragen te kunnen bieden. 
CONCLUSIE 
In dit proefschrift toonden we aan dat proactieve en reactieve controle 
belangrijke functies zijn die beide beïnvloed kunnen worden door motivatie 
(waarschijnlijk via fluctuaties in het dopaminerge systeem). Het 
noradrenerge modulatorische systeem lijkt echter voornamelijk betrokken in 
reactieve responsinhibitie. De resultaten impliceren bovendien ook dat beide 
vormen van cognitieve controle elkaar niet uitsluiten en waarschijnlijk zelfs 
samenwerken om het beste resultaat te kunnen bereiken. 
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